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Abstract
This dissertation aims to analyze aggregate consequences of mar-
ket imperfections. In particular, it is interested in the effects of capital
market imperfections and contracting constraints on the efficiency of
the allocation and, subsequently, the prospects for growth.
In the first chapter, lotteries are introduced into the framework of
Galor and Zeira (1993). This is a growth model with imperfect capital
markets and indivisible investment permitting an individual poverty
trap. Allowing for lotteries leads to a quite remarkable overturn of
the original result: more severe capital market imperfections may in-
crease aggregate consumption in finite time. Intuitively, whenever
lotteries dominate an imperfect capital market as a means of capi-
tal allocation, increasing the relative attractiveness of lotteries also
increases allocative efficiency.
The second chapter of this dissertation analyzes the effects of
intra-firm bargaining on the formation of firms under imperfect cap-
ital markets and contracting constraints. In equilibrium, wealth in-
equality induces a heterogenous distribution of firm sizes allowing for
firms both too small and too large in terms of technical efficiency.
The findings connect well to empirical facts as the missing middle of
size distributions in less developed countries. The model is able to
encompass a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and ag-
gregate wealth, providing a theoretical framework for policy analysis
of foreign aid and investment.
The last chapter finds that non-transferabilities of utility in mar-
kets, caused by e.g. contracting constraints, may induce inefficient
incentives for non-contractible investments taking place prior to mar-
kets. The timing of markets with respect to the investment affects
their efficiency. Applying this results to a model of education choice
and labor markets we find that markets opening only after agents
have invested may exhibit inefficient over-education whereas markets
that open only prior to investment do not. Hence, enforcing ex post
markets by e.g. prolonging compulsory schooling, may lead to over-
education and inefficient labor market allocations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Still the invisible hand by which markets smoothly and efficiently co-
ordinate productive activity in economies looms large over economic
theory. As this classical view holds, competition in markets provide
economic agents with the correct opportunity cost as to induce so-
cially efficient decisions by rational individual decision makers. As
a corollary then markets solve the problem of allocating any given
good as long as there exists a price for it.
However, in practice markets are prone to frictions. Numerous
imperfections impede the flawless coordination of economic activity
by markets and distort market prices. To name but a few exam-
ples, asymmetric information may prevent the formation of a market
price, thus leading to a market breakdown (Akerlof, 1970). A lack of
well-defined property rights may cause the invisible hand to stagger
as externalities invalidate the first welfare theorem (Coase, 1960).
Access to markets may depend on agents’ characteristics, thus ne-
glecting some resources in the coordination process, the classical task
of markets. To what extend is then a theoretical approximation of
the world that relies on perfect markets meaningful?
The relevance of any theory hinges, of course, mainly on whether
or not it is capable of providing adequate explanations for empirical
facts. A brief glance at the empirical literature on the role of market
imperfections might prove illuminating at this stage. Less developed
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countries are of primary concern as these economies are widely held to
be affected particularly severely by market frictions that violate the
assumptions of classical theory. Hence, they should be expected to be
the first place to encounter large scale deviations from the predictions
of classical theory.
One of the most thoroughly explored fields in this respect is the
market for loans. Banerjee (2002) collects some stylized facts from
the empirical literature on this topic. Typically, the borrowing in-
terest rate is significantly higher than the lending interest rate – a
finding that is by no means limited to less developed countries – al-
though default rates are generally low. This is in striking contrast to
the assumption of perfect markets where the law of one price should
hold. Indeed, empirical findings go further than this in that consid-
erable heterogeneity in firms’ cost of capital is observed even when
the projects being financed do not appear to vary. For instance, it is
frequently reported that richer people borrow at lower rates of inter-
est. Interestingly, another common finding is that loans are generally
taken in order to finance productive activity, so that a wedge in the
cost of capital between agents indeed has the potential to significantly
distort investment decisions in an economy.
Banerjee and Munshi (2004) present an empirical example of how
the aggregate allocation may be affected by market imperfections.
They analyze the knitted garment industry in Tirupur, India. Us-
ing data from a natural experiment they find evidence of significant
mis-allocation of capital in this particular industry. It is possible to
stratify their sample of firms into two separate social communities.
Empirical results point to the fact that capital investment is deter-
mined significantly by a firm’s social community. Firms belonging to
one social community have higher investment rates and lower produc-
tivity compared to the other social community. This distortion may
be attributable to different levels of access to suppliers, customers,
or credit markets, the last explanation being favored by the authors.
Given that at the time of observation Tirupur produced about 70%
of India’s knitted garment exports and the firm population was split
roughly equally into both communities, the mis-allocation of capital
9found in the study had indeed a sizable effect in aggregate terms.
Field (2003) analyzes the impact of property rights on labor mar-
kets. She uses data from Peru benefitting from a natural experiment
when the government granted property titles to a vast number of ur-
ban squatters. The study finds that in the course of the governmental
program total labor supply from the treated households increased by
approximately one household member while the probability of work-
ing at home decreased by a substantial amount. A tentative ex-
planation for these results is that some household members had to
physically guard their home before the titling but were free to seek
work outside their home, thereby profiting from the legal security of
their premises. Likewise, Besley (1995) provides some evidence that
the quality of property rights on land positively affects investment in
capital in Ghana.
These examples construct a powerful argument not only that mar-
kets are indeed imperfect but also that these imperfections are rel-
evant for the aggregate allocation. This view is shared by Banerjee
and Duflo (2004) who demonstrate the shortcomings of neglecting
market imperfections in growth models. They highlight the inability
of neoclassical growth theory to explain differences in factor produc-
tivity both within and across economies by means of a comparison of
the US and India.
Consequently, it is of considerable interest to provide insights into
the functioning of economies when markets are subject to frictions
and imperfections. This dissertation aims to provide a contribution
to this analysis focussing on three particular settings where market
frictions are relevant in the sense that they determine aggregate al-
location. In one setup credit market imperfections combined with
indivisible investments generate increasing returns to wealth. Yet
imperfect markets may be crowded out by other imperfect means of
capital allocation, in particular by lotteries, for instance in the form
of property crimes. In the second framework, contracting constraints
additionally distort investment incentives, thus leading to an ineffi-
cient firm size distribution in the economy. Finally, a reduced form
approach on market imperfections is taken and the optimal timing
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of markets depending on the degree of market imperfection emerges
to be of crucial importance for efficiency. It will become clear in the
course of this analysis that in all of these settings the nature of market
imperfections crucially affects the aggregate outcome and therefore
also policy implications.
Galor and Zeira Go Gambling
In the first chapter, ”Galor and Zeira Go Gambling“, lotteries are
introduced into the framework of Galor and Zeira (1993), a growth
model with imperfect capital markets and indivisible investment per-
mitting an individual poverty trap. Although agents are averse to
risk, admitting for lotteries leads to a quite remarkable overturn of
the result in the original work. Not only does the poverty trap vanish
for a broad class of parameters, but also more severe capital mar-
ket imperfections may increase aggregate consumption in finite time.
Moreover, the poverty trap may be eliminated by increasing market
frictions. The intuition is that whenever lotteries dominate an im-
perfect capital market as a means of allocation of capital, increasing
the relative attractiveness of lotteries increases allocative efficiency.
A natural interpretation for the opportunity to gamble is, of
course, conflict. The outcome of conflict is not deterministic and
the higher the relative strength of a party, the more likely is suc-
cess. Eventually, the winner is able to take over the loser’s resources.
The model then predicts social segregation of the economy into poor,
crime-infested communities and rich, relatively secure communities
which appears to describe the empirical evidence quite concisely.
Inequality and Firm Size Distribution
The second chapter of this dissertation, ”Inequality, Incomplete Con-
tracts, and the Size Distribution of Business Firms“, analyzes the for-
mation of firms and the resulting firm size distributions in economies
with imperfect capital markets and contracting constraints. Both
types of frictions are likely to prevail in less developed countries.
When labor contracts are incomplete in the sense that they can be
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renegotiated at any time, intra-firm bargaining over the joint profit
induces firm owners to expand their firm beyond a well-defined tech-
nically efficient size (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996). Capital market im-
perfections drive a wedge between the capital cost of rich and poor
agents thus inducing relatively poor firm owners to choose too small
firm sizes. Hence, in equilibrium wealth inequality induces a het-
erogenous distribution of firm sizes allowing simultaneously for firms
both too small and too large.
The results of the model connect well to empirical facts as the
missing middle of firm size distributions in less developed countries
and evidence of high volatility of productivity among firms within
the same industry in developing economies. Moreover, the model is
able to encompass a non-monotonic relationship between inequality
and aggregate wealth. While in capital rich economies income in-
equality decreases as output increases, for capital scarce economies
higher output may be associated with higher inequality. Thus, a
valid theoretical framework is provided for policy analysis of foreign
aid and investment. Indeed, foreign direct investment may hurt an
economy as sufficiently wealthy foreign investors need not be affected
by the capital market imperfection and then extend firms beyond the
efficient size. General equilibrium effects on wages then may reduce
both efficiency of the firm size distribution and aggregate output.
Markets and the Hold-up Problem
The last chapter, ”Too much Competition: On the Role of Markets
in the Hold-up Problem“, takes a more abstract approach to address
the question of whether market imperfections are relevant for aggre-
gate outcomes. The classical hold-up problem (see Klein et al., 1978,
Williamson, 1975) is revisited where ex-post bargaining over profits
from ex-ante non-contractible investments distorts incentives to in-
vest. Recent inquiries in this topic have shown that perfect markets
may solve this problem since the market price then fully reflects the
social returns to the investment (Cole et al., 2001, Felli and Roberts,
2002). Given the load of the evidence, it is a natural question whether
this theoretical finding still holds true once non-transferabilities of
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utility are taken into consideration. These might stem for instance
from contracting constraints, imperfect capital markets or asymmet-
ric information.
It emerges that under non-transferabilities of utility markets can
no longer be expected to induce efficient incentives for non-contractible
investments taking place prior to markets. The timing of imperfect
markets with respect to the investment appears to be of crucial im-
portance for efficiency of the allocation. For instance, whenever in-
vestments are strategic substitutes and non-transferabilities are suf-
ficiently severe, markets that open prior to the investment dominate
ex post markets in terms of efficiency. Moreover, the efficient timing
of markets may reverse as the market frictions decrease thus empha-
sizing that policy implications depend on the institutional shape of
markets. Applying this result to a model of education choice and
labor markets with cost-sharing contracts, it turns out that markets
opening only after agents have invested may exhibit over-education
whereas markets that open only prior to investment provide a more ef-
ficient allocation. Hence, prolonging compulsory schooling, and thus
effectively opening an ex post market, may lead to over-education
and inefficient labor market allocations.
Chapter 2
Lotteries, Inequality, and
Market Imperfections: Galor
and Zeira Go Gambling
2.1 Introduction
Rigidities in credit markets are widely held to be obstacles for sus-
tainable growth. Thus, policy advice commonly focuses on reducing
existing market imperfections in order to achieve long run prosperity.
This is also a feature common to most of the recent literature inquir-
ing into cause and effect of wealth and income inequality (this is the
case in Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Ga-
lor and Zeira (1993), Piketty (1997), and Matsuyama (2000) among
others). Typically in this literature the beneficial effects of the re-
duction of market imperfections are taken for granted. The models
build on two ingredients to analyze the effects of income distributions:
imperfect capital markets and indivisible investments with locally in-
creasing returns to scale. The first ingredient has the side effect that
reducing market imperfections improves efficiency. However, in this
chapter this need not be the case and such policy may put in danger
long term growth prospects.
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Concerning the second ingredient, it is well-known that invest-
ment indivisibilities may induce even risk averse agents to demand
fair lotteries, an idea that was put forward as early as in Friedman
(1953). The indivisibility gives rise to a jump in lifetime income with
respect to initial wealth which in turn leads to a non-concavity in
lifetime utility. However, it is possible to render the lifetime utility
function concave by introducing a suitable lottery, as was pointed
out by Ng (1965) in the context of indivisible consumption choice.
As a consequence, agents in the neighborhood of the non-concavity,
although being averse to risk, prefer participating in the lottery to
their certain income.
Given the unbroken demand for lotteries in the world’s economies
it is hard to argue they are not involved in economic decision mak-
ing. In a recent study (Garrett, 2001) it is found that substantial
amounts of income are invested in gambling activities in countries
all over the world. Moreover, it appears that lottery consumption
is prevalent especially among the poor (see for instance the studies
on state lotteries by Worthington, 2001, Scott and Garen, 1993). It
is noteworthy that this does not include the more subtle shifting of
activities towards more risky ones on the individual level. Moreover,
lotteries are evidently involved in the capital accumulation of credit
constrained individuals. Besley et al. (1993) find ample evidence for
so called random rotating saving and credit associations. Thus it
appears quite justified to consider the possibility of gambling in eco-
nomic modeling.
In this chapter we look at the model of Galor and Zeira (1993) and
analyze the effects of the admission of endowment lotteries. In their
setting this may lead to a different dynamic behavior of the model
economy. In particular, we are concerned with whether both the two
stable steady states found by them still will prevail. We are able to
show that the introduction of lotteries always leads to an instanta-
neous Pareto improvement and we provide a condition to ensure that
this is sustainable. Then we analyze the steady state behavior and
show under which circumstances the poverty trap emerging in the
original work vanishes. It turns out that for a broad parameter range
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this indeed is the case. In some cases this depends on the scope for
moral hazard in the economy being sufficiently great. In contrast to
the original results, we come to the conclusion that in these cases
amplifying market rigidities may improve welfare and eliminate the
poverty trap.
In fact, if the scope for moral hazard on the borrowers’ side rises,
so does the spread between the lending and borrowing interest rate,
thus rationing credits more strictly. Therefore more people prefer
gambling to borrowing in spite of the uncertainty. Thus, as mar-
ket conditions deteriorate, lotteries crowd out credits and it becomes
more likely that the redistribution and accumulation of initial endow-
ments by means of lotteries puts winners on the growth path towards
the high income steady state. Furthermore, lotteries prove to be
rather efficient from a long run point of view. This result indicates
that reducing existing capital market frictions always runs the risk of
creating or cementing a poverty trap in the presence of lotteries.
In an extension we note that a natural way to encounter oppor-
tunities for randomization over different income levels is given by
predatory or criminal activities. Suppose agents are able to attempt
to expropriate other agents, and the outcome of such a conflict has
a random component, such that the probability of success depends
positively on an agent’s endowments devoted to conflict. Then the
opportunity to engage in expropriation is effectively interpretable as
a lottery. However, conflict in the sense of fighting typically wastes
resources. Extending the model to costly lotteries yields similar con-
clusions provided lotteries are not too wasteful.
This chapter is related to the work of Garratt and Marshall (1994)
who examine a static setting and find that the optimal social contract
to provide education has the form of a lottery, similar to the one
emerging in this chapter. However, they assume the absence of a
market for credits to finance human capital acquisition. Our results
show that in the Galor and Zeira (1993) framework there exist cases
where allowing people to gamble leads to a complete breakdown of
the credit market and that this may actually be desirable. To some
extent this might provide a motivation for the assumption and for
16 CHAPTER 2. GALOR AND ZEIRA GO GAMBLING
the results of Garratt and Marshall.
The development economics literature provides a similar finding
in the contribution of Ghatak et al. (2001). However, their result is
driven by the theorem of the second best whereas the results in this
chapter do not depend on the presence of multiple imperfect markets.
Ghatak et al. (2001) look at a Banerjee and Newman (1993) style
setting where young agents may exert effort to overcome borrowing
constraints in order to earn entrepreneurial rents when old. Both
the labor market determining effort choice and the capital market
are imperfect in the sense that there is moral hazard and transaction
cost. Their paper finds that increasing transaction cost may lead to
higher aggregate income in the long run. The intuition is that greater
income inequality due to more severe market imperfections increases
incentives for young agents to choose high effort. As there is under-
investment in effort due to the labor market imperfections, greater
scope for moral hazard in the credit market may partially offset the
under-investment problem and improve welfare.
This chapter proceeds by presenting the model framework and
some preliminaries of our analysis in sections 2 and 3. Section 4 an-
alyzes the dynamic implications of lotteries and section 5 conducts a
welfare analysis. An application of the model is considered in section
6, while section 7 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We begin by briefly restating the underlying model of Galor and
Zeira (1993). In the model economy agents live for two periods in
overlapping generations. When young, an individual may acquire
human capital at a cost h or work unskilled for a low wage wn. When
old, an agent either works skilled earning the high wage ws if he
invested in human capital, or he works unskilled. Agents are assumed
to have ’warm-glow’ preferences that give rise to the utility function
u = α ln c+ (1− α) ln b,
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where c denotes second period consumption and b the amount be-
queathed to their offspring. Let x denote the initial endowment of
an agent at the beginning of his life. In the beginning of the econ-
omy these endowments are assumed to be continuously distributed
on [0, L] with L > h.
There exists a credit market where agents can deposit and borrow
in order to finance human capital acquisition. It is assumed that the
deposit world market interest rate 1 + r is determined exogenously
because agents live in a small open economy.1 However, there exists
moral hazard on the side of the borrowers, namely the possibility to
default on purpose. Lenders may monitor borrowers at cost z, but
the latter may choose to default deliberately even if monitored - al-
though facing a cost βz, β > 1. One way to interpret this is that
there is a lack of enforceability of contracts due to the institutional,
in particular legal, framework. In the model there exists an incentive
compatible debt contract making borrowers indifferent between de-
faulting and paying back the debt. It requires the borrowing interest
rate 1 + i to be strictly greater than 1 + r. In the capital market
equilibrium (1 + i) = (1 + r) ββ−1 . This creates the rigidity in the
credit market. We define the interest rate spread as
γ ≡ β
β − 1 .
It is quite natural to interpret γ as the scope for moral hazard in the
economy. As β approaches 1 and the cost of purposeful defaulting de-
creases, γ increases and as γ approaches 1 the moral hazard problem
disappears.
Utility maximization of agents shows that individuals separate
into three categories. The first are those agents who prefer to work
unskilled both periods thereby earning (1 + r)x+ (2 + r)wn. Agents
are born with x and earn wn in the first period of their life and
lend this in the capital market. In the second period they earn wn
again, consume and bequeath. But there exists an endowment point
1This exogeneity is not crucial to our findings. If decreasing demand for loans
induces a decline in the lending interest rate and there exists a a costless storage
technology, this would render the results of this model even more pronounced.
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such that lifetime income from unskilled working coincides with the
lifetime income from borrowing in the first period and working skilled
in the second. Equating lifetime incomes yields this point denoted
by f :
f =
1
i− r [(2 + r)wn + (1 + i)h− ws]
So, all individuals with x < f prefer unskilled working. The second
category of individuals consists of all agents with f ≤ x < h who
borrow and work skilled earning (1 + i)(x − h) + ws. Finally, all
agents with endowments x ≥ h need not borrow to acquire human
capital, work skilled, and have lifetime income (1 + r)(x − h) + ws.
This characterizes fully the agents’ equilibrium behavior: in any given
period t every old individual bequeathes a fixed share (1− α) of his
lifetime income to his offspring because of ’warm-glow’ preferences.
These bequests become the next generation’s endowments xt+1. Then
there may arise an interesting case permitting figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The bequest function without lotteries
The individuals’ bequest function in period t depending on this
period’s endowments xt has two stable steady states. One at xn and
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another one at xs.2 In the former, people work unskilled and do not
wish to undergo education because of the credit market rigidity. In
the latter agents work skilled, as they receive sufficient bequests from
their parents and do not need to borrow. A third, unstable, steady
state separates the agents who will end up rich from those who go
into poverty. It is denoted by g and given by the following expression.
g =
(1− α)[(1 + i)h− ws]
(1 + i)(1− α)− 1 . (2.1)
It now appears appropriate to state the assumptions that are
needed in the original work to achieve this dynamic behavior of the
economy:
Assumption A 2.1 In the original work it is assumed that the fol-
lowing holds:
(i) (2 + r)wn + (1 + r)h ≤ ws < (1 + r)γh,
(ii) (1− α)(1 + r) < 1 < (1− α)(1 + i), and
(iii) xs > g > xn > 0.
The first assumption is needed in order to ensure the separation of
agents into the three groups. The other two are crucial for the dy-
namics and admit figure 2.1. Note that (iii) implies g > f > xn and
(1−α)ws > h. They have to hold to ensure that the lifetime income
curve in fact intersects the 45◦ line three times thus permitting the
three steady states xn, g, and xs. These assumptions already imply
that the case Galor and Zeira analyze is characterized by a fairly high
scope for moral hazard γ and a sufficiently high bequest ratio (1−α).
Below it will be of considerable interest how the individuals’ well
being is affected by changes in the scope for moral hazard. In order to
analyze this, it suffices to examine the points f and g. An individual
with endowment f is indifferent between borrowing and investing in
human capital and unskilled working. Note that f increases as the
2We will refer to the first one using the term unskilled worker equilibrium or
low income steady state, and to the second by skilled worker equilibrium or high
income steady state.
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scope for moral hazard grows, meaning that the measure of people
earning an unskilled worker’s wage increases as f moves to the right.
Now we turn our attention towards the unstable steady state g, which
separates the two growth paths found in the original work. Also g
is found to be increasing in γ, thus implying that the measure of
individuals choosing the growth path towards the unskilled worker
equilibrium increases in the scope for moral hazard.3
As g and f increase in the scope for moral hazard this means that
the fraction of both the people who find it profitable to acquire human
capital and work skilled and those who choose the growth path to
the high income steady state decreases. The former implies that the
aggregate income curve shifts downwards in a period of an increase of
the degree of moral hazard. The latter means that aggregate income
from steady state endowments decreases as probability mass is shifted
to the low income steady state. Thus, without lotteries the presence
of moral hazard is unambiguously socially wasteful.
2.3 Preliminary Results
In this section we allow for lotteries in the original model’s setting,
characterize the optimal lotteries, and discuss some of their proper-
ties. To be precise, we are looking for the lottery preferred by all
agents in the set of fair lotteries over initial endowment levels. A
fair lottery means in this context that a lottery ticket costs its ex-
pected value. The first observation is that an adequate lottery, i.e. a
convex combination of different utility levels, should render the life-
time utility function concave as shown in Figure 2.2. Graphically, we
are interested in the convex hull of the lifetime utility function and
particularly in the linear part of the convex hull. This is in fact the
optimal actuarially fair lottery for all agents.4 Note that between the
points of tangency, say between endowments x∗ and x∗+y∗, the con-
3Both statements can be verified by inspection of the first derivatives.
4A thorough analysis of the general underlying problem including a result on
Pareto optimality of the tangential lottery can be found in Marshall (1984) or in
Garratt and Marshall (1994).
2.3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 21
vex combination of the respective utility levels is higher than utility
from certain income. Hence, individuals with endowments between
the points of tangency prefer to have a certain income of x∗ and to
invest their remaining wealth in the lottery. Individuals outside the
non-concavity region do not wish to gamble.
Figure 2.2: An interior solution tangential lottery
To find a Pareto optimal lottery, one has to look for the tangent
to both the function Un(x) = ln((2 + r)wn + (1 + r)x) for 0 < x ≤ f
and the function Us(x) = ln(ws+(1+ i)(x−h)) for f < x < h. From
x = h onwards the lifetime utility function changes into ln((1+r)(x−
h) + ws) which is flatter than Us and Un. That means the second
point of tangency cannot correspond to endowments greater than h,
i.e. x+y ≤ h. The second property of the tangent is that it connects
the points Un(x∗) and Us(x∗ + y∗). That is, it must hold that:
Un(x∗) +
∂Un(x∗)
∂x
y∗ = Us(x∗ + y∗) and
∂Un(x∗)
∂x
=
∂Us(x∗ + y∗)
∂x
(2.2)
These are two equations in two unknowns having a unique solution.
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Uniqueness follows from strict concavity of the utility function and
existence additionally from inequality of the income slopes (1 + r) <
(1+ i). The first case, which we will call the interior solution, is that
the unique solution to (2.2), (x∗, y∗), lies in the feasible set defined
by:
(x∗, y∗) ∈
{
(x, y) : −2 + r
1 + r
wn < x ≤ f ; 0 ≤ x+ y ≤ h
}
(2.3)
Then solving the system yields the expressions for x∗ and y∗:
Lemma 2.1 The interior solution optimal lottery for x∗+y∗ < h is
given by:
y∗ = h+
2 + r
1 + r
wn − ws1 + i and
x∗ =
(1 + i)h− ws + (1− ln(γ))γ(2 + r)wn
(1 + i) ln(γ)
with the property x∗+y∗ > f .
This fully characterizes the optimal lottery and the set of agents
who want to participate. It is a raffle paying out a fixed prize y∗
and participants buy their desired winning probability. Individuals
invest an amount x of their initial endowments in lottery tickets and
receive in return the probability xy of winning the prize y.
5 This is
preferred by all agents with endowments x ∈ (x∗, x∗+y∗) easily to
be seen in Figure 2.2. These individuals wish to invest x−x∗ of their
endowments in lottery tickets.
As Assumption 1.(i) postulates that (1+i)h > ws, it must be true
that y∗ > 2+r1+rwn > 0. This implies that there always exists a variety
of endowment levels such that agents are better off participating in
the lottery, namely all x ∈ (max{x∗; 0};x∗+y∗). Note that x∗ may be
negative implying that all the poor prefer the lottery. Additionally,
it holds that x∗ < f and x∗ + y∗ > f , so all lottery winners invest
5This lottery is analogous to the one described in Friedman (1953), footnote
13. Note that this lottery is equivalent to one paying out x∗ to the losers and
x∗+y∗ to the winners and minimum investment of x∗. Then all individuals with
x ∈ (x∗, y∗+x∗) would want to invest all their wealth in the lottery.
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in human capital and become skilled workers and all losers become
unskilled workers.
If the unique solution of the equation system is not contained in
the feasible set (2.3), the point of tangency to Us(x) is to the right of
endowment h. In this case, which we will call the corner solution6,
it must hold that:
x∗ + y∗ = h and
(1 + r)y∗
(1 + r)x∗ + (2 + r)wn
+ ln((1 + r)x∗ + (2 + r)wn) = ln(ws)
which can be rearranged to yield
Lemma 2.2 The corner solution optimal lottery is given by:
y∗ = ln
(
wS
(1+r)x∗ + (2+r)wn
)
(1+r)x∗ + (2+r)wn
1 + r
with x∗+y∗ = h
If there is a corner solution and winners’ endowments after the lot-
tery are equal to h this corresponds to a situation where the market
for educational loans collapses as all agents in need of capital choose
to gamble. Thus lotteries may crowd out loans up to a complete
breakdown of the credit market. Clearly, in this case the interval
(x∗, x∗ + y∗) is non-empty, too. This means that there are always
endowment levels for which it is profitable to participate in the lot-
tery. Then some agents are better off gambling while the other agents
behave as in the original work, so we can state the following prelim-
inary:
Lemma 2.3 In the setting of Galor and Zeira there always exists
a fair lottery with a prize y∗ such that a non-empty set of agents
characterized by their initial wealth x ∈ (x∗;x∗ + y∗) participates.
This leads to a Pareto improvement from an ex ante point of view.
Moreover, we are able to state a property of the solution to (2.2)
that will be very useful in the further course of the paper. Indeed,
6As a matter of fact there is another corner solution at x∗ = 0. Because this
case does not alter our results at all, for notational convenience we will limit our
attention without loss of generality to cases where x∗ ≥ 0.
24 CHAPTER 2. GALOR AND ZEIRA GO GAMBLING
the corner solution is the limit of the interior solution as the degree
of moral hazard γ increases.
Lemma 2.4 An interior solution (x∗, y∗) of the system of equations
(1) converges to the corner solution as the scope for moral hazard
increases. In the case of an interior solution x∗ and y∗ increase with
moral hazard.
Proof: In Appendix.
With an optimal lottery there appear to be two ways of human
capital acquisition in the model. Firstly by paying h, which applies
to the rich individuals. Secondly by buying a lottery ticket which
pays partly for the education for the winners. As noted by Garratt
and Marshall (1994) this bears certain resemblance to a private and
a public schooling sector. Publicly funded schools are financed by
parental income or bequest tax giving each contributor a probabilistic
right of admission with the success probability increasing in parental
income.
2.4 Lotteries and Intergenerational Dy-
namics
It is a natural question whether the instantaneous Pareto improve-
ment is sustainable. Sustainability will be used in this context in
the sense that the lottery winners’ increase in utility carries over to
the next generation putting the entire dynasty on the growth path to
the skilled worker equilibrium with certainty. Winning the lottery at
the beginning of the period changes the winners’ endowments from
xt = x, x∗<x<x∗+y∗ to xt = x∗+y∗. In order to put the winners
on the growth path to xs the point x∗+y∗ must lie to the right of
g. Following the argumentation in Galor and Zeira (1993) the agents
then bequeath more to their offspring than they had themselves af-
ter winning the lottery. This pattern continues for generations and
finally bequests converge to xs. This argumentation gives rise to the
following definition:
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Definition 2.1 Sustainability is said to hold if x∗ + y∗ > g.
Obviously, this implies also that whenever sustainability holds, the
unstable steady state g ceases to exist as people in g prefer playing the
lottery. We will be able to provide a condition to ensure that lucky
gamblers in fact bequeath enough to their offspring in order to put
them on the desirable growth path. Then we look at the robustness
of the low income steady state, i.e. the unskilled worker equilibrium,
and provide conditions for eliminating this steady state. To ensure
that xn is not a steady state, individuals with this endowment must
prefer the optimal lottery to certain income from unskilled working.
This is the case if and only if xn>x∗ which motivates the following
definition:
Definition 2.2 Elimination of the low income steady state is said to
hold if x∗ < xn.
Note that full benefits of the introduction of lotteries arise only if
both sustainability holds and the low income steady state ceases to
be one. In this case the introduction of lotteries not only creates a
Pareto improvement but also erases the presence of a long run poverty
trap at the endowment point xn (see figure 2.1).
Before we begin the analysis of the steady states let us briefly
state the bequest function in the presence of lotteries. It depends
linearly on lifetime income and fully characterizes the dynamics of
the model. As stated in Lemma 2.3, any agent with initial wealth
x ∈ [x∗;x∗ + y∗] (weakly) prefers to participate in the lottery. The
other agents choose to behave as in the original model. This allows
us to write down the individuals’ bequest functions as follows:
xt+1 = (1−α)

((2+r)wn + (1+r)x) for 0 ≤ x < x∗{
((2+r)wn + (1+r)x∗) or
(ws + (x∗+y∗ − h)(1+i)) for x
∗≤ x < x∗+y∗
(ws + (x− h)(1 + i)) for x∗+y∗ ≤ x < h
(ws + (x− h)(1 + r)) for h ≤ x.
With lotteries available the poorest individuals still tend to prefer
the certain income from unskilled working and the rich ones with suf-
ficient endowments to pay the acquisition cost of human capital still
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choose the skilled worker’s income with certainty. And still there may
be some who want to borrow to become skilled workers. Yet there
appear some individuals preferring to gamble, drawn from the mid-
dle income group. Their endowments are almost or just sufficient to
find investing in human capital profitable without lotteries but they
face a high borrowing interest rate due to the moral hazard. Note
that this behavior appears to be consistent with the data collected by
Garrett (2001). He finds in a cross section analysis that gambling ex-
penditure as a percentage of GDP is highest for intermediate income
countries. Elasticity of demand for gambling is positive and appears
to increase for low and intermediate countries whereas it is negative
for high income countries.
2.4.1 Sustainability
Analyzing the individuals’ bequest behavior in the presence of lotter-
ies in the Galor and Zeira setting we are able to state our first result
about the intergenerational dynamics:
Proposition 2.1 For any set of parameters there exists some γˆ such
that for all γ ≥ γˆ, such that the increase in lottery winners’ lifetime
income is sustainable. For γ < γˆ, (i) there exists an interval (h1, h2]
such that for the cost of acquiring human capital h ∈ (h1, h2] sustain-
ability holds, and (ii) there exists an interval [w1, w2) such that for
skilled workers’ wage ws ∈ [w1, w2) sustainability holds.
Proof: Assume parameters h, ws, wn, r, α and γ such that Assump-
tion A2.1 holds. Using Lemma 2.1 and the definition of the point g
from (2.1), the condition x∗ + y∗ − g > 0 can be restated for interior
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solutions7 as:(
ln γ + 1
ln γ
− (1−α)(1 + i)
(1−α)(1 + i)− 1
)[
h− ws
1 + i
]
+
1
ln γ
2+r
1+r
wn > 0
⇔ (1−α)(1 + i)− (ln γ + 1)
ln γ[(1−α)(1 + i)− 1]
[
h− ws
1 + i
]
+
1
ln γ
2+r
1+r
wn > 0
⇔
(
1− ln γ
(1−α)(1 + i)− 1
)[
h− ws
1 + i
]
+
2+r
1+r
wn > 0.
(2.4)
For x∗ + y∗ > g to hold it suffices that the first term in the last
expression is positive. This is the case if:
ln γ + 1
γ
< (1− α)(1 + r).
This shows clearly, as the LHS decreases with γ, that for any set of
parameters there exists always some γˆ sufficiently large such that the
above condition holds for all γ ≥ γˆ.8 The constraints on γ stated in
Assumption 2.1, in particular ws(1+r)h < γ <
1
(1−α)(1+r) , are obviously
consistent with the sufficient condition and the implication. This in
turn implies that if there is sufficient scope for moral hazard, inequal-
ity (2.4) holds and lottery winners’ endowments x∗+y∗ > g after the
lottery took place. Thus, winners are set on the growth path to xs.
As stated in Lemma 2.4, an increase in γ drives the interior solution
towards the corner solution where sustainability holds trivially. It is
thus always the case that there exists some γ sufficiently great such
that lottery winnings are sustainable.
To prove the second part of the proposition we proceed with the
analysis of inequality (2.4). Let 1ln γ <
1
(1−α)(1+i)−1 and the sufficient
condition does not hold. Then x∗ + y∗ > g is equivalent to:
(2 + r)γwn >
(
ln γ
(1− α)(1 + i)− 1 − 1
)
((1 + i)h− ws)(2.5)
7Note that this holds by definition if there is a corner solution to the maxi-
mization problem, i.e. x∗ + y∗ = h.
8Note also that then the LHS of inequality (2.4) increases with γ.
28 CHAPTER 2. GALOR AND ZEIRA GO GAMBLING
where both sides are positive. It cannot be concluded that this con-
dition generally holds from the Assumption A2.1 alone. However, it
can be easily shown by looking at (2.5) that (i) given all other pa-
rameters there exists hˆ > ws1+i such that for
ws
1+i < h ≤ hˆ, consistent
with Assumption A2.1, condition (2.5) holds, and that (ii) given all
other parameters there exists 0 < wˆs < (1 + i)h such that for all
(1 + i)h > ws ≥ wˆs, consistent with Assumption A2.1, condition
(2.5) holds. On the other hand, if γ happens to be very close to its
lower bound, then the inequality need not hold.9 That means there
are parameter values such that a lottery winner’s income is not sus-
tainable, but there exists always some γ sufficiently high such that
inequality (2.4) holds. 
To sum up, we have shown that in case of an interior solution the
long run effect on lottery winners’ income paths is ambiguous. How-
ever, if the scope for moral hazard captured in the parameter γ is
sufficiently great, sustainability can always be achieved. Sustainabil-
ity trivially holds if there is a corner solution as then lottery winners
have endowments equal to the acquisition cost of human capital.
2.4.2 The Low Income Steady State
The next issue is the robustness of the unskilled worker steady state
found in the original work. Taking into account that lotteries might
change the behavior of the agents situated in that steady state,
namely inducing them to gamble for a better life. Formal analy-
sis shows that this indeed may be the case and the low income steady
state may disappear:
Proposition 2.2 Allowing for lotteries in the setting of Galor and
Zeira the dynamics of the model has the following properties:
(i) In case of an interior solution, xn ceases to be a steady state iff:
ws
(2 + r)wn
> γ
(
(1 + r)h
(2 + r)wn
+ 1− ln γ
1− (1− α)(1 + r)
)
.
9An example where γ is consistent with Assumption A2.1 but sufficiently small
not to induce sustainability can be found in the Appendix.
2.4. LOTTERIES AND INTERGENERATIONAL DYNAMICS 29
This condition tightens in γ for interior solutions.
(ii) In case of a corner solution, xn ceases to be a steady state iff:
(1 + r)h
(2 + r)wn
≤ ln
(
[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]ws
(2 + r)wn
)
1 + (1− α)(1 + r)2
1− (1− α)(1 + r) .
Condition (ii) implies condition (i).
(iii) If condition (ii) holds, then there always exists a γ sufficiently
high, such that lotteries both achieve sustainability and elimi-
nate the low income steady state.
Proof : Writing down Definition 2 as xn − x∗ > 0 leaves us with:
(1− α)(2 + r)wn
1− (1− α)(1 + r) −
1
ln γ
(
h− ws
1 + i
+ (1− ln γ)2 + r
1 + r
wn
)
> 0
⇔ ws
1 + i
− h+ (2 + r)wn
(
(1− α) ln γ
1− (1− α)(1 + r) −
1− ln γ
1 + r
)
> 0
This can be simplified and rearranged to yield the condition in num-
ber (i):
ws
(1 + r)γ
− h+ 2 + r
1 + r
wn
(
ln γ − [1− (1− α)(1 + r)]
1− (1− α)(1 + r)
)
> 0
⇔ ws
(2 + r)wn
> γ
(
(1 + r)h
(2 + r)wn
+ 1− ln γ
1− (1− α)(1 + r)
)
.(2.6)
By closer inspection we find that the RHS of this inequality is
increasing in γ for sufficiently small γ.10 Note that for sufficiently
high γ the corner solution obtains. However, for interior solutions
we know from Lemma 2.4 that x∗ is strictly increasing in γ. This
implies that inequality (2.6) unambiguously tightens as γ increases
for x∗ interior. For corner solutions x∗ remains constant as does x∗.
Turning to the case of a corner solution note that x∗ ≤ xn does
not automatically hold. It is, however, equivalent to the following
10In fact, one can easily show by differentiating the RHS of (2.6) that it has a
maximum for ’small’ γ which may or may not be smaller than the LHS of (2.6).
As γ goes out of bounds the RHS approaches minus infinity.
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weak inequality:
∂Un(xn)
∂x
(h− xn) + Un(xn) ≤ Us(h)
⇔ (1+r)(h− xn)
(1+r)xn + (2+r)wn
− ln
(
ws
(1 + r)xn + (2 + r)wn
)
≤ 0
Note at this point that ln(.) must be strictly positive. Then, applying
the definition of xn to the last expression we obtain:
(1 + r)
[
h− (1−α)(1+r)(2+r)wn1−(1−α)(1+r)
]
(1 + r) (1−α)(2+r)wn1−(1−α)(1+r)
≤ ln
(
[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]ws
(2 + r)wn
)
Getting rid of the fractions and rearranging yields the following ex-
pression:
(1 + r)h[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]− (1 + r)(1− α)(2 + r)wn
(2 + r)wn
≤ ln (.)
This allows us to write down the condition (ii):
(1 + r)h
(2 + r)wn
≤ ln
(
[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]ws
(2 + r)wn
)
1 + (1− α)(1 + r)2
1− (1− α)(1 + r) .
(2.7)
If this inequality holds then the poverty trap vanishes in case of a
corner solution. By Lemma 2.4 we know that x∗ strictly increases
in γ for interior solutions. This means that x∗ is maximal in case
of the corner solution. In contrast to this, xn does not depend on γ
which allows the conclusion that if x∗ ≤ xn for the corner solution
which is equivalent to the last inequality, this must hold for interior
solutions as well. This implies that whenever inequality (2.7) is true,
inequality (2.6) must hold as well.
To show the last part of Proposition 2.2, note first that the corner
solution condition (ii) implies the interior one (i) and, by Lemma 2.4,
the interior solution converges to the corner solution as γ increases.
Together this means (ii) implies that xn ceases to be a steady state
for all levels of moral hazard. Now it is possible to apply Proposition
1. 
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The essence of Proposition 2.2 is to characterize the class of pa-
rameters for which the unskilled worker steady state disappears. Note
that condition (i) becomes less likely to hold as γ increases. This is
quite disappointing given the results in the last subsection, because
there now appears to be a trade-off between sustainability and the
elimination of xn as a steady state. Yet the critical condition is num-
ber (ii) stating under which circumstances the corner solution lottery
induces people with endowment xn to gamble for any scope for moral
hazard. In the following corollary we give a sufficient condition for
this.
Corollary 2.1 A sufficient condition for the elimination of the low
income steady state is given by:
1 ≤ ws + (1 + r)h
ws − (1 + r)h
(2 + r)wn
(1 + r)h
ln
(
[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]ws
(2 + r)wn
)
.
This is implied by using Assumption A2.1.(iii) on condition (ii) in
Proposition 2.2. Note that only wages and education cost enter the
sufficient condition. This means the class of parameter sets consistent
with (ii) appears to contain all the interesting cases, mainly those
where lifetime income from unskilled working is comparable to the
cost of human capital acquisition. It seems that mainly polar cases
of parameter sets, in the sense that one parameter takes an extreme
value compared to the others, violate (ii).
So far, we have shown that there are always agents who demand
lotteries. Then we have characterized the optimal lottery. With
respect to the dynamics of the model it is of considerable interest
whether the optimal lottery leads to a sustainable increase in income
and if it erases the low income steady state. We found in Proposi-
tion 2.1 that the former can always be achieved provided the scope
for moral hazard is great enough. Yet introducing lotteries may or
may not achieve the latter, although in the more plausible classes of
parameter sets the low income steady state is eliminated. In Proposi-
tion 2.2, the critical condition is number (ii). Not only does it imply
number (i), it also determines the circumstances under which moral
hazard in the economy may increase without causing harm. Lotteries
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extend their beneficiary effects fully only if both sustainability holds
and the low income steady state vanishes. Number (ii) in Proposition
2 is a sufficient condition for both of this and thus for the elimina-
tion of the long run poverty trap, given a degree of moral hazard
sufficiently high.
2.5 Welfare Analysis
This section aims to provide an analysis of the effects of moral hazard
on welfare in the long run. It will focus on those individuals who in
fact choose to participate in the lottery. Those who do not gamble
behave as in the original work and can be excluded from a welfare
analysis. Therefore we limit our attention to the gamblers, that is
the individuals who prefer to participate in the lottery given some
degree of moral hazard in the economy. To make the analysis mean-
ingful, we assume that these individuals have positive measure at the
beginning of our analysis. At the beginning of each period the gam-
blers invest all their wealth surpassing x∗ in lottery tickets, so that
the individual winning probability is given by x−x
∗
y∗ . Winners receive
x∗ + y∗, whereas the unlucky ones keep x∗ before deciding whether
to work skilled or unskilled. Losers prefer to work unskilled, whereas
we know from Lemma 2.1 that winners invest in human capital and
work skilled. This means the expected lifetime income IG(x) of a
gambler with endowment x is:
E[IG(x)] =
x− x∗
y∗
((1 + i)(x∗+y∗ − h) + ws) +
+(1− x− x
∗
y∗
)((1+r)x∗ + (2+r)wn)
Then it follows immediately that:
Lemma 2.5 The individual expected income allowing for lotteries is
strictly greater than the certain income without lotteries for almost
all endowment levels among gamblers.
The proof is a straightforward application of Jensen’s inequality
and can be found in the Appendix. Lemma 2.5 holds for any distri-
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bution of endowments and thus for any period t. This implies that
if lotteries are allowed for in any given period, within that period
they move probability mass to the right on the endowment line. If
sustainability holds, this carries over to the following periods. As
individual expected lifetime income is greater with lotteries, so is ag-
gregate lifetime income because the lotteries are actuarially fair and
there is no aggregate uncertainty.
As shown above, it may be the case that allowing for lotteries does
not lead to sustainability but this might be achieved, were there more
scope for moral hazard in the economy. How would the individuals’
well-being be affected then? Note first that all individuals with initial
endowments x ∈ (x∗, h) obviously would face a decrease of utility
if γ increased. By the increase, risk averse agents would be made
worse off in certain income so that they then would prefer a convex
combination of utilities, which they did not before the increase.
Figure 2.3: Increasing the scope for moral hazard
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Assume for now that there is an exogenous deterioration of cap-
ital markets in the economy. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, lotteries
crowd out borrowing as the scope for moral hazard rises. An increase
of γ shifts f to fˆ , so that the optimal lottery before the increase,
given by the flatter dotted line, translates into the steeper dotted
line, characterized by xˆ∗ and yˆ∗. The interval of endowments such
that gambling is preferred extends. Conversely, the interval of en-
dowments such that borrowing is preferred shrinks.
Continuing the welfare analysis, note that because of ’warm glow’
- preferences an increase in utility of the following generations does
not enter the present generation’s utility function. Hence, we have to
focus on future period aggregate utility. We begin by assuming that
in some period t γ rises to the level γˆ where sustainability just holds,
i.e. xˆ∗ + yˆ∗ = gˆ + ,  > 0. Denote the gamblers’ initial conditional
distribution of initial endowments in period t by11
Ft(x) := Ft(xt |x∗t ≤ xt ≤ xˆ∗t + yˆ∗t )
which is assumed to be integrable. Aggregate utility in any period
t+ k is given by
Ut+k =
∫ xs
x∗
EU(I(x))dFt+k(x)
where EU(I(x)) denotes the expected utility of an agent depending
on endowments and Ft+k(x) the period-t + k-distribution of endow-
ments of period-t gamblers. On the one hand, an increase of γ strictly
lowers utility in the same period and may lower aggregate income.
But in the long run, in particular in the steady states, aggregate util-
ity may be higher if there is more scope of moral hazard. We are able
to state the following.
Proposition 2.3 Assume an interior solution lottery, such that sus-
tainability does not hold, i.e. x∗ + y∗ < f . Then a sufficiently great
increase of the scope moral hazard always leads to higher aggregate
utility and income in the economy after finitely many periods if
11All endogenous variables will be denoted by hats for the high moral hazard
case.
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(i) condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2 holds, or
(ii) condition (i) in Proposition 2.2 does not hold, but it holds that∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
xˆ∗
(Ft(g)− Ft(x))dx > 0.
Proof: In Appendix.
Note that conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2.2 are sufficient
conditions for x∗ < xn. Intuitively, part (iii) in Proposition 2.2 or
part (ii) of Proposition 2.3 ensure that y∗ increases sufficiently with
γ so that both sustainability and elimination of the poverty trap can
be obtained. The main point of Proposition 3 is to provide conditions
for sustainability to be more important for long run prospects than
the elimination of the low income steady state. As it turns out, this is
true whenever Proposition 2.(ii) holds which is depicted in Figure 2.3,
independently of the distribution of endowments in the initial period
or, if this is not the case, if there is sufficient probability mass to the
left of the point g. The latter means that if there are many gamblers
with endowments less than g, then sustainability is more important.
Loosely speaking, this happens whenever the poor outnumber the
middle income class individuals.
Yet sustainability may always be achieved by a sufficiently high
scope for moral hazard. The intuition is that borrowing becomes less
attractive and more and more agents prefer gambling to borrowing as
credit market conditions deteriorate and the interest rate spread rises.
Then the prize payed out by the lottery rises and so does lifetime
income of the winners. Thus it becomes more likely that winners
are able to overcome the barrier that separates rags from riches in
the long run. In these cases long term perspectives of the economy
depend positively on the scope for moral hazard. Thus reducing
market imperfections runs the danger of placing the economy on a
growth path towards less aggregate utility, or even of creating the
poverty trap found by Galor and Zeira (1993).
Now consider the case of a corner solution, which implies that
market imperfections are sufficiently severe to cause a credit market
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breakdown, being an Pareto improvement as opposed to the case
without lotteries. If Proposition 3 holds, then this appears to be at
least not harmful if not desirable from a long term point of view.
Here appears a nice connection to the work of Garratt and Marshall
(1994) who analyze a case where the credit market to finance human
capital acquisition is assumed not to exist. In an otherwise very
similar setting they find that an optimal social contract involves a
fixed prize lottery. This chapter might offer a theoretical motivation
for their assumption, explaining why the economy might be better
off without a credit market for educational loans once lotteries are
taken into account.
2.6 Application
A natural opportunity to gamble that does not rely on third party
enforcement is, of course, conflict. Typically the outcome of conflict
between two parties does reflect the relative strength of each party,
yet the outcome is subject to a random component. The choice of
weapons affects success probabilities but victory is far from certain.
Incorporating the possibility of costly conflict in the framework, the
model predicts a certain segregation within the economy. While at
least some of the poorer agents find it desirable to engage in conflict,
richer agents do not. Moreover, those agents willing to engage in
conflict do not necessarily seek to fight rich agents. This draws a fa-
miliar picture of socioeconomic segregation within an economy where
poverty and criminal activity are highly correlated. Some evidence
for this is provided, for instance, by Cullen and Levitt (1999). They
find that although migration into urban areas does not appear to be
affected by changes in crime rates, richer people tend to be very re-
sponsive to higher crime rates leaving areas where crime rates have
increased. One could argue that socioeconomic segregation is largely
due to social interaction, e.g. via negative role models, and that this
in turn determines criminal activity. However, the study by Ludwig
et al. (2001) casts some doubt on this argument. It finds that in an
randomized housing experiment property crime rates after relocation
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are positively affected by being treated.
The main departure of an economy with conflict from our model
lies in the waste of resources due to fighting. This section aims to pro-
vide an illustration of how conflict may serve as a means to provide
agents with their desired opportunities for convexification of their
consumption sets. Suppose two agents fight and the winner has the
opportunity to expropriate the loser. Suppose further the result is
affected by the agents’ individual strength represented by the amount
of endowments they carry with them. However, the outcome of con-
flict is not deterministic. Being stronger than one’s opponent does
not ensure victory, it increases the chances of winning. Therefore we
use a stochastic contest technology, the ratio form contest success
function (see Hirshleifer, 1989, Skaperdas, 1996, Neary, 1997).12
To be precise, let us assume that an agent i employs part of his
initial endowment xi − x for use in the conflict. Let y denote the
sum of all endowments used by parties in the conflict. Then agent i’s
probability of winning the conflict is given by
pi(x, y) =
xi − x
y
(2.8)
The prize for winning the conflict is determined by the sum of en-
dowments used in the conflict y. However, during the conflict part
of the endowments is wasted such that the winner conflict obtains
the prize βy where β < 1 is a cost parameter. This means that for
an agent i a conflict is equivalent to a costly ex-ante lottery (x, y)
over endowment levels x + βy with probability pi(x, y) and x with
probability 1− pi(x, y).
The following proposition states that given market imperfections
are sufficiently severe and the percentage cost of conflict is not too
high there are indeed agents preferring to gamble.
12Under the ratio form contest success function a party that does not dedicate
any endowments to conflict loses with certainty. Hirshleifer (2000) argues that
the difference form appears to be more consistent with fighting as a non-resisting
losing party need not lose everything due to real-world frictions. In our case
we assume that conflicting parties are able to hide away part of their initial
endowment they do not want to risk in a fight before conflict thus incorporating
the desired property.
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Proposition 2.4 Agents with initial endowments xi in the neighbor-
hood of f prefer a costly lottery to their certain endowment if (i) the
scope for moral hazard is sufficiently high, or if (ii) the cost of lotteries
is sufficiently low. Agents with endowments xi < x∗ or xi > x∗ + y∗
prefer their certain endowment to any costly lottery. The endowment
of a winner of a costly lottery that is the optimal choice for some
agent, x+ βy, has the property f < x+ βy ≤ x∗ + y∗.
Proof: In Appendix.
Firstly, this proposition reinforces the intuition of the previous
sections. There is scope for conflict in the economy if either the cap-
ital market is sufficiently imperfect or the cost of fighting sufficiently
low. The agents willing to engage in conflict are a subset of the
gamblers of the sections above. More interestingly, there is an upper
bound on a winner’s endowment depending on the cost of conflict.
Combined with the fact that winners will become skilled workers, this
points to the fact that for sufficiently low cost of conflict the analysis
of the previous sections goes through as well.13 On the other hand,
sufficiently rich agents are not threatened by conflict as fighting oc-
curs mainly among the poor. This appears to be consistent with the
empirical evidence.
2.7 Conclusion
We find in this chapter that allowing for lotteries in the setting of Ga-
lor and Zeira (1993) leads unambiguously to a Pareto improvement.
Consistent with existing literature it is found that mainly agents with
intermediate incomes want to gamble whereas rich individuals never
do. For wide and the more plausible classes of parameters also the
dynamics of the model economy changes fundamentally, erasing the
possibility of a poverty trap emerging in the original work. Intuitively,
agents previously caught in the poverty trap now like to gamble and
13Indeed, we conjecture that the equilibrium under actuarially fair lotteries is
the limit of an equilibrium with costly lotteries as β approaches 1.
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are thus able to escape towards the desirable high income steady
state independent of the initial distribution of endowments. Hence,
the finding of persistent inequality due to the presence of capital mar-
ket frictions may be reversed once the possibility of gambling is taken
into account.
In the presence of lotteries there emerges another interesting trade
off: From a long term perspective it would be desirable both that
lottery winnings are sustainable and that agents in the poverty trap
want to escape by gambling. The former appears to be achievable as
the moral hazard problem becomes more severe, while for the latter
the reverse is found to be true. A great scope for moral hazard in the
economy may be interpreted as high monitoring costs, due to e.g. a
legal system favoring borrowers over lenders, lack of property rights,
or difficulties in contract enforcement and the like. As it turns out,
the goal of sustainability seems to be more important for a large class
of parameters from a long run perspective. Hence, in contrast to the
original work, it may in fact be desirable to have more scope for moral
hazard thus reducing the demand for inefficient loans. That is, given
perfect capital markets cannot be achieved, capital market frictions
actually need not be bad news and in this model policies aiming to
ameliorate market conditions may put in danger long run prosperity
indeed.
The underlying mechanism of the model, namely the crowding out
of inefficient means to accumulate sufficient capital, seems to apply to
far more general settings of dynamic inefficiency. Introducing a less
inefficient accumulation instrument to circumvent barriers to extra
rents, similar to this model’s human capital acquisition cost, may in
general lead to similar findings.
Taking a positive point of view, the far from perfect markets for
financing human capital acquisition might state a long run optimum.
Then nothing could be gained by adopting political measures aim-
ing at the reduction of rigidities in this market. Quite the contrary,
such policy would run the risk of worsening long term perspectives
of the economy. Of course, robust empirical evidence is necessary
to be able to derive political implications. Unfortunately, existing
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empirical literature on the effects of lotteries as a means to bypass
wealth constraints tends to be scarce. Adopting the interpretation
of lotteries as public funding of universities, it should be expected
that greater initial endowment inequality goes hand in hand with a
less pronounced public higher educational system. This points to an
obvious extension of the model delivering testable predictions for em-
pirical research. On the other hand, interpreting property crime as an
opportunity to gamble, the analysis predicts that higher population
shares of poor agents induce higher crime which is consistent with
most empirical observations. However, this in turn affects the insti-
tutional shape of markets, namely the security of property rights in
an economy. Thus higher crime rates could be interpreted as higher
scope for moral hazard. Subsequently, poor agents are attracted more
to conflict further crowing out capital market. Growth prospects then
depend mainly on the efficiency of the conflict technology.
Chapter 3
Inequality, Incomplete
Contracts, and the Size
Distribution of Business
Firms
3.1 Introduction
The size distribution of business firms has proved to be one of the
more enduring objects of economic research as it reflects the orga-
nization of production in an economy. Naturally, it is one of the
major concerns of economic analysis whether production is organized
efficiently, be it within plants, firms, or industries. Within an indus-
try, that is among firms producing the same output good, presumably
with access to the same technology, there is little theoretical reason to
expect a non-degenerate distribution of sizes in classical competitive
equilibrium theory. Empirical evidence, however, tends to confirm
heterogeneous size distributions of firms. A possible way of reconcil-
iation is that firms differ with respect to unobservable technological
characteristics and firm sizes are chosen optimally in response to those
characteristics. Yet judging from observations it is far from obvious
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that all firms are indeed efficiently sized (see e.g. Banerjee and Duflo,
2004).
Moreover, when efficient organization of production given tech-
nology means optimal factor input choice, this primarily delivers a
theory of plant size as put forward by Hart (1995). It is not obvious
how technical efficiency at plant level might be connected to technical
efficiency at the firm level. Integration of technically efficient plants
might for instance result in undesirable market concentration. That
is, focussing on input-output analysis of production in plants pre-
cludes a possibly interesting and relevant aspect of the firm, namely
strategic considerations. Firm size may not only affect production but
also output markets or the distribution of profits among stakeholders,
an issue this chapter will emphasize. Hence, in order to explain size
distributions of firms it is desirable to employ a proper notion of the
boundaries of a firm. As a consequence, this chapter follows along the
lines of property rights theory, explicitly modeling ownership rights
on productive assets thereby allowing for a well-defined boundary of
the firm.
Departures from a degenerate firm size distribution have also been
explained by introducing market imperfections or missing markets.
Often this comes in conjunction with assumptions on technology that
ensure market imperfections on one market affect another. In this
chapter markets are complete and imperfections are assumed explic-
itly in that contracts within firms are incomplete, thus leading to
renegotiations, and there is a spread between lending and borrowing
interest rate. There is an immediate application as these assump-
tions can be expected to hold in developing countries, for instance
due to enforcement problems. The production technology is assumed
to be deterministic, to have strict complementarity between labor
and capital, and a well-defined optimum at a certain firm size such
that average output is maximized. This has the virtue of providing
a clear-cut efficiency benchmark as opposed to most of the literature
where size choice is always constrained efficient given a firm’s char-
acteristics, for instance technology or wealth level, and equilibrium
prices. Complementarity of inputs to production is needed primarily
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to ensure that at least one agent is indispensable. However, in this
model an agent always has the incentive to choose a technology that
makes him indispensable because incompleteness of labor contracts
implies renegotiations within firms.
Agents in the model economy meet in a matching market decid-
ing on coalition membership, ownership rights on assets and debt or
deposit and are allowed to make instantaneous side payments. Then
agents engage in productive activities in their coalitions. Due to the
incompleteness of contracts, output shares of agents are determined
by renegotiation, consistent with intra-firm bargaining in Stole and
Zwiebel (1996). Agents’ payoffs then depend positively on their own-
ership rights on assets.
The equilibrium firm size distribution turns out to be heteroge-
nous and is capable of simultaneously allowing for firms both too
small and too large compared to the firm size that maximizes aver-
age output. For this both intra-firm bargaining and imperfect capital
markets are needed. Inequality in initial endowments among agents
and capital market imperfections induce a wedge in the cost of cap-
ital between agents of different wealth levels. Subsequently, poorer
agents choose less investment in assets than rich agents do. The bar-
gaining induces owners of firms to employ more agents than techni-
cally efficient as their share of joint profit increases with the number
of employees and assets owned. Hence, the desired firm size by a
firm owner exceeds the efficient one, but wealth-constrained owners
choose smaller sizes. In addition, the model generates a relation be-
tween wealth and income inequality reminiscent of the dual economy.
Whereas wealth inequality between workers and owners exceeds in-
come inequality, income inequality exceeds wealth inequality between
firm members and unmatched agents. As the measure of unmatched
agents negatively depends on capital stock the model is able to incor-
porate a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and growth.
In equilibrium, the firm size distribution tends to be bimodal
whenever market imperfections and endowment inequality are suf-
ficiently severe and the endowment distribution has a Paretian tail.
This is consistent with empirical findings as bimodal size distribu-
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tions appear to be typical for developing countries (e. g. the survey by
Tybout, 2000), countries generally deemed to be prone to market im-
perfections and high wealth inequality. In contrast, size distributions
of firms in developed countries are commonly found to be unimodal
(see Cabral and Mata, 2003). A number of empirical studies (e. g.
Little et al., 1988, Biggs et al., 1995, Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2002)
provide some evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between
efficiency and size of firms in terms of output per worker in countries
with bimodal firm size distributions, indicating that the presence of
both too large and too small firms is indeed common. This suggests
that the model is capable of providing a viable framework for policy
analysis in developing countries.
The literature on size distributions of firms is abundant, yet tends
to focus on input-output analysis. A research agenda can be traced
back at least to Simon and Bonini (1958). Lucas (1978) introduces a
general equilibrium model with agents heterogenous with respect to
productivity. Firms sizes are chosen optimally based on complemen-
tarity of agents’ productivity type with input factors. In equilibrium,
firms always have a technically efficient size and the size distribu-
tion depends on the distribution of types. In Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1979) agents differ in their aversion to risk. In a general equilibrium
model without insurance markets less risk averse agents become en-
trepreneurs employing more risk averse agents. Labor demand in-
creases and equilibrium firm size decreases in the entrepreneur’s risk
aversion such that firms tend to be too small in equilibrium compared
to the first best. The size distribution of firms then depends on the
distribution of risk aversion among agents.
Another strand of the literature concerned with firm size hetero-
geneity is on entry and exit of firms. Among other notable contri-
butions are the selection models in Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn
(1992). They introduce dynamic partial equilibrium models of firms
that are subject to productivity shocks and decide on market entry
or exit based on the properties of the stochastic process governing
productivity shocks. Firm sizes are always efficient given their pro-
ductivity state and the size distribution depends exclusively on the
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properties of the productivity shocks.
These contribution share a neo-classical view of the firm as a black
box combining input factors to produce output. More recent contri-
butions tend to move away from this standpoint, as for instance,
Caballero and Hammour (1996). They assume specificity of factors
to production and include bargaining over joint profits in their anal-
ysis. This leads to a better bargaining position and a higher profit
share of the factor that is less specific in the sense that it may be
more easily employed elsewhere. Consequently, they find overem-
ployment in equilibrium when labor is less mobile than capital and
thus the equilibrium wage rate is below its first best level. However,
given equilibrium prices, firms choose their factor inputs efficiently.
Another approach, by Cooley et al. (2004), is to model financial con-
straints on firms’ investments which results in undersized firms com-
pared to the average output maximizing firm size. In a general equi-
librium model where contracting constraints prevent efficient lending
and firms differ in wealth, poorer firms are undercapitalized. Given
a Leontief production technology demand for labor is below its first
best level and so are the wages. If there are firms sufficiently rich
not to be financially constrained, these choose a size above its first
best level. Yet, given the equilibrium wage rate, these firms are effi-
ciently sized. However, with the possible exception of Caballero and
Hammour (1996), the mentioned contributions share a potential de-
ficiency in that it is not straightforward whether they are on plant or
firm sizes.
Methodologically this chapter is related to Legros and Newman
(2004b), who find too large firms in a matching model between tech-
nologically complementary firms using an incomplete contracting frame-
work. In their model monetary side payments between coalition mem-
bers are limited by liquidity constraints, but agents can be compen-
sated by changing the organizational structure. This may lead to in-
tegration although this type of ownership in their model is inefficient
in a well-defined sense. In a partial setting close to Hart and Moore
(1990), Bolton and Whinston (1993) find a similar over-integration
result.
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This chapter will proceed by introducing the theoretical model in
section 2. Section 3 gives an equilibrium existence result, and section
4 identifies some properties of the matching equilibrium with respect
to the endowment distribution. In section 5 we identify circumstances
leading to a bimodal firm size distribution and discuss applications
of the model. Section 6 concludes with a discussion while the more
cumbersome proofs are confined to the appendix.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Agents
There is a single-good economy populated by a continuum of agents
I ≡ [0, 1]. The single good can be used both for consumption and
investment. Agents are heterogenous in their initial endowments of
the good which is given by the one to one mapping ω : I → [ω, ω],
ω < ω, assumed to be continuously differentiable. The function ω(i)
is then the inverse of the atom-less wealth distribution function in
the model economy. All agents are endowed with the same amount
of human capital h, so hi = h for all i ∈ I. We assume that an agent’s
human capital becomes specific to the task that it is employed in.1
Agent i’s utility function ui(ci) is linear in consumption of the single
good ci which is given by final payoffs and assumed to be ui = ci.
3.2.2 Assets
In the economy there exist two types of assets, AI and AII . These as-
sets are complementary in the sense that combined output exceeds the
sum of individual output and one asset without the other is useless.
Imagine these assets to be a factory building and a machine, for in-
stance. Thus, under our assumptions a factory cannot produce with-
1While this assumption appears to be not entirely innocuous, it has the virtue
that outside options in the equilibrium of the renegotiation game do not depend
on equilibrium profits in coalitions. An alternative assumption is that the match-
ing process involves frictions, for instance in the form of costs associated with
switching coalitions.
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out a machine and vice versa. The production technology incorpo-
rated in the assets is denoted by f(A, hn) where the set A denotes the
assets used in production and hn = (h0, h1, ..., hn) a vector of human
capital. We follow the convention of writing An = {AI , AII1 , ..., AIIn }.
Assumptions on the technology are
Assumption A 3.1 (Production technology) Let hn denote a (1 ×
n+1) vector of hs.
(i) f(∅, h0) = f({AI}, h0) = f({AII}, h0) = 0.
(ii) f(An, hn)− f(An−1, hn−1) > f(An+1, hn+1)− f(An, hn) ≥ 0 ∀n >
1.
(iii) limn→∞(f(An, hn)− f(An−1, hn−1)) = 0.
(iv) 1n+1f(An, hn) <
1
K+1f(AK , hK) ∀n 6= K.
(v) f(An, hn) = f(An, hn+1) = f(An+1, hn) ∀n ≥ 1.
(vi) Investment cost of an asset is c regardless of the type.
As this model is concerned with the output from human capital only
we assume for convenience that production cost is zero. Thus we
limit our attention to additional output achievable by the strict com-
plementarity of human and physical capital.2 Assumption (i) gives
the output of an agent who is not member of a coalition which is
normalized to zero thus giving the agents’ outside option. By As-
sumption (ii) the production technology has diminishing returns to
scale and Assumption (iii) will guarantee a finite bound on coalition
sizes. Assumption (vi) ensures that there is a firm size K that is
efficient in the sense that it maximizes average surplus. Note that it
is implied by (ii) and (iii). Assumption (v) states that human capital
and assets are strict complements, so that a factory and a machine
need an operator each to produce output. By Assumption (vi) setting
up an asset involves the investment of c units of the good regardless
of the asset type. This assumption is made to avoid that exogenous
2Note that this interpretation is also consistent with the costly acquisition of
specific human capital provided the acquisition cost is constant across agents.
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asset cost asymmetries drive the results of the analysis. Wherever the
level of human capital is constant across agent we will drop it as an
argument to the production function and write f(An) for f(An, hn).
3.2.3 Coalitions and Ownership Structures
All agents i ∈ I may form finite coalitions to jointly produce out-
put. Coalitions or teams of agents are assumed to be of finite size
to capture the notion of small units in a large economy. Within a
team of agents each team member matters, but the impact of a team
on the whole economy is negligible. Let F(I) denote the set of finite
subsets of I. A coalition will be denoted by N ∈ F(I) consisting of
n + 1 = |N | members. M will denote the member of coalition N
owning AI . We will call M the owner and the remaining agents the
workers, although this proves to be appropriate only for coalitions
with n > 1 workers.3 The distribution of ownership rights on assets
in a set of agents L ∈ F(I) with L ⊆ NL for some coalition NL, is
captured by θ(L) giving the assets of one or more agents M :
Definition 3.1 Let θ(L) be the mapping θ : F(I) → {AI ;AII ; ∅}R,
assigning a set of agents to their assets.
To familiarize the reader with the concept, note that e.g. {AI} ⊆
θ(M) by convention. We follow the convention of referring to a coali-
tion that is a singleton by simply writing the identity of the agent.
The combination of a coalition and the allocation of ownership rights
within that coalition (N, θ) is called a firm. At this point we limit
our analysis for simplicity to a limited set of admissible ownership
structures:
Assumption A 3.2 For all coalitions N , |θ(i)| = 0 ∀ i 6= M ∈ N ,
i.e. no worker holds any assets and θ(i) 6= θ(j) for |θ(i)|, |θ(j)| > 0
and i, j ∈ N .
3In the course of this chapter we will refer to a coalition N by the number of
its workers, n, and use the term n firm as a synonym.
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This assumption excludes ownership structures that assign joint own-
ership of assets and those that allow workers to hold assets.4 A dis-
cussion on this assumption is postponed to section 6 where we also
present an example where Assumption 3.2 does not hold. However,
it is best motivated by putting more structure on the technology in-
corporated in the assets. Suppose for instance that asset type AI
represents a non-physical asset as for instance trust in the firm em-
bodied in its physical presence, while asset type AII represents the
size of the productive asset. This way, the holder of asset AII must
at the same time hold AI . This could describe the setup of a shop
where the store building itself represents the firm as perceived by
customers and suppliers.
Indeed, Chowdhury (1994) provides a case study of small grocers
in Dhaka, Bangladesh, that appears to be consistent with our assump-
tions. A grocery store typically consists of an owner-manager assisted
by employees where the owner-manager owns both the building and
the stock. The physical size of the shop determines the number of as-
sistants. Interviewed entrepreneurs emphasize the need for visibility
in order to obtain trade credit. Almost all case studies in the same
survey find also that owners place huge importance on personal trust
between their firm and both suppliers and customers.
Another case study in the same survey, on women entrepreneurs
in the textile industry (Zohir, 1994), finds a similar pattern. The
typical firm consists of one cutting master who provides design and
supervision and several operators of sewing machines. Interestingly,
assets, i.e. the sewing machines, are usually owned by the cutting
master. Asset AI would represent the human capital for designing
clothes and asset AII a sewing machine. Strikingly, a common fea-
ture among small firms in different industries is that initial capital
investment is to a large extent financed by equity with typical debt-
equity ratios of 0.25. Only after setting up firms begin to regularly
use trade credit for financing working capital.
4It is possible to relax the assumption to allow workers to own one asset AII
without changing the analysis.
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3.2.4 Sequence of Events
The timing of events in the model economy is given as follows.
1) Matching market takes place, agents simultaneously decide on
coalitions, investment plans, and their capital market position.
2) Production takes place and firm members may renegotiate the
distribution of profits at any time.
3) Payoffs take place.
3.2.5 Contractual Environment and Renegotiations
The exposition proceeds backwards in time starting with intrafirm
renegotiations. We assume that labor contracts can be renegotiated
at any time. One possible foundation for this assumption lies in
the non-contractability of claims to future output whereas contracts
that determine ownership rights on assets and instantaneous side pay-
ments in the course of coalition formation are feasible in this economy.
A reason for the lack of contracts conditioning on output may
reside in the legal institutions of an economy and the nature of out-
put. It seems reasonable that at one time or another in the course
of production any team member has the opportunity to hide units
of output or profits due to its liquid nature.5 In contrast to this,
assets are viewed as machinery or buildings and are somewhat more
protected from adverse behavior. Thus output may not be verifiable
especially in small and medium businesses lacking a sophisticated
accounting scheme. Moreover, even if output is verifiable, in order
to enforce the contract a court will be needed. It will then depend
on the ability of this court to reveal the true circumstances within
a given team whether a certain sharing rule is contractible or not.
5This points to another motivation for our assumptions. Suppose for instance
that team members’ actions are not observable and the amount of output units
that can be diverted depends on the individual’s access to output. Access in turn
is likely to depend on individual ownership rights. A Nash bargaining solution
model where threat points are determined by the amount of output agents can
secure themselves in case renegotiations break down yields similar conclusions.
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Non-binding labor contracts can be caused by weak legal institutions
as well.
An alternative set of assumptions also giving rise to renegotia-
tions is that labor contracts are non-binding and contracts on future
output only possible within coalitions. This means that contracts
on coalitions cannot be written in the matching market. However,
agents may decide in the matching market to become specific to each
other. This describes an economy where written labor contracts and
worker protection laws are not frequent. This appears to hold for
less developed countries, and even in some developed countries their
effectiveness is not beyond doubt. Outsiders’ inability to write con-
tracts on future output may be explained by an asymmetric informa-
tion setting where firm members’ actions are observable only within
firms.
Whenever contracts are incomplete in one of these senses renego-
tiations will determine individual shares of joint profit. Fortunately,
the literature on renegotiations with property rights is abundant and
provides some more robust results. Let pii(n, θ) denote the payoff of
agent i in team N of size n+1 given an allocation of ownership rights
θ. The arguments capture joint output Π(n) = f(An) and agent i’s
relative bargaining power based on the importance of his assets to
the team. Formally, we assume
Assumption A 3.3 Individual payoffs from renegotiations within the
team have the following properties provided individual outside options
are worse for all team members.6
(i) Asset ownership increases the individual profit share:
pii(n, θ) ≥ pii(n, θ′) for |θ(i)| > |θ′(i)| with strict inequality for
|θ(i)| > 1.
(ii) Profits are split equally in symmetric teams: pii(1, θ) = pij(1, θ)∀ θ.
(iii) The indispensable agent’s payoff share increases in firm size:
pii(n,θ)
Π(n) >
pii(n−1,θ)
Π(n−1) ∀ n if θ(i) ⊃ AI .
6It is straightforward that in a matching equilibrium this must hold by stabil-
ity.
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Assumption A 3.3.(ii) is straightforward as within symmetric firms
both agents are indispensable for production. Parts (i)7 and (iii)
are central results from most of the literature on bargaining under
the possibility of exclusion and compatible with production that has
diminishing returns to team size.
Notably our set of assumptions is consistent with a number of
extensive-form bargaining games, in particular with those yielding
the Shapley value as an outcome. For instance, Hart and Moore
(1990) use this concept for modeling renegotiations with the result
that holding property rights increases an agent’s share of joint profit.8
Intuitively, this is due to possibility to use the right to withdraw as-
sets from production as a threat. Obviously, if one agent’s profit
shares increases in the number of assets then the share of some other
agents must decrease. The fact that the Shapley value of an indis-
pensable agent increases in the number of substitutable co-workers
can be checked by calculations as in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Another prominent example is the non-cooperative bargaining
game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). They analyze rene-
gotiations within a firm such that an indispensable agent bargains
bilaterally with the remainder of the team. The bargaining game
used is that of Binmore et al. (1986). In a generalized version they
find that individual profits are given by the Shapley value and not less
than the individual outside option, that is an agent’s maximum profit
obtained outside the team. That intra-firm bargaining allowing for
property rights on assets is indeed consistent with the assumptions
can be concluded from Propositions 1-3 in Gall (2004). Even when
7Part (i) is superfluous under centralized ownership as assumed in Assumption
A3.2. However, at a later stage of the paper, Assumption A3.2 will be relaxed
as suggested in footnote 4. Note that then strict equality in (i) for |θ(i)| =
1 implies that workers holding one AII have the same renegotiation payoff as
workers holding no assets. This in turn implies that both roles are equivalent in
this model up to an interpretation of the side payments, i.e. whether they include
investment cost for asset-less workers or not for asset-owning workers.
8Interestingly, de Meza and Lockwood (1998) find that the indication for the
property rights allocation is not robust to minor alterations in the extensive form
of the underlying bargaining game. The finding that agents’ profit shares are
non-decreasing in asset ownership carries over nevertheless.
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allowing for minor alterations in the extensive form, as in Wester-
mark (2003), Assumption A 3.3 continues to be consistent with this
bargaining game.
3.2.6 The Matching Stage
In the matching stage a matching market takes place. This means
that individuals decide simultaneously on their investment in assets,
on the coalition they will take part in, and their activity on the capital
market. When choosing a course of action, agents treat the interest
rate as exogenous. In the economy the interest rate is determined
endogenously by credit market clearing asset investment plans. At
the matching stage agents know their continuation payoffs from the
subsequent stage of being member in some coalition N with an al-
location of property rights θ and holding ownership rights on assets
θ(i). This continuation profit is given by the individual payoffs from
renegotiations, pii(n, θ).
Let the individual valuation function vi(n, θ, ω(i), r) denote this
continuation payoff from being in coalition N net of capital invest-
ment costs and interest rate payments depending on the number of
workers in a coalition n, asset ownership θ, individual endowments
ω(i) and interest rate r:
vi(n, θ, ω(i), r) = pii(n, θ)+(1+r)(ω(i)−|θ(i)|c) if ω(i)≥|θ(i)|c
vi(n, θ, ω(i), r) = pii(n, θ)+(1+i)(ω(i)−|θ(i)|c) if ω(i)< |θ(i)|c.
Feasible allocations of ownership rights θ associated to any coalition
N can be restricted to require agents to be able to repay their debts
and technical efficiency. The set of feasible allocations of ownership
rights on assets in a coalition N , Θ(N), is then given by
Θ(N) ≡ {(θ(i))i∈N : θ(i) ∈ {∅;An} and∑
i∈N
|θ(i)|= |N |;pii(n, θ)+(1+i)(ω(i)−|θ(i)|c)≥ 0},
Θ({i}) ≡ ∅.
That means that only allocations that are consistent with Assumption
A3.2, that employ the proper number of assets, and whose members
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are able to pay back their debt are considered feasible except for
singletons where only the empty set, i.e. owning no asset and receiving
the outside option, is deemed feasible.
3.2.7 Preferences over Ownership and Firm Size
We first determine some properties of the optimal individual asset
ownership θ(i) depending on the interest rate r and the coalition N
individual i is member of. Let pi1 ≡ f(A1,h1)2 abbreviate average profit
in a symmetric n = 1 firm which is equal to the renegotiation game
payoff for a n = 1 firm member given Assumption A 3.3. The fol-
lowing lemma states some properties of agents’ preference orderings
over ownership rights.
Lemma 3.1 Agents’ preferences over individual ownership rights are
well-defined and monotone in the interest rate and wealth:
(i) For any two pairs of ownership rights and coalition size there
is at most one interest rate r0, such that an agent with ω(i) is
indifferent at r0, prefers the pair involving more asset ownership
at r < r0, and prefers the other one at r > r0.
(ii) For any two pairs of ownership rights and coalition size there
is at most one endowment level ω0, such that an agent endowed
with ω0 is indifferent, an agent with ω(i) > ω0 prefers the pair
involving more asset ownership, and an agent with ω(i) < ω0
prefers the other one. Moreover, ω0 is non-decreasing in the
interest rate r.
Proof: In Appendix.
This means that agents’ bilateral preference orderings on asset
ownership may switch exactly once both in the interest rate and in
initial endowments. Moreover, a monotonicity result holds: more as-
sets are preferred as the individual cost for capital decreases, namely
whenever the interest rate decreases or wealth increases. It is pos-
sible to show that indeed for all agents θ(i) = ∅ is strictly preferred
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to θ′(i) = {AII} in coalitions with |N | > 1 and side payments from
workers to owners |t(i)− t′(i)| < c.
In order to determine an upper bound on firm size we look at
asymmetric firms with n > 1 where members obtain payoffs from
either owning nothing, that is θ(i) = ∅ which is given by
vi(n, θ, ω(i), r) = pii(n, θ) + (1 + r)ω(i),
or from owning everything, with θ(i) = An, which amounts to
vi(n, θ, ω(i), r) = pii(n, θ) + (1 + r)(ω(i)− (n+ 1)c).
It is not necessary to include side payments in these equations as we
are interested in the optimal firm size an owner with unlimited re-
sources would choose and side payments must be less than c. Clearly,
the workers’ payoffs are decreasing in n, net of side payments, whereas
a sufficiently rich owner’s payoff increases in n as long as
vi(n+1, θn+1, ω(i), r)− vi(n, θn, ω(i), r) > 0
⇔ pii(n+ 1, θn+1)− pii(n, θn) > (1+r)c, (3.1)
where θn(i) = An. This inequality implies there exists a cutoff firm
size n so that further increasing firm size leads to a decrease in the
owner’s payoff even for an owner who has sufficient endowments not
to need to borrow. Independently of the owner’s asset AII holdings,
marginal profit from increasing firm size by one must outweigh the
cost for an additional asset. Furthermore, this cutoff firm size must be
finite because of the assumptions on the production function. There-
fore n¯ provides a general finite upper bound on firm sizes. To make
things interesting we limit our analysis to the case where investment
costs are sufficiently small so that at least for an agent who is not
credit constrained it pays to choose a firm size n > K at r = 0, that
is
Assumption A 3.4 (sufficiently small investment cost)
∃n > K : pii(n, θn) > pii(n−1, θn−1) + c > pi1 + nc.
where θn(i) = An. Moreover, pii(n+1, θ′) < pii(n, θ′) for all n ≥ 1
and θ(i) = ∅.
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This assumption holds whenever profits from renegotiation are in-
creasing sufficiently in firm size despite diminishing returns to scale
compared to asset investment cost. As M ’s renegotiation payoff in-
creases in firm size the maximal firm size to expect is determined by
(3.1) and by equilibrium side payments. Let us collect the results on
preferred firm sizes in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Preferences over firm size have the following properties:
(i) For n > 1, vi(n, θ(i) = ∅, ω(i), r) is strictly decreasing in n and
(ii) any firm size n > n ∈ N cannot result from profit-maximizing
behavior.
Figure 3.1: Ownership preferences depending on endowments and
interest rate
Let us represent Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2 by Figure 3.1. It is possible
to partition the endowment space into a finite number of subsets so
that all endowment levels in each subset induce the same preference
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ordering. The support of the endowment distribution is on the ver-
tical axis and the interest rate on the horizontal axis with the thin
lines representing multiples of investment cost c. The bold lines cor-
respond to cutoff values for endowments given r, so that the labeled
areas denote the intervals of endowments at a given interest rate for
which the labeled action is optimal. For workers the bold lines rep-
resent indifference between owning one asset in a symmetric n = 1
firm and working in some n > 1 firm. The support of the endowment
distribution is on the vertical axis and the interest rate on the hor-
izontal axis with the thin lines representing multiples of investment
cost c. This describes a class society of agents as found in the work
by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Banerjee and Newman (1993).
3.2.8 Side Payments
Let t(i,N) denote individual i’s side payment in coalition N . We
allow only for balanced side payments within a coalition, that is∑
i∈N t(i,N) = 0 for all coalitions N .
9 Side payments are subject
to the capital market imperfection as well. This introduces a crucial
non-transferability of utility into the matching model that will pre-
vent the allocation from generally maximizing aggregate utility. Then
the individual valuation function vi(.) from being member of firm
(N, θ) incorporating individual side payments t(i,N) can be written
as
vi(n, θ, ω(i), r, t(i,N))=

pii(n, θ)+(1+r)(ω(i)+t(i,N)−|θ(i)|c)
if ω(i) ≥ |θ(i)|c+ t(i,N)
pii(n, θ)+(1+i)(ω(i)+t(i,N)−|θ(i)|c)
if ω(i) < |θ(i)|c+ t(i,N).
(3.2)
To put this into context with figure 3.1, note that side payments
may shift upwards or downwards the curves indicating indifference
between different investment plans.
9We follow the convention of interpreting t(.) as the payments from workers
to owners which may be negative, of course.
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3.2.9 Capital Market
Investment in assets may be financed by individual endowments or by
loans taken on the capital market. Endowments not used for assets
may be lent on the capital market. The capital market is assumed to
be imperfect such that there is an interest rate spread between lending
interest rate 1+r and borrowing interest rate 1+i ≡ (1+r)γ, γ > 1.10
The lending interest rate is endogenously defined by market clearing.
We assume there exists a costless storage technology providing a rate
of return of 0 which will provide a lower bound for the equilibrium
interest rate.
The excess demand for loans is given by:
LD(θ, r) =
∫
I
[|θ(i)|c− ω(i)]di.
Agent i’s preferred ownership choice θ(i) depends on r and thus excess
demand for loans does so, too. However, preferred ownership choices
also depend on the side payments. Side payments are balanced within
coalitions, so they do not enter excess demand. Due to feasibility
of ownership right allocations for all n > 0 coalitions investment
plans involve exactly n+ 1 assets. Whenever aggregate endowments
are scarce the equilibrium interest rate is determined by inducing
a sufficiently large measure of agents to weakly prefer their outside
option to any role in any equilibrium firm. In addition, these agents
have to prefer their outside option to anything they could possibly
get in any non-equilibrium firm at side payments that induce any
agent to own this particular firm.
To illustrate this let us look more closely at a symmetric firm
and suppose side payments are 0 for the moment. For an agent with
endowments ω(i) < c not to prefer to join a symmetric firm it must
hold that
(1 + r∗)ω(i) ≥ pi2 + (1 + r∗)γ(ω(i)− c).
10This is a simple and straightforward way to model imperfect credit markets
that has frequently been used in the literature. It may be generated by the
presence of moral hazard on the borrower’s side, see for instance Galor and Zeira
(1993) or chapter 2 of this dissertation for a similar setup.
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Define the endowment level such that an individual is indifferent be-
tween the outside option and being member of a symmetric firm, ωˆ,
accordingly by
ωˆ =
1
γ − 1(γc−
pi1
1 + r
). (3.3)
Using Lemma 3.1 and continuity of ω(i) the measure of agents pre-
ferring their outside option to the symmetric firm, µU , is given by
µˆ = µ(i ∈ I : ω(i) ≤ ωˆ),
which is continuous and strictly increasing in r on (ω, c). Returning
to the general case let w =
∫
I
ω(i)di denote aggregate endowments.
Define the cutoff endowment level omega U such that the measure
of agents poorer than ωU equals the difference between the capital
stock necessary to provide every agent with an asset and aggregate
endowments implicitly by
µ(ω(i) ≤ ωU ) = max{c− w; 0}.
Finally, let tˆ(n) denote the side payment that makes the richest un-
matched agent with wealth ωU exactly indifferent between the outside
option and working in an n firm. Then the interest rate is determined
by the following set of weak inequalities:
rˆ :

µˆ(r) ≥ c− w, and
(1+r)ω(i) ≥ vi(n, ∅, ω(i), r, t∗) ∀n :
µn > 0, ω(i) ≤ ωU , and
∀n′≤n s.t. µn′=0 ∃ n s.t. µn>0 :
vi(n,An, ω, r, t∗)≥vi(n′, An′ , ω, r, tˆ(n′))
(3.4)
with at least one expression holding with equality. That is, agents
with endowments less than ωU must prefer their outside option to be-
ing member of a symmetric firm, to working in an equilibrium firm at
equilibrium side payments, and to bribe the richest agent in the econ-
omy into a non-equilibrium firm. Otherwise the equilibrium interest
rate is zero because of the costless storage technology. Formally, the
60CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY AND FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS
equilibrium interest rate is given by
r∗ =
{
rˆ s.t. (3.4) if w < c
0 if w ≥ c. (3.5)
3.2.10 Equilibrium Concept
Formally, a non-transferable utility matching equilibrium with lim-
ited side payments similar to Legros and Newman (2004a) and Legros
and Newman (1996) is defined as follows
Definition 3.2 A matching equilibrium with limited side payments
denoted by (P ∗, θ∗, r∗, t∗) is a measure consistent partition P ∗ of the
agent space, a mapping θ∗ of individuals to their assets, an interest
rate r∗ and transfers t∗ such that
• condition (3.5) holds (credit market clearing),
• for all Pi ∈ P ∗ it holds that
∑
j∈Pi t
∗
j = 0 for all i ∈ I (within
coalition transfers),
• @P ′i ∈ F(I) such that
vi(|P ′i |, θ′, ω(i), r∗, t′i) > vi(|P ∗i |, θ∗, ω(i), r∗, t∗i ) ∀ i ∈ P ′i , i ∈ P ∗i
and feasible θ′ ∈ Θ(P ′i ) such that
∑
j∈P ′i t
′
j = 0 (stability).
Measure consistency intuitively requires that the measure of first
members of any coalition must equate the measure of the second
members which must equate the measure of third members etc.11
This equilibrium concept postulates that there exists no blocking
coalition which is feasible with respect to the distribution of own-
ership rights and aggregate endowments and makes every member
strictly better off using side payments. It coincides with the f-core
with limited side payments (see Kaneko and Wooders, 1996).
11The reader is referred to Kaneko and Wooders (1986) for the formal definition
and extensive discussion.
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3.2.11 Feasibility and Labor Demand
Stability and measure consistency of a matching equilibrium trans-
late into a condition equating supply and demand for labor for each
firm size. That is, given equilibrium payoffs for each firm size n the
measure of agents weakly preferring to be owners of such firms must
equate n times the measure of agents weakly preferring to be workers
in such firms. Let us first define the measures µnM by
µnM = µ({i : vi(n, θ, ω(i), r, t(i)) ≥ vi(n′, θ′, ω(i), r, t′(i)) ,
∀ (n′, θ′) 6=(n, θ)}), (3.6)
and µnW by
µnW = µ({j : ω(i) ≥ ωU , vj(n, θ, ω(j), r, t(j)) ≥
vj(n′, θ′, ω(j), r, t′(j)) ,∀ (n′, θ′) 6=(n, θ)}). (3.7)
Monetary side payments t(.), t′(.) are those associated to the respec-
tive coalition and ownership rights combination with positive measure
in equilibrium.12 These expressions give the measures µnM and µnW
of all agents weakly preferring to be owners of n firms to all other
ownership rights and other firm sizes, and, respectively, to be workers
in an n firm.
Let µn denote the measure of n firms in equilibrium. Feasibility
requires aggregate investment demand to equate aggregate endow-
ments whenever the latter are not abundant
n(r∗)∑
n=1
(n+ 1)µnc ≤ w. (3.8)
12Strictly speaking, side payments in firm types of measure zero in equilibrium
need not be defined. However, due to monotonicity found in Lemma 3.1 and the
fact that firms consist only of workers and owners, if there exist side payments
t(n) for a firm size n such that µnM = µnW = 0, then this firm size must
have measure zero, ie. there exist no side payments making both workers and
owners in n firms better off than some other firm size with positive measure given
equilibrium side payments. Therefore we can assign these side payments t(n)
to firm types of measure zero as shadow prices which will be quite useful when
simulating.
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In equilibrium for all firm sizes n > 0 it must hold that
µn ≤ µnM and nµn ≤ µnW . (3.9)
This means that in this model side payments are used to equate
labor supply and demand for any firm size thus functioning similar
to market prices in general equilibrium models. It is noteworthy
though, that in equilibrium a positive measure of agents typically
will be indifferent between activity in several labor markets.
3.2.12 First Best Benchmark
Concluding this section, we will provide an efficiency benchmark in
order to enable comparison with later results. In a first best world
where everything is verifiable coalition size should be expected to
maximize the marginal increase in net output of an additional worker
subject to efficient human capital investments. This is – given the
assumption on the production function – equivalent to maximizing
average output per coalition member. Hence, in a first best world
coalition size would be equal to K throughout the economy provided
sufficient aggregate endowments.
3.3 Existence
As a first step let us sum up some important preliminaries that will
hold for any equilibrium.
Lemma 3.3 Monetary side payments workers pay to owners within
firms depend only on the size of the firm and decrease in firm size for
all firm sizes that have positive measure in equilibrium. If aggregate
endowments are scarce, side payments are positive for all firm sizes.
Proof: In Appendix.
The finding that side payments depend only on firm sizes means
that side payments function in fact like market wages for labor in a
firm of certain size and do not depend on individual wealth. That
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bigger firms pay higher wages seems to be consistent with much of the
empirical findings, yet some caution is appropriate. Side payments
only constitute part of a worker’s payoff, in addition they receive the
payoff from intra-firm renegotiations of the joint profit.
Moreover, Lemma 3.3 implies that in equilibrium at least for
scarce aggregate endowments the poorest agents match into the largest
firms requiring the smallest investment in form of side payments. On
the other hand, richer agents match into firms that require more in-
vestment, that is into firms with more assets, as can be verified by
comparing investment costs for an n and an n + 1 firm and using
Lemma 3.3 and the fact that differences in workers’ side payments
can never be higher than the cost of an asset. Hence, matching is
negative assortative.
Now let us verify that the matching equilibrium indeed exists and
induces a unique distribution of firm sizes. The full proof is somewhat
involved and therefore refined to the appendix but a sketch of it can
be given here. First we show that there exists an r∗ not dependent
on side payments that induces credit market clearing. Given r∗, exis-
tence of a matching equilibrium follows using a well known result by
Kaneko and Wooders (1996). Then we establish uniqueness of equi-
librium payoffs which follows almost by definition of the equilibrium.
Finally, it is shown by contradiction that uniqueness of payoffs pins
down coalition size and allocation of ownership rights in almost all
coalitions.
Proposition 3.1 A matching equilibrium with limited side payments
exists and induces a unique distribution of firm sizes.
Proof: In Appendix.
To illustrate the matching equilibrium a brief informal discussion
of two polar examples follows. Consider first an example with per-
fect equality in the economy. Assume there is an almost degenerate
distribution of endowments so that ω(i) = c and that K = 1.13 This
13In this case side payments are zero. However, for K > 1 the efficiency result
carries over only if K firms are sufficiently efficient compared to other firm sizes.
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means any agent has sufficient endowments to prefer owning assets
to not owning any and being a worker in a large firm. It follows
immediately that the model economy will be populated entirely by
small, efficient firms: there will emerge only n = 1 coalitions with
symmetric asset ownership. This can be interpreted as an economy
consisting exclusively of self-employed individuals collaborating via
markets.
The second example focuses on an extreme case of endowment
inequality and severe credit market imperfections. Let there be a
large measure of endowment-less individuals, and a comparatively
small measure of rich individuals owning all the endowments in the
economy. This is not covered by the assumption of continuous dif-
ferentiability of ω(i), however, an equilibrium may exist nevertheless.
To be more concrete, assume that the measure of poor individuals
exceeds the one of the super-rich more than twofold. Then there will
emerge only large firms in the economy and all assets are owned by
rich agents, and all poor individuals are workers.
3.4 Firm Size and Endowment Distribu-
tion
Having established that a matching equilibrium indeed exists in our
model and induces a unique distribution of firm sizes, we are inter-
ested in its properties. The examples at the end of the last section
only describe polar cases of wealth distributions. In this section we
will therefore examine the properties of the matching equilibrium
more generally.
Key to the matching equilibrium analysis is that all agents can
secure themselves at least the payoff from being member of a sym-
metric firm, that is vi(1, θ, ω(i), r) where |θ(i)| = 1, or the outside
option 0, whichever is higher. This is because all agents have the
opportunity to choose symmetric n = 1 coalitions and do not need
agents from other endowment classes to form their desired coalition.
This means there are only agents willing to be workers if the poorest
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agent has sufficiently bad outside options, that is the cost of capital
for the poorest agent is sufficiently high. Equally, there will only be
owners if the richest agent has sufficiently bad outside options, that
is the cost of capital for the richest agent is sufficiently low. More-
over, poor agents having high cost of capital choose low investment
occupations whereas rich agents facing low cost of capital choose high
investment occupations. This means large firms will only emerge in
equilibrium if there is sufficient heterogeneity in the agents’ cost of
capital, i. e. there is sufficient endowment inequality.
3.4.1 Properties of the Matching Equilibrium
This subsection is concerned with some preliminary properties of
the matching equilibrium, especially with equilibrium side payments.
These largely determine the size distribution of firms and thus whether
a variety of large firms emerges in equilibrium, and if so under what
circumstances. As the endowment distribution becomes more equal
and agents’ bargaining positions become more equal the firm size
distribution may converge to a point measure at the efficient size K.
However, this may happen only if the capital market imperfections
are not too severe. If this is not the case the firm size distribution
converges to a point measure at the minimal size n = 1. For in-
stance, with perfect credit markets transferability of utility between
coalition members is perfect. Then, of course, the f-core converges
to coalitions that maximize average output, namely of size K. Intu-
itively, as the endowment distribution becomes more equal, coalition
members not owning assets are richer and therefore less dependent on
the inefficient capital market when transferring utility. The following
proposition subsumes some interesting properties of the equilibrium
allocation.
Proposition 3.2 Properties of the matching equilibrium allocation
(i) When capital is scarce, a necessary condition for only efficient
firms to emerge in equilibrium whenever K > 2 is that both
capital market imperfections are not too severe and average pro-
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ductivity in the efficient firm is sufficiently high compared to all
other firm sizes.
(ii) When capital is scarce and the spread between upper and lower
bound of the endowment distribution sufficiently large, both 1 <
n′ < K and n > K firms have positive measure in equilibrium
if, in line with Assumption A3.1, average output in n firms is
sufficiently high compared to n′ firms and average output in n
and n′ firms is sufficiently high compared to all other firm sizes,
and capital market imperfections are sufficiently severe.
Proof: In Appendix.
Part (i) of the proposition gives conditions for the firm size dis-
tribution to be degenerate at the efficient firm size. Not surprisingly,
the set of necessary condition relaxes if average productivity in K
firms is high compared to all other firm sizes. However, it is possible
for any technology to find capital market imperfections sufficiently
severe such that an equilibrium with only efficiently sized firms can-
not occur for any distribution of endowments. Part (ii) states then
the desired result of the emergence of both too small and too large
firms in equilibrium which demands sufficiently imperfect capital and
a relatively high average output in these firms compared to other firm
sizes, as long as covered by Assumption A3.1.
3.4.2 Large Firms and Mean Preserving Spreads
The next step is to analyze whether a redistribution of initial endow-
ments can affect technical efficiency in the economy. To this end we
determine the effects of a mean preserving spread in the endowment
distribution on the size distribution of firms. As probability mass
moves from the center of the endowment distribution to its tails,
both the measures of prospective owners of and of workers in large
firms increase. This in turn leads to an increase of the measures of
large firms at the cost of small firms and moves the equilibrium firm
size distribution to the right. The following proposition captures this
insight but first a technical definition is required.
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Definition 3.3 Let F , G be endowment distribution functions with
mean ωM . G is said to a redistribution from owners to workers from
F satisfying the single crossing property if for some ωˆ such that nˆ ≡
|θ(i)| 6= 0 for ωi = ωˆ in equilibrium under F
F (ω) ≥ G(ω)∀ω < ωˆ and F (ω) ≤ G(ω)∀ω > ωˆ
holds.
A transition from F to G describes a redistribution of endowments
from owners to workers such that owners of n > nˆ firms transfers
endowments to agents that hold less ownership than nˆ.14
Proposition 3.3 Let the endowment distribution G be a redistribu-
tion from owners to workers from the the endowment distribution F
as in Definition 3.3. Let G reduce the measure of agents willing to
work in nˆ firms under endowment distribution F . In an economy
with endowment distribution G the measure of n > nˆ firms cannot
be greater than in an economy with endowment distribution F . In
particular, the the largest firm size nmax > nˆ in the economy with F
cannot be smaller than the largest firm size in the economy with G.
Proof: In Appendix.
Proposition 3.3 states that suitable redistributions of initial en-
dowments from owners to workers in fact prevents the formation of
inefficiently large firms. A reshuffle of measure from the tails of the
endowment distribution to the center simply leaves less agents will-
ing to participate in large firms either as workers or as owners. More
generally, it follows that the measure of large firms and thus the skew-
ness of the firm size distribution depend on the kurtosis of the wealth
distribution. The higher the kurtosis of the endowment distribution
the more large firms emerge and the more is the firm size distribution
skewed to the right.
On the other hand, Proposition 3.3 tells an important story about
the dynamics of inequality in the model economy. Whenever endow-
ments are scarce, a decrease in endowment inequality can lead to
14Note that F must be a mean preserving spread of G.
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a decrease in the measure of large firms suggesting a more equal
distribution of income. Therefore the model is consistent with a non-
monotonic evolution of inequality as long as the economy has not
grown enough for endowments to be abundant. To characterize the
effect of changes in inequality on the size distribution of firms is the
aim of the next proposition. A change inducing scarcity of work-
ers (owners) for all firm sizes is typically associated with less (more)
inequality as relatively less (more) agents are poor after the distri-
butional change. A special case of such a change in the endowment
distribution is a uniform scarcity of workers (owners), that is labor
demand exceeds (falls short of) labor supply by the same measure for
all firms.
Proposition 3.4 Assume a unimodal endowment distribution. Let
a redistribution from owners (workers) to workers (owners) of the en-
dowment distribution induce a uniform scarcity of workers (owners)
given old side payments and the new interest rate. Then all side pay-
ments decrease (increase), however side payments in smaller firms
increase (decrease) relative to side payments in larger firms.
Proof: In Appendix.
This proposition tells primarily a story about the evolution of side
payments as inequality in endowments changes in a certain way. But
it contains a more general insight, in that side payments in small firms
are affected relatively less by certain changes in the endowment dis-
tribution than those in larger firms. A particular intriguing corollary
of Proposition 3.4 is that as inequality decreases sufficiently inducing
a uniform scarcity of workers, the firm size distribution converges to
a point measure at n = K provided the capital imperfection is not
overly severe, see Proposition 3.2, and otherwise to a point measure
at n = 1.
It has to be emphasized that more equality in the limit tends to be
associated with higher aggregate output because output efficiency is
not related directly to credit market imperfections. One could argue,
for instance, that a move towards more equally distributed initial
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endowments increases efficiency because an imperfect credit market
that wastes resources is needed less for the proper allocation of en-
dowments. Although this line of reasoning applies to payoffs, which
increase as credit market activity declines, aggregate output is only
influenced by the friction in the capital market through changes in
the equilibrium allocation. On the other hand, the effect on aggre-
gate output of a move towards more equality in the distribution of
endowments is ambiguous. Depending on parameters, the resulting
shift in the firm size distribution towards larger firms can rise the
measure of efficient K firms sufficiently to offset the distorting effect
on firms of other sizes.
3.4.3 Heterogeneity of Large Firms
As we have just shown, the measure of large firms that emerge in
equilibrium depends on the range and the kurtosis of the endowment
distribution. Now we are interested in the properties of the distri-
bution of n > 1 firms and which circumstances favor heterogeneity
in those large firms, that is the variance of the firm size distribution.
Equilibrium firm sizes are determined by the conflicting interests of
poor agents and rich agents. Poor agents wish to work in small firms
whereas rich agents are likely to prefer greater firm sizes. More ex-
actly, an agent’s preferred firm size increases in wealth. This means
large firms will be more heterogenous with respect to size the scarcer
potential large firm owners are and the more heterogenous these are,
that is the more right-skewed the endowment distribution is.
Proposition 3.5 A necessary condition for a firm of size n > 1
to emerge in equilibrium is that (i) the spread between ω and ω is
sufficiently large and endowments are abundant, or (ii) endowments
are scarce and ω is sufficiently large.
Proof: In Appendix.
This proposition states effectively that economies having wealth
distributions with larger support, that is a larger spread between
lower and upper bound of the endowment distribution, ω and ω,
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tend to have more inefficient and therefore larger firms in equilibrium.
Whenever endowments are scarce, firms tend to be larger for unequal
endowment distributions, that is for those with high skewness and a
Paretian right tail. Then the interest rate is high, but endowments of
the wealthiest unmatched agent, ωU , are relatively small due to the
large measure of agents in the left tail.
This indicates that the endowment level of the richest individual
affects the size distribution of firms beyond the result on mean pre-
serving spreads in the last subsection. Connecting this with Propo-
sition 3.4 implies that the size of the largest firms tends to increase
with a change in the endowment distribution such that the gap be-
tween rich and poor widens and owners become scarce. The latter
is attributable to an increase in skewness of the endowment distribu-
tion. Thus skewness appears to favor a heterogenous firm landscape
in the sense that there are large firms of different sizes.
3.4.4 The Income Distribution
The income distribution in equilibrium is key to the dynamics of
the firm size distribution, as it determines next period’s endowment
distribution. Consequently, it is of particular interest whether the
distribution of income is more or less unequal than the endowment
distribution in terms of Propositions 3.3 to 3.5. Note that an agent’s
income is given by vi(n∗, θ∗, ω(i), r∗). Suppose for the moment that
ω > 0 in order to properly define the endowment gap for agents i
and j, ω(i) > ω(j), as ω(i)ω(j) . Define the income gap between the same
agents i and j likewise as vi(.)vj(.) . The following proposition character-
izes the link from endowment to income distribution.
Proposition 3.6 An agent’s income is weakly increasing in endow-
ments. Moreover, the income gap between the richest and the poorest
agent in the economy exceeds the endowment gap if the poorest agent
remains unmatched in equilibrium. However, the endowment gap be-
tween the richest and the poorest agent matched into some firm of
size n exceeds the income gap.
Proof: In Appendix.
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Proposition 3.6 provides a valuable insight. For capital scarce
economies income inequality exceeds endowment inequality between
unmatched agents and agents matched into firms but not between
workers and owners. This finding suggests that a dynamic version
of the model will be compatible with a non-monotonic relationship
of inequality and growth. On the one hand the income distribution
of those agents matched is less unequal than the endowment distri-
bution of those agents incorporating a trickle-down effect of growth.
On the other hand the trickle-down effect does not extend to those
agents remaining unmatched creating greater income inequality than
endowment inequality between agents employed or owning and those
agents remaining in autarky. As the capital stock grows less agents
remain in autarky and the trickle-down effect dominates. Moreover,
there is a dual economy flavor to the dynamics of this model. Whether
the economy is able to transform into an economy of firms from an
economy consisting of agents living in economic autarky then depends
largely on the economies’ ability to generate capital stock growth and
thus on agents’ optimal saving policies.
3.5 Application
3.5.1 Bimodal Size Distributions
In this section we consider the extent to which the model is able
to capture empirical findings on firm size distributions in different
countries. Firm size distributions in developing countries are typically
characterized by the missing middle (see e.g. Tybout, 2000). That is,
the share of the work force employed in intermediately sized firms is
significantly less than both the share of those employed in small or
large firms. A sufficient condition for this is that the size distribution
of firms is bimodal with one peak to left and the other one to the right
of the mean. In contrast, developed economies typically have single
peaked distributions of workforce per firm size with the modus to
the left of the mean. Suppose that the endowment density is single
peaked and strictly increasing to the left of its peak while strictly
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decreasing to the right of it.
Proposition 3.4 already suggests how a bimodal size distribution of
firms may emerge. Starting from a relatively equal distribution, in the
sense that it is almost degenerate at its mean, and reshuffling measure
to induce mean preserving spreads, that yield a uniform scarcity of
owners, makes side payments in smaller firms decrease relative to
those in large firms. For a sufficiently large reshuffle of measure and
sufficiently severe capital market imperfections this will induce the
measure of some n firm to exceed the measure of some n′ firm with
n > n′ > 1 as larger firms become more attractive to potential owners
in equilibrium. Given that there still remains sufficient probability
mass around ω(i) = c the measure of symmetric firms exceeds that
of smaller n > 1 firms and the size distribution of firms is bimodal.
On the other hand, necessary conditions for a bimodal distribution
are given in the following (heuristic) proposition.
Proposition 3.7 Necessary conditions for a bimodal firm size distri-
bution in equilibrium are sufficient skewness of the endowment distri-
bution and (i) for the left peak sufficient average output of some small
firm compared to larger firms or sufficient mass of the endowment
distribution around the mean, or (ii) for the right peak a Paretian
right tail or sufficient average output of some large firm compared to
smaller firms.
Proof: In Appendix.
This means that for a bimodal size distribution to prevail either
some n > 2 firm must be very efficient at least locally, that means
compared to the next smaller sized firm, or side payments in that n
firm must be particularly high which can only be the case if owners for
this firm are scarce and thus the endowment distribution sufficiently
skewed. This reflects the simple fact that there must be both enough
agents weakly preferring to work in such a firm and enough agents
willing to own them. Depending on which market side is relatively
scarce, side payments in this firm type must be extreme - either high
or low. For the left peak to emerge sufficient endowment measure
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around c and a sufficiently high degree of capital market imperfec-
tions is needed as well. The intuition for this is that the bargaining
inefficiency increases with firm size as long as the capital market is
not perfect.
In case of particularly high side payments for some n > 2 firm,
we know from Proposition 3.4 that side payments increase faster for
larger firms as the measure of agents willing to work exceeds the
measure of owners proportionately for any large firm. This means
that the general level of side payments has to be sufficiently high in
the economy which is only possible if the endowment distribution is
very skewed and there are many poor and few rich agents and capital
market imperfections are sufficiently severe. An illustration of this
case follows in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
Figure 3.2: Wealth distribution leading to an inverse firm size distri-
bution
Figure 3.2 depicts an endowment distribution that results in a
missing middle of firm sizes. The mode is situated far to the left,
thereafter the density is a decreasing convex function becoming rel-
atively flat near the mean in order to put sufficient probability mass
on the endowment levels where agents prefer to own assets. The lat-
ter suggests necessity of a Paretian tail. The firm size distribution
represented by the darker bars has a left peak at symmetric n = 1
firms and a right peak at n = 5 firms. The lighter bars represent
the overall workforce allocated to each size category. It is notable
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Figure 3.3: Wealth distribution leading to a normal firm size distri-
bution
that the efficient firm size in this case is K = 3 and the renegotiation
payoffs are determined by intra-firm bargaining (Stole and Zwiebel,
1996).
Now suppose the mode shifts to the right while preserving the
mean as depicted in Figure 3.3. As a consequence, probability mass
is shifted away from the tails which may result in a loss of the right
tail’s Paretian properties. Then less agents want to own or work in
large firms and the size density moves slightly to the left. A move
from a very unequal endowment distribution to a more equal one
transforms a bimodal firm size distribution into a single-peaked one.
3.5.2 Inequality and Efficiency
Given an economy has a bimodal firm size distribution in equilib-
rium what are the implications for the efficiency of the allocation?
Unfortunately, they appear to be ambiguous at best as a bimodal
firm size distribution in this model may reflect either a very ineffi-
cient allocation with the intermediate firm sizes being efficient, as
in the example in figures 3.2 and 3.3, or a more efficient allocation
with one of the peaks on the efficient size. At the heart of this lies
the fact that intra-firm bargaining leads to an unequal distribution
of profits within firms which can only be compensated ex ante by
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side payments using the imperfect capital market. Hence, it depends
on the capital market imperfection which firm size turns out to be
the most attractive one given that side payments must compensate
workers for intra-firm bargaining.
As Proposition 3.2 suggests, a high degree of capital market im-
perfections precludes the formation of only efficient K > 1 firms even
when the endowment distribution is degenerate. In this case inequal-
ity in endowments can serve to bypass an improperly functioning
capital market and therefore more inequality in the sense of skewness
and kurtosis may increase aggregate income (see e.g. Gru¨ner and
Schils (2002) for a similar finding). Whenever capital market imper-
fections are not too severe, an unequal distribution of firm profits ex
post can successfully be compensated by side payments. In this case
a move towards more equality in the endowment distribution drives
down the level of side payments required to equate labor supply and
demand, so that in the limit only efficient firms emerge.
3.5.3 Increasing Aggregate Endowments
Efficiency and the shape of the firm size distribution also depend on
the aggregate wealth of the model economy. This insight lies at the
heart of the discussion on desirability of foreign aid and foreign direct
investments. This subsection provides examples of the effects of both
in our framework. If endowments are scarce, Proposition 3.2 states
that side payments are positive for all firm sizes. This implies im-
mediately that for capital market clearing to hold the poorest agents
remain unmatched as they need to borrow to pay the side payments.
Scarcity of endowments may also be associated with a scarcity of own-
ers. In this case the firm size distribution is largely determined by
the firm size choices of rich agents. Adding wealth into this economy
does not necessarily lead to a more efficient allocation or an increase
in aggregate income. If despite the increase in aggregate endowments
workers are still sufficiently abundant, the efficiency of the allocation
depends mainly on the distribution of the additional wealth.
To illustrate this idea let us conduct a thought experiment by
dropping additional capital on the economy. Formally, we shift the
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whole endowment density to the right and increase skewness. Thus
aggregate endowments increase (by approximately three percent in
this case) while holding the cost of an asset constant at c. The
efficient firm size is again K = 3 in this example. Details of the
parametrization can be found in the appendix. Endowment densities
are depicted to the left in Figure 3.4 and the corresponding workforce
distributions across firms to the right. Note that the bars represent
measures of agents being member of a firm of the respective size. The
dashed line represents the initial endowment distribution and the en-
dowment distribution after the increase in wealth is depicted by the
solid line. Workforce distributions are drawn to the right in Figure
3.4 with the darker bars corresponding to the equilibrium before the
increase in wealth.
Figure 3.4: An increase in wealth leading to a decrease in income
Given the initial endowment distribution, workers are relatively
abundant and owners relatively scarce. As aggregate wealth increases
sufficiently, this might reverse. However, if aggregate wealth increases
by a moderate amount, workers remain abundant whereas the mea-
sure of owners increases and thus the measure of efficient K firms
may decrease. In the case of Figure 3.4 more agents become mem-
bers of inefficiently large n = 5 firms. This is favored by the rightward
shuffle of a substantial amount of probability mass among the poorly
endowed and by the fact that the interest rate has to decrease.
Of course, the effect in the example is of transitory nature only.
3.5. APPLICATION 77
If endowments of the poorest agent increase sufficiently so do equilib-
rium outside options, notably the payoff from being member of a sym-
metric firm. This drives down side payments and ultimately moves
the firm size distribution towards a single peaked one. Whether the
modus sits at the efficient firm size or at symmetric firms depends
on the severity of the capital market imperfection and on relative
productivity as in Proposition 3.2.
To achieve an increase in aggregate income or even productiv-
ity in this particular case, aggregate endowments must increase suf-
ficiently or the additional endowments must be distributed appro-
priately. This means here that the capital injection should induce
receivers of capital to own K firms. For economies with scarce en-
dowments and a large efficient firm size, a uniform increase of en-
dowments tends primarily to increase the measure of small and large
firms. Only when poor agents become sufficiently scarce may the
general equilibrium effect on side payments facilitate the formation
of large efficient firms.
Now suppose that we add a small measure of very rich agents
to an economy where workers are abundant and side payments are
high, as in the example. Given that the additional endowments are
sufficiently few then workers may still be abundant for all firm sizes,
in the sense of Proposition 3.4. In this case very rich agents face high
side payments and find it optimal to set up large firms. Then, as in
Figure 3.4, the right tail of the size distribution tends to gain measure.
If the efficient firm size is small but greater than 1 this decreases
productivity and may decrease even aggregate output. This can be
interpreted as an influx of foreign direct investment adding a measure
of agents facing foreign capital cost and not being subject to the local
credit market imperfections. Therefore economies with high wealth
inequality and scarce endowments need not benefit from foreign direct
investments unless the amount of investment is sufficiently large.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Allowing for partial and joint ownership, i.e. dropping Assumption
3.2, results primarily in adding another dimension of complexity to
notation and analysis of equilibrium allocation. Joint ownership of
the factory, that is asset AI , could be accommodated relatively easily,
changing the size of the symmetric firm size to the efficient one and
thus replacing symmetric n = 1 firms by symmetric n = K firms.
A natural application of this is the emergence of cooperatives, for
instance. In this case the firm size distribution converges always to
the efficient one when capital market imperfections or endowment
inequality vanish and effects on efficiency in the previous section be-
come less ambiguous. Otherwise the results carry over.
By introducing partial ownership another set of cutoff endowment
levels emerges that allows a finer coarsening of the type space. There-
fore the main effect of an extension of the model would be to create
a new investment opportunity with cost situated between those of
n = 1 and n = 2 firms. Asset investments that induce this cost to
agents involve agents owning one or two assets thus qualifying for
n = 1 or n = 2 firms. While there may emerge some shifting of
equilibrium measure between these firm types the general property
of the model that poorer agents choose less and richer agents more
ownership of assets does not change. As it is exactly this feature
that drives the missing middle result in section 6, we conjecture that
distributional results will not be affected significantly by admitting
partial ownership. As owners of only type II assets too have an incen-
tive of increasing firm size beyond the efficient one (see Gall, 2004)
the scope for changing the central finding that both too large and too
small firms emerge in equilibrium appears to be quite limited.
We are able to present an example where partial ownership can
be fully admitted by capping firm size at n = 3 assets AII in order
to keep the model numerically solvable. The results of a numerical
simulation of this model are shown in figure 3.5.15 The lighter bars
show the distribution of the workforce and the darker bars the distri-
15The details of the simulation are provided in the appendix.
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Figure 3.5: An example with partial ownership
bution of firms according to their size. Parameters are chosen such
that the efficient coalition size is K = 2, that is a coalition with two
assets. Indeed, both too small and too large productive coalitions
emerge in equilibrium and there appears a missing middle of the size
distribution of business firms.
The view that AI and AII in this model resemble productive
non-human assets as a factory building and machines is by no means
exclusive. It is consistent with the model to let these assets stand for
e.g. plants thus giving an indication inefficient vertical integration
and empire building. This points to an interesting reinterpretation
of the model: for instance asset AI might be a brand and asset AII
a plant. Then endowment inequality determines the variety of goods
produced in an economy. In the examples in section 5 more unequal
endowment distributions translate into less variety of goods consis-
tent with empirical facts.
An extension of this work could analyze the effects of the develop-
ment of contractual and labor institutions, for instance by introducing
profit sharing contracts. Here arises a neat connection to the work
of Williamson (2000) proposing a theory of developing institutions
where secure property rights emerge before contract enforcement. In
this sense this work aims to contribute to an institutional explanation
of economic development.
How do our findings fit into the big picture of development eco-
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nomics? We already mentioned that within developing economies the
distribution of labor force among firm sizes is frequently found to be
bimodal, and in that way to lack labor in intermediately sized firms.
This feature is not known for industrialized economies. Our model is
able to explain this empirical fact as bimodal firm size distributions
emerge for very skewed endowment distributions with a Paretian right
tail. As endowment inequality decreases and the modus shifts to the
right the firm size distribution becomes uni-modal. Moreover, under
intra-firm bargaining an increase in endowments does not necessar-
ily lead to an increase of production, especially if endowments are
scarce, the poor abundant and the additional endowments are not
distributed exactly as to induce additional demand for ownership of
efficient firms. Moreover, the model generates a wedge in income of
unmatched agents and members of firms thus creating a potential for
class societies reminiscent of the dual economy. This suggests that
the model provides an adequate instrument for policy analysis of the
industrial sector in developing countries.
Chapter 4
On the Role of Markets in
the Hold-up Problem
4.1 Introduction
It is a common perception that economic agents face the correct in-
centives for their choice of actions if only there exist competitive
markets and corresponding prices for the consequences of their ac-
tions. In particular, it has been argued (Cole et al., 2001, Felli and
Roberts, 2002) that the well-known hold-up problem (see e.g. Klein
et al., 1978, Williamson, 1975) can be ameliorated, if not solved, by
the presence of markets. In the canonical example agents undertake
non-contractible complementary investments prior to an opportunity
to jointly produce output. At the production stage investments are
sunk and agents may have the incentive to renege on their contractual
obligation. Renegotiation-proof contracts may then not fully inter-
nalize the social benefits of their investments. However, competition
on markets ex post may lead to prices capturing the social return of
effort, thus inducing first best incentives at the investment stage.
However, in practice only rarely can utility be expected to be
transferred perfectly between agents on markets. The presence of
e.g. imperfect credit markets as in chapter 3 of this dissertation,
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contracting constraints, or social norms limits the ability of agents
to transfer utility to their co-workers or partners ex ante, when con-
tracting in the matching market. For instance, a spread between
borrowing and lending interest induces a wedge in the opportunity
cost of capital between rich and poor agents thus precluding a one-
to-one transfer of utility. If there is limited liability in an economy,
making side payments in the matching market face tightens the in-
centive constraints of agents subject to moral hazard. Social norms
postulating the exchange of gifts rather than payments may drive
a wedge between agents’ opportunity costs, thus preventing perfect
transfer of utility.
In such a framework the intuition that competition sets correct
incentives is incomplete. Whenever markets are characterized by less
than perfectly transferable utility, market prices no longer have to
coincide with the full social benefit of agents’ actions. For instance,
as Becker (1973) pointed out, non-transferabilities may change the
matching pattern compared to the efficient allocation. More recently,
results characterizing conditions on the circumstances that lead to
inefficient patterns are provided in the work of Legros and Newman
(2002, 2004b). Then the desirability of markets as a solution to the
hold-up problem may weaken considerably. To test this conjecture
we analyze two settings. On the one hand, we let markets open
before an investment choice affecting agents’ characteristics is made
– corresponding to the classical hold-up problem. And on the other
hand, we let markets open after agents have made the investment
choice. As it turns out, the presence of markets ex post does not
generally increase output in an economy, but may be harmful. This
result continues to hold if we allow markets to open both ex ante and
ex post.
Intuitively, market imperfections that induce non-transferabilities
of utility have a twofold effect on the market allocation. On the
one hand, they may render the matching pattern inefficient, and on
the other hand, they typically induce inefficient incentives for the
investment ex ante. Indeed the market allocation may be distorted
sufficiently, so that an ex post matching market is no longer desirable
4.1. INTRODUCTION 83
both from an individual and a social point of view. It has to be
emphasized that our results are caused solely by deterministic effects
of non-transferabilities of utility and do not hinge on multiplicity of
equilibria and coordination failure as in Mailath et al. (2004).
To provide an example with an immediate application, consider
teamwork production where prior to production agents have an in-
vestment opportunity to acquire education, thereby augmenting their
human capital. Suppose further that human capital positively af-
fects an agent’s productivity and that individual inputs to produc-
tion are strategic substitutes. Efficiency then requires negative as-
sortative matching to maximize aggregate output. Permitting non-
transferabilities in form of cost sharing contracts as the only means of
utility transfer between agents within teams changes the picture. If
markets open after the investment opportunity, matching is positive
assortative. The intuition is that in order to be an attractive match,
agents need to be able to compensate their matches. In this example,
compensation is limited to cost sharing and an agent’s human capi-
tal. In order to match with a highly productive type, agents have to
be sufficiently attractive, meaning that they have to be sufficiently
productive themselves. This sets education investment incentives too
high, resulting in over-investment in human capital within coalitions.
In contrast, if agents match prior to investments, investment incen-
tives are determined by a coordination game within the firm. Then
investment incentives are given by the game’s payoffs – which may
depend on the matching equilibrium payoffs. Despite of usually too
low investment incentives compared to the first best investment level,
an allocation under ex ante matching may generate higher output and
even Pareto dominate an allocation under ex post matching.
The example appears to be consistent with the well-documented
observation of over-education within firms (see e.g. the survey by
Hartog, 2000), that is the presence of workers having acquired more
education than needed for the task they are employed at. A more re-
cent study (Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2002) focuses on the competition
for jobs among the unemployed. They find clear evidence of a crowd-
ing out of the less educated by the more educated for jobs that are
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reported to require comparatively low education. This clearly lends
some support to the relevance of positive assortative matching in an
ex-post labor market. Our result of distorted investment incentives
ex ante provides a caveat for prolonging the duration of compulsory
schooling. Indeed, empirical studies on the effect of education spells
on growth are as plenty as ambiguous (see e.g. the survey by Krueger
and Lindahl, 2001). There are some studies finding a negative rela-
tionship between duration of education and growth (e.g. Barro and
Lee, 1993, Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994), but do not seem overly ro-
bust. However, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) find some evidence of an
inverted U-shaped relationship, such that education is a significantly
positive factor for growth only in the countries with the lowest level
of education. This appears to be consistent with our model.
Taking one step further, the optimality of market timing may re-
verse as market imperfections vanish, thus providing a motivation for
the development of market institutions. Moving both markets closer
to perfectly transferable utility, the ex post market equilibrium may
switch to negative assortative matching, thus erasing the matching
inefficiency yet retaining higher investment incentives than ex ante
markets.
To put this into context with literature, in particular the one on
property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990),
let us emphasize that by no means investments have to be relationship
specific as in the property rights literature, while, of course, specificity
of investments can be easily accommodated within our framework.
Quite the reverse is true, exclusive business relations may arise as
a result of inefficient markets. It is therefore possible to interpret
our results within the theory of the firm, where the firm emerges to
shelter its members’ investments from markets.
In the literature on the hold-up problem two recent contribu-
tions generate first best investment incentives by assuming markets
with perfectly transferable utility. Cole et al. (2001) examine match-
ing equilibria under transferable utility with continua of agents and
two-sided investment in complementary attributes. They find ineffi-
ciencies due to the possibility of multiple matching equilibria which
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arise if the optimal investment choice function has discontinuities.
However, an agent’s equilibrium investments are constrained efficient
given the coalition this agent is matched into in equilibrium. The
optimal allocation is found to be always in the equilibrium set, and
for sufficiently large attribute spaces it is indeed the only equilibrium.
Felli and Roberts (2002) analyze the hold-up problem with a finite
number of agents. They get efficiency for one-sided investments in at-
tributes. Here, too, investments are constrained efficient with respect
to the respective coalition. The intuition is that firms are auctioned
off to workers who receive the full marginal benefit while firms receive
marginal benefits equivalent to full compensation for the next smaller
attribute firm. However, uniqueness of the efficient equilibrium de-
pends crucially on the fact that attributes of agents from the other
market side are sufficiently close to each other. Thus, when choos-
ing their attribute, agents have an incentive to choose the optimal
investment within the equilibrium match. Peters and Siow (2002)
consider a two sided matching model with two-sided investments in a
single attribute where utility is strictly non-transferable. In contrast
to the contributions cited above which assume supermodularity of the
joint production function, agents’ attributes are perfect substitutes.
This and symmetry in the type distributions lead to efficiency for
large economies. However, for finite economies the under-investment
problem is ameliorated but efficiency need not be achieved.
Mailath and Postlewaite (2004) present an application of non-
transferable utility matching and the theorem of the second best and
consider different degrees of non-transferability of utility. An econ-
omy may move from a regime with strictly non-transferable utility
to one where limited side payments are possible. After the regime
change, the matching exhibits no longer positive assortative match-
ing (see the results by Legros and Newman, 2002, 2004b, for a more
general analysis). This is constrained efficient given the joint pro-
duction technology. Due to the absence of insurance and income
uncertainty, production efficiency of the allocation may be higher
under the regime where some limited means of utility transfer within
coalitions is possible. However, their paper does not consider ex ante
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investments in attributes.
The chapter will proceed by introducing the framework and some
technical preliminaries in Section 2. Section 3 provides a simple
model of human capital acquisition and labor-sharing contracts. In
section 4 we present a more general differentiable model of non-
transferable utility matching allowing us to state an impossibility
result in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 The Framework
4.2.1 Agents
Throughout the chapter we will consider a world populated by a con-
tinuum of agents living on A and B, both sets endowed with equal
Lebesgue measure. That is, the analysis in this chapter focuses on
two-sided matching, although most of our results should carry over to
one-sided matching models as well. Agents are characterized by their
type θi, describing the characteristics they are born with. An agent’s
type may determine for instance cost of productive activity, but also
captures an agent’s ability to transfer utility to another agent. In
addition to an agent’s type, an agent also has an attribute xi. In
contrast to the type, the attribute may be changed by an agent at
some stage, for instance by investing in human capital and thus in-
creasing productivity at a cost determined by the type. An agent’s
investment in his attribute is non-contractible. Agents derive utility
from consumption which depends only on output and possible side
payments and is assumed to be additively separable in consumption
and side payments.
4.2.2 Coalitions
We focus exclusively on coalitions of pairs of agents C = (i ∈ A, j ∈
B) consisting of one agent from each market side. Within a coali-
tion there exists an opportunity of joint production. However, due
to the non-transferability, output may not be transferred at a rate
of 1 within a coalition. The utility possibility frontier of a coalition
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of agents a and b denotes the Pareto frontier of all attainable com-
binations of both agents’ utilities within a coalition. In particular,
the utility possibility frontier of a coalition of agents a and b will be
represented by a non-negative real-valued function φ(a, b, v) denoting
a’s maximum payoff when b obtains payoff v ∈ R0+.1
This means φ(.) represents the Pareto frontier of feasible distribu-
tions of the coalition’s payoff between coalition members. In general,
joint payoffs can be redistributed between members only by side pay-
ments at the matching stage or by appropriately choosing actions
in the subgame within a coalition in case the extensive form allows
for this. It follows that under perfectly transferable utility the util-
ity possibility frontier always has the slope of −1 whereas this holds
no longer for the case of non-transferable utility. An example for
φ(a, b, v) under non-transferabilities is depicted in figure 4.1.
In the graph agents’ payoffs without side payments from being
member of a coalition (a, b) given their attributes are denoted by U
and V . Agent a has inferior means of transferring utility compared
to agent b as the utility a has to spend to give b one unit is greater
than the utility b has to give up in order to increase a’s utility by one
unit. Two properties of φ are of special interest for our analysis and
are given in attribute notation as follows.
Definition 4.1 φ(.) is said to have generalized increasing differences
(GID) if for all a, b ∈ A and c, d ∈ B with xa > xb and xc > xd
φ(c, a, φ(a, d, v)) ≥ φ(c, b, φ(b, d, v))
for all v ∈ [0, v¯] with v¯ defined implicitly by φ(b, d, v¯) = 0.
φ(.) is said to have generalized decreasing differences (GDD) if for
all a, b ∈ A and c, d ∈ B
φ(c, a, φ(a, d, v)) ≤ φ(c, b, φ(b, d, v))
for all v ∈ [0, v¯].
1Here we slightly abuse notation. φ(a, b, v) will typically depend either on
both agents’ types θa and θb in the case of matching prior to attribute choice, or
on both agents’ attributes xa and xb. However, we use an agent’s identity as an
abbreviation for the relevant variable.
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Figure 4.1: Utility possibility frontier at the matching stage
As shown in Legros and Newman (2004a), these conditions determine
the matching pattern in equilibrium.
4.2.3 Matching Equilibrium
Coalition formation occurs by matching, and the solution concept is
a matching equilibrium. We admit side payments between coalition
members albeit of a limited form governed by the agents’ transfer-
ability type.
Definition 4.2 A matching equilibrium is a one-to-one mappingM :
A→ B that assigns any a ∈ A to some b ∈ B and payoffs {ui}i∈A,B
such that
• M is measure-consistent,
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• ua = φ(a, b, ub) for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
• there does not exist a ∈ A and b 6= M(a) ∈ B with ua <
φ(a, b, v) and ub < v for all v ∈ [0, v¯] with v¯ defined implicitly
by φ(b, d, v¯) = 0.
Note that by definition the matching equilibrium coincides with
the f-core which has the virtue of existence under relatively mild
conditions (see Kaneko andWooders, 1986, 1996). It is notable at this
point that an agent’s attribute and the degree of utility transferability
act as substitutes with respect to an agent’s attractiveness towards
other agents in an ex post market. For instance, an agent from market
side A may be indifferent between matching with an agent b, who has
high attribute and low transferability of utility, and an agent b′ with
low attribute but excellent means of transferring utility. This is the
only source of distortions in this matching model.
Of special interest are monotone matching patterns such as posi-
tive assortative matching (PAM) which is said to hold if the equilib-
rium matching function µ(.) has the following property:
xa ≥ xb ⇔ xµ(a) ≥ xµ(b) ∀ a, b ∈ A,
for matching taking place after attribute choice. Likewise, negative
assortative matching (NAM) holds for µ(.) such that
xa ≤ xb ⇔ xµ(a) ≥ xµ(b) ∀ a, b ∈ A.
Legros and Newman (2004a) show that generalized increasing dif-
ferences of the utility possibility frontier implies positive assortative
matching independently of the distribution of types. Correspond-
ingly, generalized decreasing differences induce negative assortative
matching in equilibrium.
4.2.4 The Timing of Markets
A central issue of this chapter will be to compare efficiency of two
different regimes of market activity. Under one regime, markets will
be allowed to open before agents invest in their attributes, a case we
90 CHAPTER 4. MARKETS AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
will refer to as ex ante markets. Under another regime, markets will
be allowed to open after investments in attributes have been chosen
by agents, a case that will be referred to as ex post markets.2 That
means the sequence of events is given by
(i) Nature chooses agents’ types
(ii) Matching markets may or may not open ex ante
(iii) Agents decide on their attribute investment
(iv) Matching markets may or may not open ex post
4.2.5 A Numerical Example
Let us look now at a simple numerical example in the spirit of the one
in Becker (1973) where constraints on contracting render matching
markets outcomes inefficient. In particular, we assume complete non-
transferability of utility, so that markets both ex ante and ex post
exhibit positive assortative matching despite the substitutability of
investments in the production function. However, ex post markets in
this example generate over-investment whereas ex ante markets do
not. Agents are born without physical endowment and there is no
capital market. Although agents are free to contract on future output,
when deviating from splitting the surplus this incurs an efficiency loss
which we impose on the model. In line with incomplete contracts
theory this efficiency loss is assumed to be sufficiently severe as to
generate completely non-transferable utility.
The economy is populated by two market sides represented by
two continua A and B of measure 1. Agents’ types consist of the
investment cost to increase their attribute, θi, and of their lack of
ability to transfer utility. Assume there are only two cost types,
1 < θ < 32 and θ > 3, and the measure of agents on market side A with
θ, α, is equal to the one on market side B. Let α ∈ (0, 1). Agents have
2This is equivalent to a regime where markets open both before and after
attribute investments, but commitment of agents to remain in the coalition chosen
ex ante is excluded.
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the possibility to form partnerships consisting of two members, one
from each market side. Depending on whether agents have invested
in their attribute (I) or not (NI) the payoffs in a coalition (a, b) are
given by
I NI
I 4, 4 3.5, 3.5
NI 3.5, 3.5 2, 2
That is, payoffs within coalition are split equally and agents have
no means to deviate from that distribution nor to make side pay-
ments when forming a coalition in the market. Moreover, payoffs
have decreasing returns to the human capital investment. This im-
plies immediately that efficient allocations are characterized by neg-
ative assortative matching.
Ex post market
We are analyzing two different regimes. First assume there is a
matching market after agents invest in their attributes, but not be-
fore they invested. We already know that, due to the structure of
payoffs, for sufficiently severe non-transferable utility positive assor-
tative matching will obtain. A low cost agent a who invests, either
matches with an agent b who has invested leading to a payoff of 4−θ,
or matches with an agent b who has not invested, giving agent a a
payoff of 3.5−θ. Hence, low cost agents a always invest whereas high
cost agents never do.3 The same reasoning applies to agents b, so
that under our assumption of completely non-transferable utility all
low cost agents invest before the matching market, whereas high cost
agents never do. This means under the second regime measure α of
coalitions consist of two low cost agents who both invest and measure
1− α of coalitions consist of two high cost agents who do not invest.
3However, there is the possibility of asymmetric equilibria where low cost
agents on one market side expect low cost agents on the other market side to
invest. These asymmetric equilibria are, however, an artefact of the two-sided
matching and disappear when matching is one-sided.
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Ex ante market
Let us now look at the ex ante matching market when the ex post
market does not open. Then within a coalition agents split the sur-
plus. In this case an agent a invests if 4 − θa > 3.5 given his match
b invests and if 3.5 − θa > 2 given his match does not invest. This
means, within coalitions a low cost agent a invests if agent b does not
and vice versa. High cost agents never invest. Assume for the sake
of simplicity that agents have access to a correlated randomization
device when deciding on investments in attributes. Then expected
payoffs of two low cost agents in a coalition are 3.5 − 12θ, 3.5 − 12θ.
Given the payoffs from the investment game within the coalition the
payoffs in the ex ante matching market are given by the following
matrix.
θ θ
θ 3.5− 12θ, 3.5− 12θ 3.5− θ, 3.5
θ 3.5, 3.5− θ 2, 2
Given that the means of transferring utility is sufficiently inefficient
the matching will exhibit positive assortative matching in equilib-
rium. This pins down an allocation where measure α of equilibrium
coalitions consists of low cost agents with exactly one agent investing
and measure (1−α) of coalitions consists of high cost agents that do
not invest.
Discussion
Calculating the difference in aggregate output between ex ante and ex
post markets yields α(θ−1) which is positive under our assumptions.
This means that aggregate output is greater when markets open prior
to the investment only. Moreover, ex ante markets Pareto dominate
ex post markets from an ex ante perspective in this example as low
cost agents’ expected payoffs are strictly higher in ex ante markets
whereas high cost agents’ payoffs are exactly the same under both
regimes.
Hence, in this example competition ex post reduces efficiency. The
intuition is that in order to become a more attractive match in the
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market, an agent has an incentive to invest in the attribute whenever
this is cheaper than transferring utility. This holds quite generally
for matching markets with non-transferable utility and the efficiency
result can be expected to carry over to other cases where efficient
matching is not positive assortative.
Introducing transferability in this example leads to interesting
dynamics (see Gall et al. (2005) for a more thorough analysis of this
example). Assume that agents have access to a perfect means of
utility transfer, called liquidity. However, the maximum amount of
utility they are able to transfer is bounded above by L > 0. Then, for
L < 12 the analysis remains unchanged for sufficiently high θ. For
1
2 <
L < θ2 agents of type θ in the ex post market are able to compensate
agents of type θ and negative assortative matching emerges, whereas
the results for the ex ante market continue to hold for sufficiently
high θ. In this case, aggregate output with ex post markets exceeds
aggregate output with ex ante markets. Thus the constrained efficient
timing of markets is reversed. For L > θ2 both markets yield negative
assortative matching and efficient investments.4
The following illustration provides some reason to believe in the
relevance of this last finding. Suppose that the non-transferabilities of
utility are caused by capital market imperfections. Agents may have
to finance side payments in the matching market by loans which are
subject to moral hazard. Absent non-pecuniary punishments this
drives a wedge between the borrowing and the deposit rate (see e.g.
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The development of credit market institu-
tions may then be represented by the introduction of liquidity in the
market. As a consequence, the optimal timing of markets switches
from ex ante to ex post. An ex ante market in our terminology is
equivalent to a commitment ex ante not to go on the market ex post,
a commitment that can be solved by a firm, for instance. As market
imperfections decline the value of this commitment becomes obsolete
and productive activity increasingly relies on spot markets. Hence,
our example may offer some insight into the raise and the fall of the
4For this result we need the correlated equilibrium in the investment game
within a coalition of two θ agents with ex ante markets.
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corporation.
4.3 Cost-sharing and Educational Attain-
ment
This section examines the decision of economic agents whether to in-
vest in human capital in order to increase productivity. After the in-
vestment in human capital, agents pursue productive activities yield-
ing output. Production occurs in teams of two agents and has the
property that attribute investments are substitutes. In particular, it
will never be efficient that both team members undertake the human
capital investment. We analyze two possible regimes: one in which
the labor market takes place prior to human capital investment and
one in which the labor market opens after the human capital invest-
ment. This may be interpreted as different durations of compulsory
schooling as by prolonging compulsory schooling agents have an addi-
tional opportunity to invest in human capital before they are allowed
to enter the labor market. It turns out that prolonged compulsory
schooling may indeed deteriorate aggregate output.
Suppose the economy consists of two market sides, each one pop-
ulated by a continuum of agents of measure 1. The agents differ with
respect to their type θi which can be high, θ, or low, θ < θ.5 Both
types of agents have measure 12 each on both market sides. Agents
have the opportunity to form teams in order to produce joint out-
put. The production opportunity may be thought of as a local public
good giving both agents the same payoff pi from its existence. To
produce the good a fixed amount of labor K is required, and inputs
to production are perfect substitutes.6
5We follow the convention of denoting a high type by an upper bar which
corresponds to low cost.
6Empirically, some support is lent to this assumption in a study by van
Smoorenburg and van der Velden (2000) who find evidence that overeducated
individuals are less likely to receive on-the-job training in the Netherlands, sug-
gesting that there is some substitutability of educational skills acquired before
entering a firm and those acquired within firms which supports the specification
of our example.
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We assume that only the division of labor within a team of agents
is contractible. Moreover, agents have the opportunity to invest in
their attributes prior to production. An agent who invests has the
attribute c, an agent who does not has c < c. The attributes can be
interpreted as productivity, as they affect both unit labor cost and
value of output. The investment in attributes comes at a cost, that is
either high, θ−1, or low, θ
−1
. Finally, the attributes of agents within
a team have some influence on the payoff they receive from the good:
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c) > pi(c, c)− pi(c, c) > c
c
[pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)], (4.1)
and pi(.) is symmetric. That is, we assume decreasing returns to
attributes in the payoff. An agent i has the utility function
ui = pi(ci, c−i)− xi
ci
− k(ci, θi), (4.2)
where k(.) = 1θi if ci = c and k(.) = 0 otherwise. Given the fixed
amount of labor required for the production of the good, xi = K −
x−i. Finally, we need to state assumptions on the investment cost to
generate the desired results. We assume that θ is prohibitively low,
i.e.
1
θ
> pi(c, c)− pi(c, c). (4.3)
The high type is assumed to have low investment cost, but not too
low, that is
2
c
c
[pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)] > 1
θ
> pi(c, c)− pi(c, c) +K
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
. (4.4)
Moreover, we assume that c ≥ 2c to save notation.
4.3.1 Ex post Market
Suppose for now that the matching market takes place after invest-
ments in attributes. In this case investment costs are sunk, and from
(4.2) we can easily derive a utility possibility frontier for this market.
First note that ua in terms of ub is given by
ua(ca, cb, ub) = pi(ca, cb)− K − cb(pi(ca, cb)− ub)ca.
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A similar expression can be derived for ub(cb, ca, ua). Both expres-
sions define the utility possibility frontier φ(i, j, v) = ui(ci, cj , v).
Now we are in a position to check whether one of the generalized dif-
ference conditions applies to this case. Indeed, generalized increasing
differences, that is in this case
ub(c, c, ua(c, c, v)) > ub(c, c, ua(c, c, v)) ∀v ∈ [0;φ(c, c, 0)],
holds if
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c) > c
c
[pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)]. (4.5)
This is assumed to be the case in (4.1). Therefore, in the ex post mar-
ket positive assortative matching occurs. Figure 4.2 provides an illus-
tration of the generalized increasing difference condition. It contains
the utility possibility frontiers of heterogeneous coalitions (dashed
lines) and homogeneous coalitions (solid lines). The arrows represent
the generalized increasing difference condition.
Finally, we need to determine ex ante investment behavior of
agents. Consider agent i’s decision ex ante: i invests if
pi(c, c−i)− pi(c, c′−i)−
(
x
c
− x
′
c
)
>
1
θi
.
c−i and x, as well as their starred counterparts, denote expected at-
tribute and labor share in a match conditional on the own attribute.
Then in the matching equilibrium all c agents match with one another
and all c do likewise. Hence, the attribute investment condition re-
duces to
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)− K
2
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
>
1
θi
.
This holds for θi = θ, but not for θi = θ under assumptions (4.1) and
(4.4), and (4.3). To invest is indeed a dominant strategy for the high
type for all equilibrium labor shares as can be seen by assumption
(4.4). Hence, with an ex post matching market, high type agents
invest, whereas low type agents do not, and the matching is positive
assortative.
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Figure 4.2: Generalized increasing differences in the ex post market
4.3.2 Ex ante Market
For the ex ante market case agents match before investing in at-
tributes while being able to contract on the labor share in produc-
tion. Within the team agents play a simultaneous coordination game
by deciding on their attribute investment. Low type agents have suf-
ficiently high cost so that not investing is a dominant strategy for
them. High type agents’ investment decisions depending on their
match’s type are determined by the following inequalities:
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)− xi
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
>
1
θ
and
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)− xi
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
<
1
θ
.
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xi is the labor share agent of i in the matching equilibrium. First
suppose agent i matches with another high type agent. Then x = K2
because of symmetric distributions. This means for
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)− K
2
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
>
1
θ
> pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)
−K
2
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
, (4.6)
in the investment game among high type agents there exist three
equilibria. To make this matching as attractive as possible, we assume
that agents have access to a correlated randomization device so that
the expected payoff from a high type match is
Eui(θ, θ) = pi(c, c)− 12
(
1
θ
+ xi
(
1
c
+
1
c
))
.
In the investment game in a heterogeneous team there is a unique
equilibrium where the high type invests and the low type does not
for all xi if
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c) > 1
θ
> pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)−K
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
. (4.7)
This complies with our assumptions determining outcome and payoffs
in a heterogeneous match. For a coalition of two low type agents, the
unique equilibrium is that neither invests. Using these results we
can determine the utility possibility frontier for the ex ante matching
market for each possible combination of types (θa, θb):
Eua(θ, θ, ub) = 2pi(c, c)− 1
θ
− K
2
(
1
c
+
1
c
)
− ub,
ua(θ, θ, ub) = pi(c, c)− 1
θ
− 1
c
(K − c(pi(c, c)− ub)),
ua(θ, θ, ub) = 2pi(c, c)− K
c
− ub. (4.8)
Checking whether the ex ante matching has some generalized differ-
ences property, we find that indeed generalized decreasing differences,
that is
ub(θ, θ, ua(θ, θ, v)) > ub(θ, θ, ua(θ, θ, v)) ∀v ∈ [0;φ(θ, θ, 0)],
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obtains if
2
c
c
[pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)] + K
2
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
>
1
θ
. (4.9)
This is implied by the assumption in (4.4).
Figure 4.3: Generalized decreasing differences in the ex ante market
In this case ex ante matching is negative assortative with respect
to agents’ types θi. Then only heterogeneous coalitions are formed.
The associated equilibrium in the investment subgame involves in-
vestment for the high type agents, but not for the low type agents.
Figure 4.3 depicts the utility possibility frontiers of heterogeneous
(dashed lines) and homogeneous coalitions (solid lines). In compari-
son to Figure 4.2 the utility possibility frontier of a homogenous high
type coalition has contracted towards the origin, thus rendering this
kind of coalition comparatively unattractive. Indeed, heterogeneous
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coalitions have become so attractive that generalized decreasing dif-
ferences obtain as traced by the arrows. Let us sum up our findings
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Under Assumptions (4.1) - (4.4), ex ante markets
induce negative assortative matching with respect to type and high
type agents invest whereas low type agents do not. Ex post markets
induce positive assortative matching with respect to attribute and high
type agents invest whereas low type agents do not.
To compare both regimes with respect to total surplus it suffices
to compare the sums of the low and the high types’ utilities in each
regime. That is, ex ante markets generate higher surplus than ex
post markets if
2pi(c, c)− 1
θ
+x∗
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
−K
c
> pi(c, c)+pi(c, c)− 1
θ
+
K
2
(
1
c
− 1
c
)
(4.10)
where again x∗ denotes the equilibrium labor share of a high type in
the ex ante matching market. The condition weakens in x∗, so that a
sufficient condition can be derived by setting x∗ = 0. The so derived
sufficient condition for (4.10) coincides with assumption (4.4). Hence,
ex ante matching markets are more desirable in this example from a
surplus point of view.
4.3.3 Discussion
In this example ex post matching generates an inefficient matching
pattern and over-investment within coalitions. This is ameliorated
when the matching market takes place before the investment in at-
tributes. However, side payments in the ex ante market do not need
to induce efficient cost sharing. In general, there is no reason to ex-
pect them to do so. The intuition driving the results in this example
is that the cost of redundant investments can be partly internalized
within a coalition in case of ex ante matching. In case of ex post
matching redundant investments take place because they serve as a
means of utility transfer.
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Both the ex post matching market outcome and the incentive
for over-investment in human capital given by better prospects in
the labor markets has some empirical support in the finding of over-
education. This describes a mismatch between the educational at-
tainment requirement of a given task and the actual educational at-
tainment of the worker employed in it (see e.g. Freeman, 1976). For
the ex post market setting of our example there is overeducation in
high type coalitions and undereducation in low type coalitions. This
is indeed a well-documented feature of labor markets in European
countries and the US (see the survey of Hartog, 2000). Cockx and
Dejemeppe (2002) study the competition for jobs among the unem-
ployed in Belgium. They find that higher education than formally
required for a job significantly increases the hiring probability of an
agent. Thus, overeducated individuals crowd out adequately edu-
cated individuals. Pischke and von Wachter (2005) find evidence
that increasing compulsory schooling from 8 to 9 years in Germany
had zero effect on earnings of those affected. It has to emphasized
that professional formation plays a prominent role in Germany, in
particular for those likely to leave school after 8 years, such that
there existed ex ante markets. Thus a tentative explanation for these
finding is that closing the ex ante markets after 8 years of school-
ing did not lead to the acquisition of education in the ninth year
of schooling as those students affected by the change were prepared
to into professional formation. It has to be emphasized that the re-
sults in our example are not at odds with empirical treatment studies
finding positive private returns to additional schooling using natural
experiments such as Duflo (2001). This is precisely what the exam-
ple predicts. However, as Angrist (1995) noted, general equilibrium
effects may overcompensate the positive returns among the treated.
4.3.4 Extensions
How is then the desired timing of markets affected by varying the
extent of non-transferabilities in the market? In particular, will a
decrease in the severity of market imperfections reverse the optimal
market order? Let us introduce a means of transferring utility be-
102 CHAPTER 4. MARKETS AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
tween coalition members at a one to one ratio and call it liquidity.
To be precise, assume that each agent has the possibility of perfectly
transferring up to b units of utility. For the ex post market the utility
possibility frontier for heterogeneous matches is then given by
u1(c, c)(u2) =
(
1 +
c
c
)
pi(c, c) +
(
1− c
c
)
b− K
c
− c
c
u2.
To be exact, only a part of the utility possibility frontier is given
by the equation, namely where u2 is sufficiently low such that the
utility transfer by means of liquidity has been used up, i.e. u2 ≤
pi(c, c) − b. For u2 > pi(c, c) − b, the utility possibility frontier is
given by u1(c, c, u2) = 2pi(c, c)− Kc −u2. For homogeneous coalitions
nothing changes. Calculating a sufficient condition for the generalized
decreasing differences condition yields
pi(c, c)− pi(c, c) < c
c
[pi(c, c)− pi(c, c)] +
(
1 +
c
c
)
b.
This condition strictly weakens in b. This means that for sufficiently
transferable utility the ex post market yields the efficient matching
pattern, namely negative assortative. Still high types invest and low
types do not. The ex ante market yields negative assortative match-
ing for all b and investment incentives within coalitions do not change.
The only coalition where introducing liquidity has an impact is a het-
erogeneous match. There the utility possibility frontier changes into
u1(θ, θ)(u2) =
(
1 +
c
c
)
pi(c, c)− 1
θ
− K
c
+
(
1− c
c
)
b− c
c
u2.
Again, this expression is valid only for sufficiently low u2, namely
u2 ≤ pi(c, c)− b. For homogeneous matches nothing changes, so that
matching must remain negative assortative.
Effects of the introduction of liquidity on the desirability of ex
ante versus ex post markets are ambiguous and depend on equilib-
rium payoffs of agents. However, whenever there is sufficient liquidity
for the ex post market to yield negative assortative matching, both
regimes reach efficiency in terms of investment incentives and match-
ing pattern. The only remaining sources of inefficiencies are utility
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transfers by labor sharing. We already know that for sufficiently high
equilibrium payoffs of the high cost agents, i.e. uθ > pi(c, c)−b, labor
sharing within coalitions is efficient under both regimes. By strict
substitutability of inputs, surplus in a coalition increases in the labor
share of the low cost agent. One can show that, given b sufficiently
small as to not induce first best labor sharing in all equilibria, there
exist equilibria in ex ante markets where low cost agents’ payoffs are
smaller (and their labor share greater) than in any equilibrium with
ex post markets. Hence, with equilibrium selection by Pareto domi-
nance, ex ante markets remain more desirable than ex post markets
even if both induce negative assortative matching. The intuition is
simply that ex ante markets induce less inefficient compensation. For
perfectly transferable utility both regimes yield first best allocations.
Suppose now again that there is no liquidity.7 Instead of compar-
ing two regimes one could let the agents choose whether to participate
in ex ante or ex post markets. In order to avoid multiple rational ex-
pectations equilibria we assume that in the ex post market there is
an influx of new agents, say measure  > 0 both of c and c agents.
Then all rational expectations equilibria have the property that high
type θ agents invest and wait for the ex post market. This means
that the existence of an ex post market where matching is positive
assortative attracts the high types in this example. An application of
this extension are foreign direct investments where multinationals co-
operate with local firms. Cost-sharing contracts are frequently found
in such co-operations. Local governments’ decision whether to force
investors into joint ventures reflects the timing of markets in our
example. Our results suggest that intervention is indeed desirable
to avoid an inefficient matching pattern, whenever investments are
strategic substitutes within a coalition, e.g. when joint production
faces severe coordination problems.
7Admitting liquidity in this setting and increasing b generates multiple equi-
libria as high types’ payoffs in ex ante markets converge to their payoffs in ex
post markets, in particular whenever b is sufficiently great to induce negative
assortative matching in the ex post market.
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4.4 A Differentiable NTUMatching Setup
In the remainder of this chapter we reason that ex post market equi-
libria with non-transferability cannot generally be expected to induce
efficient ex ante investment incentives. This means there is little rea-
son to expect that generally ex post markets will beat ex ante markets
in terms of efficiency whenever utility is not fully transferable. To this
end, we return to a more general setting. Agents may differ with re-
spect to their types (γi, δi) ∈ Γi ×D, i = a ∈ A, b ∈ B, reflecting e.g.
innate ability, and the degree of utility transferability which could
represent wealth, for instance. For simplicity ability type spaces Γa
and Γb are assumed to be compact subsets of R2. The transferability
type of an agent i ∈ K, is δi ∈ DK where K = A,B. DA is defined
as follows.
Definition 4.3 Define the transferability type space for market side
A, DA, as a space of continuous, strictly decreasing functions δ :
R×B 7→ R with the properties that
• The number of points u ∈ R where δ(u, b), b ∈ B is not differ-
entiable with respect to u is at most finite,
• 0 < δ(u, b) ≤ u for u ∈ R and b ∈ B, and
• 0 < ∂δ(u,b)∂u ≤ 1 and ∂δ(u,b)∂u ≥ ∂δ(v,b)∂v for u ≤ v for all b ∈ B
and all points u, v ∈ R where δ(.) is differentiable.
Define DB likewise. Agents have the opportunity to invest in their
attribute xi ∈ X where X is a compact subset of R+ at the beginning
of their lives which comes at a utility cost k(xi, γi).
Assumption A 4.1 The cost function k(xi, γi) is assumed to be
convex and twice continuously differentiable.
The agents’ common utility function is assumed to be linear and to
look like ui = g(x) + τ(i, j) − k(xi, γi) where g(x) is a production
function turning all team members’ human capital into output, and
τ(i, j) denotes a possible side payment that an agent i receives from
his match j. Output of a coalition (a, b) depends on the human capital
of the coalition members according to the production function g(x).
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Assumption A 4.2 g(x) is assumed to be twice continuously dif-
ferentiable and strictly concave in each of its arguments, the Inada
conditions are assumed to hold for each partial derivative, and g(x)
directly enters both agents’ utilities.
While the regularity conditions assumed on g(x) appear to be fairly
standard, the assumption that g(x) represents each coalition mem-
ber’s utility from the coalition requires some justification. This as-
sumption is tantamount to requiring efficient production at surplus
splitting. The intuition behind the formalization of the problem is
to abstract from using an explicit model of within coalition behavior,
and instead to assume that outcomes of such within coalition be-
havior can be represented by g(x) and transferability types δi. This
means any explicit model of within coalition behavior that gener-
ates equilibrium payoffs with the regularity properties required by
Definition 4.3 and efficient production at equal sharing of surplus is
representable by our formalization. That is a matching game with
non-transferable utility is described by ((γi, δi)i∈A,B , g(.), k(.)).
Of particular interest is, of course, the link between the utility pos-
sibility frontier within a coalition and the degree of non-transferability
the coalition members are subject to. Any matching (a, b) has the
utility possibility frontier
φ(a, b, v) = g(xa, xb)
{ −δ−1a (v − g(xa, xb), b) if v > g(xa, xb)
+δb(g(xa, xb)− v, a) if v ≤ g(xa, xb) (4.11)
Note that the definition of DK implies that all δ ∈ DK are invert-
ible. As equilibrium concept we use again the one in Definition 4.2
for the matching stage. Investments have to maximize individual
utility given the expected matching equilibrium. For expositional
convenience we restate Definition 4.2 modified by explicitly referring
to attribute investments which in turn determine utility possibility
frontiers within coalitions. This is to emphasize that there are two
separate issues of efficiency. Firstly, the matching pattern given at-
tributes, i.e. the matching function M, and, secondly, an agent’s
attribute investment given some expected equilibrium match.
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Definition 4.4 The allocation ((xa, xb)a∈A,b∈B ,M) whereM : A→
B is a one-to-one mapping that assigns any a ∈ A to some b ∈ B
and xa, xb ∈ X are agents’ attribute choices, and payoffs {ui}i∈A,B
is a rational expectations equilibrium of the non-transferable utility
matching game ((γi, δi)i∈A,B , g(.), k(.)) if
• M is measure-consistent,
• xi is individually optimal given (x−i,M),
• ua = φ(a, b, ub) for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
• there does not exist a ∈ A and b 6= M(a) ∈ B with ua <
φ(a, b, v) and ub < v.
As a first step we are interested in determining under what cir-
cumstances φ preserves properties such as supermodularity of the
joint production function g(.). Thus it is possible to identify condi-
tions for an efficient matching function M to emerge in equilibrium.
We use the equilibrium concept of Definition 4.2 which exists under
our assumptions (see e.g. Kaneko and Wooders, 1996). To this end
we extend the work of Legros and Newman (2004a) by the following
Proposition.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose g(x) has increasing differences in x and
that for all u ∈ R both δa(u, i) ≥ δb(u, i) and δc(u, j) ≥ δd(u, j) for all
a, b, j ∈ A and c, d, i ∈ B with attributes xa > xb and xc > xd. Then
positive assortative matching obtains in equilibrium and the matching
allocation is efficient given attributes.
The proof is straightforward and can be found in the appendix.
It turns out that in order to obtain efficient matching, it suffices
that agents with higher attributes also have weakly better means of
transferring utility. The intuition of this proposition is quite simple.
By making sure that an agent has better means of transferring utility
the more able he is, it follows that an agent can always outbid less
able agents but not more able ones. Hence, the relative ranking of
any agent is preserved in the equilibrium matching. An extension of
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Proposition 4.2 relating efficiency of the matching allocation to the
distribution of transferability types for decreasing differences of g(.)
is straightforward.
In particular, Proposition 4.2 states that whenever all agents on
the same market side have equal means of transferring utility within a
coalition, the matching will be positive assortative for supermodular
g(.). This can be extended to submodular g(.) that lead to negative
assortative matching, so that efficient matching obtains in both cases.
Moreover, this finding suggests that positive (negative) correlation of
the degree of transferability with the agents’ attributes is sufficient for
efficient matching for supermodular (submodular) joint production
functions g(.).
4.5 Attribute Investments
Now we turn towards the agents’ investments in attributes. As a
benchmark, (constrained) optimal investment levels given a match of
agents a and b are given by
max
xa,xb
2g(xa, xb)−
∑
i=a,b
k(xi, γi).
Assume that this is concave problem. The optimization problem has
the usual first order condition
k′(x∗i , γi) = 2g
′(x∗a, x
∗
b), (4.12)
for i = a, b where the starred variables are the optimal solution.
Returning to the case of ex-ante investments in attributes prior to
matching, agents choose their investment levels based on the outcome
of the matching stage. Now suppose that the second stage matching
equilibrium is representable by a matching function M : A 7→ B.
Assumption A 4.3 The matching functionM(a) determines a con-
tinuously differentiable function xM(xa) : X 7→ X of the attribute of
the match of an agent a ∈ A depending on a’s attribute. xM(xa) is
assumed to be invertible.
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We postulate a function rather than a correspondence as we focus on
rational expectations equilibria. The function τ : A×B 7→ R denotes
equilibrium side payments from a ∈ A to b ∈ B for matches (a, b) in
units of utility for the receiver. An agent a’s optimization problem is
then given by
max
xa
g(xa, xM(a)) + τ(xa, xM(a))− k(xa, γa).
Assume for the moment that this a concave problem as well and that
τ(.) is differentiable with respect to its arguments. The first order
necessary condition is given by
∂k(x∗a, γa)
∂xa
=
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xa
+
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xM(a)
∂xM(a)
∂xa
+
∂τ(xa, xM(a))
∂xa
+
∂τ(xa, xM(a))
∂xM(a)
∂xM(a)
∂xa
.(4.13)
Note that the derivative of the side payment will depend on the
change in the ability to transfer utility of a’s match M(a) as well.
Now the problem of analyzing efficiency reduces to comparing the
respective first order conditions (4.12) and (4.13). To put this more
simple ex-ante investments are constrained efficient if and only if
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xa
=
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xM(a)
∂xM(a)
∂xa
+
∂τ(xa, xM(a))
∂xa
+
∂τ(xa, xM(a))
∂xM(a)
∂xM(a)
∂xa
. (4.14)
It is immediate from the stability condition of a matching equilibrium
that the RHS of (4.14) is positive and thus investment incentives are
greater than in the usual incomplete contracts case.
4.5.1 Constant Side Payments
Let us assume for now that equilibrium side payments are constant
across agents which excludes the possibility of negative assortative
matching. In particular, this case includes strictly non-transferable
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utility. Then ex ante investments are efficient if and only if for all a
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xa
=
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xM(a)
∂xM(a)
∂xa
. (4.15)
This means that the direct effect of a change in xa on joint profit
must be equal to the indirect effect via a change in the equilibrium
match M(a). It is immediate that this condition holds for example
if the matching is positive assortative, g(.) has unity elasticity of
substitution, and attributes are distributed equally on both market
sides as in Peters and Siow (2002). Rewriting (4.15) yields
g′xa(x
∗
a, xM(a))
g′xb(x
∗
a, xM(a))
= x′M(a) ∀a.
Obviously, this condition does not hold generally as the matching
functionM(a) typically depends on the distribution of types on both
market sides. Some cases where (4.15) holds and efficiency can be
achieved are linear matching functions and CES production functions
as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose M has the property xM(a) = λxa for all
a and some λ > 0 in a rational expectations equilibrium and the
joint profit function g(x, y) has the property gx(x, y)x = gy(x, y)y for
x = λy, then ex-ante investments are constrained efficient.
Proof: Obvious.
This proposition states that for a production function with con-
stant optimal factor input ratio investments are efficient if the match-
ing function matches agents such that their attributes correspond
exactly to this optimal factor input ratio.
4.5.2 Choosing the Utility Possibility Frontier
The key insight to matching models with non-transferable utility is
that agents’ attributes determine the location of the utility possibility
frontier in a given coalition in the matching market. By adjusting the
110 CHAPTER 4. MARKETS AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
attribute an agent is able to shift the utility possibility frontier. In
our formalization agents choose the origin of their utility possibility
frontier as depicted in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Utility possibility frontiers at the investment stage
Suppose an agent a expects to be matched with an agent b with
attribute xb. This gives rise to the set of possible utility possibil-
ity frontiers in figure 4.4. The dashed lines are instances of possible
utility possibility frontiers in the matching stage associated to some
points on the solid line. This in turn reflects a and b’s utility de-
pending on a’s choice of attribute xa. The attribute choice xa corre-
sponding to a in the graph has the property g′(xa, xb) = k′(xa), i.e.
this is the investment choice when external effects are not realized at
all. b and c are arbitrary choices of ub indicating that for imperfect
transferability of utility in general there exists no dominant utility
possibility frontier in the sense of set inclusion. This means that
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if agent a expects to pay high side payments, the utility possibility
frontier associated to ub = c dominates the one associated to ub = b
and vice versa if a expects to receive high side payments.
In case of perfectly transferable utility the slopes of all attain-
able utility possibility frontiers are −1. Therefore, there exists a
unique optimal frontier including all others, namely at ub such that
u′a(ub) = −1. However, this identity implies for the associated xa that
necessarily k′(xa) = 2g′(xa, xb), i.e. xa is chosen efficiently given xb.
For non-transferable utility this does not need to hold and we will
show that indeed non-transferabilities of utility generally distort in-
vestment incentives.
Let us now develop this intuition formally. An agent a’s set of
attainable utility possibility frontiers can be characterized by
F(xb) = {(ua, ub) : ua = g(xa, xb)− k(xa)
s.t. ub(xa, xb) = g(xa, xb)− k(xb)}.
F corresponds to the solid line in figure 4.4 and is the locus of all
origins of the utility possibility frontier of agents a and b attainable
by choice of xa when xb is given. We now state a useful lemma
characterizing an important property of F determining incentives for
investment in attributes.
Lemma 4.1 F(xb) has the property that for xb > 0 ua(ub) is a con-
tinuously differentiable function and
∂ua
∂ub
= 1−
∂k(xa,γa)
∂xa
∂g(xa,xb)
∂xa
.
Moreover, ua(ub) is strictly concave.
Proof: In Appendix.
The Lemma states an important link between the slope of F at
the point of the choice of xa to investment incentives. In general, an
agent chooses the utility possibility frontier that maximizes his utility
for the utility level his match needs to be given to ensure stability of
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Figure 4.5: Utility possibility frontier for the linear NTU case
equilibrium. For transferable utility this utility possibility frontier is
always given by the tangent to F(.) with slope −1.
In the case of non-transferable utility choosing the utility pos-
sibility frontier amounts to minimizing the utility cost incurred for
the transfer of a given amount of utility. Figure 4.5 shows the linear
case. The dashed line represents the utility possibility frontier if the
attribute investment is efficient and the dotted line gives the opti-
mal choice of investment given an agent’s beliefs over his equilibrium
match and payoff. In the neighborhood of the efficient investment
at the point (x, y) an agent chooses to transfer utility by adjusting
attribute investments where the dotted line coincides with the solid
line. However, for large utility transfers a combination is optimal.
For the non-transferable utility case we find that efficient investment
incentives need not to be expected.
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Proposition 4.4 Suppose δi ∈ DK for all i ∈ K, K = A,B and
Assumptions A 1-3 hold. Then investments in attributes are con-
strained efficient if and only if for rational expectations equilibrium
payoffs ua and ub and attribute investments xa and xb it holds that
ua + ub = 2g(xa, xb)− (k(xa) + k(xb)).
Proof: In Appendix.
To put this in other words, investment incentives will not even
be constrained efficient unless equilibrium payoffs require only side
payments that are not subject to the non-transferability of utility.
As a consequence, for non-transferabilities, that can be represented
by functions δi whose slope is bounded away from 1, for constrained
efficient investment incentives it is necessary that side payments are
not used in equilibrium. The following corollary is then immediate
from Proposition 4.3 and 4.4:
Corollary 4.1 Suppose agent a ∈ A has δa such that δa(u, b) < u for
all u > 0 and all b ∈ B. Then in any rational expectations equilibrium
agent a’s ex ante investment xa is constrained efficient if and only if
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xa
=
∂g(x∗a, xM(a))
∂xM(a)
∂xM(a)
∂xa
.
This means that constrained efficient investment incentives hinge on
a knife-edge condition on the primitives of the model such as the dis-
tribution of agents and the functional form of g(.). Hence, the match-
ing equilibrium with non-transferable utility cannot be expected to
induce efficient investment incentives.
However, for general functions δ we are able to obtain a simi-
lar result. Define ((γi, δTUi )i∈A,B , g(.), k(.)) to denote the transfer-
able utility version of the non-transferable utility matching game
((γi, δi)i∈A,B , g(.), k(.)). That is, δTi U(u) = u for all i ∈ A,B and
all finite u ≥ 0. Since all efficient allocations belong to some equi-
librium allocation of the transferable version of the matching game
we are in a position to state a more general proposition. Denote by
τmax(i, j) the maximum amount of utility that can be transferred to
i in coalition (i, j).
114 CHAPTER 4. MARKETS AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM
Proposition 4.5 An equilibrium allocation ((xa, xb)a,b∈A,B ,M) of
the non-transferable utility matching game ((γi, δi)i∈A,B , g(.), k(.)) is
efficient only if it coincides with some equilibrium allocation of its
transferable utility version and equilibrium payoffs ua, ub are such that
for all i ∈ A,B and the match j ui − g(xi, xj)− k(xi) ≤ τmax(i, j).
Proof: First note that the transferable version of any non-transferable
utility matching game has to reach an efficient matching allocation
(in the sense of aggregate utility maximization) given individual at-
tributes by definition. Note further that all efficient allocations must
be equilibria of the transferable utility version of the matching game.
To see this, suppose the contrary and let M maximize aggregate
utility of i ∈ A,B. A blocking coalition exists if and only if there
is some a ∈ A and some b ∈ B with b 6= M(a) and 2g(a, b) >
g(a,M(a))+ g(M−1(b), b). This condition implies, however, thatM
does not maximize aggregate utility, a contradiction.
On the other hand, for the transferable utility version it must
hold that ∂ua(ub)∂ub = −1 for all relevant ub. Hence, in the transferable
utility version agents’ attribute investments are constrained efficient
and the matching function induces efficient matching given attributes.
This means that all efficient allocations of the non-transferable utility
game ((γi, δi)i∈A,B , g(.), k(.)) are in the set of equilibrium allocations
of its transferable utility version. This proves necessity. 
This last proposition provides a useful tool in assessing the prop-
erties of a specific model. Given the equilibrium of its transfer-
able utility version, it is then easy to calculate whether the allo-
cation will survive the introduction of market friction leading to non-
transferabilities by analyzing the equilibrium side payments.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the allocative role of markets with non-
transferable utility in the classical hold-up problem. It finds that
non-transferabilities quite generally preclude markets from setting ex
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ante investment incentives efficiently. Since markets that open be-
fore the investment typically do not induce efficient incentives either,
there emerges a role for the timing of markets. Indeed, as we show,
ex ante markets may dominate ex post markets both in terms of ag-
gregate output and Pareto efficiency whenever non-transferabilities
are sufficiently severe.
In particular, whenever investments are strategic substitutes the
private return from investments on the market may exceed the social
return. The reason is that transferring utility at the market stage may
be more costly than increasing investment beyond the efficient level,
thereby inducing over-investment. We have applied this reasoning to
a model of educational attainment when contracting is limited to cost-
sharing. As a result in ex post markets higher educated agents crowd
out lower educated agents in the competition for jobs that require low
education. This feature has been frequently cited as over-education
in the empirical literature.
Moreover, this framework allows for the analysis of the evolu-
tion of market institutions. The optimal timing of markets depends,
of course, on the severity and on the specific nature of the non-
transferabilities. Suppose that restrictions on contract enforcement
induce non-transferable utility at the market stage and a suitable
technology such that indeed the ex ante market allocation dominates
the ex post market allocation. However, as an economy develops
more efficient instruments of enforcement, non-transferabilities can
be expected to diminish. In our framework this results in a change of
the optimal timing of markets, interpretable for instance by a move
from contracting within corporations to spot markets, thus opening
a new and interesting field for future research.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix to
Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.4
Taking the derivative of y∗+x∗ as defined in Lemma 2.1 with respect
to γ yields
∂(x∗ + y∗)
∂γ
=
1+ln γ+(ln γ)2
γ ws − (1 + r)h− (2 + r)wn
(1 + r)γ(ln γ)2
.
Inspection of the derivative shows that (x∗+y∗) has a global maxi-
mum in γ, strictly increases before attaining it, and strictly decreases
thereafter. But it is also the case that
lim
γ→∞(x
∗+y∗) = h+
2 + r
1 + r
wn > h.
This implies that the derivative with respect to γ must be strictly
positive whenever the function value (x∗+ y∗) is smaller than its
limit. Hence, given an interior solution with (x∗+y∗) < h, increasing
γ also increases (x∗+y∗) until reaching the boundary h.
Concerning the second part of the lemma, y∗ is obviously increas-
ing in γ. To show that x∗ also is, take any γ1, γ2 with γ1 > γ2 within
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the definition range. Then it can easily be checked that
∂Us(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
γ1
>
∂Us(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
γ2
∀x.
On the other hand it holds that
Us(h) = ln(ws) ∀ γ.
This implies by monotonicity that
Us(x)|γ1 < Us(x)|γ2 ∀ x < h. (A.1)
This in turn implies that any tangent to Us(x)|γ2 lies strictly above
the area under Us(x)|γ1 for all x < h.
Now take some point z > Us(x)|γ2 , x < h. Let T2(x) be any
tangent to Us(x)|γ2 with the property that it contains the point z.
Denote by T1(x) a tangent to Us(x)|γ1 with the property that it also
contains z. Let the respective points of tangency ti be implicitly
defined by Ti(ti) = Us(ti)|γi , i = 1, 2.
Then it must hold that T2(t1) > T1(t1) as long as t1, t2 lie to the
left of h implying that that the slope of T2 is greater than the slope of
T1. This must be true because T2(x) > Us(x)|γ2 ∀x due to concavity
of Us and because of inequality (A.1).
This implies that the tangent to both Un(x) at x = x1 and
Us(x)|γ2 must be steeper than the tangent to both Un(x) at x = x2
and Us(x)|γ1 for all tangency points to the left of h. This follows
from monotonicity of Un(x). This and strict concavity then also im-
ply that x1 > x2. This means x∗ increases in γ as long as an interior
solution is the case. 
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Sustainability
Sustainability holds if h is sufficiently close to wn
Using assumption A2.1.(i), inequality (2.5) is implied by:
(2 + r)γwn >
(
ln γ
(1− α)(1 + i)− 1 − 1
)
((i− r)h− (2 + r)wn)
⇔ γ >
(
ln γ
(1− α)(1 + i)− 1 − 1
)(
(1 + r)(γ − 1)
(2 + r)
h
wn
− 1
)
.
Taking some γ > 1 with 1 < ln γ(1−α)(1+i)−1 , this condition holds for h
sufficiently small compared to wn.
A case where sustainability fails
Looking at a rewritten inequality (2.5) we find:
γ >
(
ln γ
(1− α)(1 + i)− 1 − 1
)(
(1 + r)γh− ws
(2 + r)wn
)
.
It is now possible to find a γ sufficiently close to its lower bound
given by Assumption A2.1, such that this inequality does not hold
provided ws is sufficiently close to (1 + r)h and (2 + r)wn.
Proof of Lemma 2.5
First we use the fact that every gambler weakly prefers the lottery
because the convex combination of the corresponding utility levels
lies above the certain utility level for gamblers. Expected utility
from gambling is given by:
E[U(IG(x))] =
x−x∗
y∗
ln((1+i)(x∗+y∗− h) + ws) +
+(1− x−x
∗
y∗
) ln((1+r)x∗ + (2+r)wn).
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That means that for all x ∈ (x∗, x∗ + y∗) it must hold one of the
following:
∀x∈(x∗, f) :
E(UG(x)) > ln((1+r)x+ (2+r)wn) > ln((1+i)(x−h) +ws)
∀x∈ [f, x∗+y∗) :
E(UG(x)) > ln((1+i)(x−h) +ws) > ln((1+r)x+ (2+r)wn).
Yet Jensen’s inequality implies:
E(UG(IG(x))) ≤ ln(E[IG(x)]).
So that ∀x ∈ (x∗, f) : E[IG(x)] > (1 + r)x + (2 + r)wn and ∀x ∈
[f, x∗ + y∗) : E[IG(x)] > (1 + i)(x − h) + ws. This establishes the
lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Step 1: Note that aggregate utility levels Ut+k and Uˆt+l, k, l ∈ N are
converging sequences in R. To see this, write down e.g. Ut+k as a
function of endowments
Ut+k =
∫ xs
0
EU(I(x))dFt+k(x).
So the dynamic behavior of Ut+k is entirely governed by the dis-
tribution of initial endowments among period-t-gamblers in period
t + k. But we know that Ft+k(x) converges. Hence, so does Ut+k.
An analogous argument applies to Uˆt+k.
Step 2: We show that if Uˆ ≡ liml→∞ Uˆt+l > U ≡ limk→∞ Ut+k,
then there exists an N < ∞ such that Uˆt+N > UN+l. Because of
convergence, the sequences {Uˆt+k, k ∈ R} and {Ut+k, k ∈ R} have
the properties
∀  > 0 ∃K : |Ut+k − U | <  ∀ k ≥ K and
∀  > 0 ∃L : |Uˆt+l − Uˆ | <  ∀ l ≥ L.
121
Let 2 = |U − Uˆ |, then it must hold for all n ≥ N ≡ max{K,L} that
Uˆt+n > Ut+n.
Step 3: If condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2 holds, then Uˆ > U
trivially, thus establishing the first part of the proposition.
Step 4: Assume condition (i) in Proposition 2.2 does not hold.
Then only in the first period agents are willing to gamble both under
γ and γˆ. Steady state income under γ is given by:
ISS(x) =
∫ g
0
dFt(x)[xn(1 + r) + wn(2 + r)]
+
∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
g
dFt(x)[(xs − h)(1 + r) + ws],
and steady state income under γˆ by:
IˆSS(x) =
[∫ xˆ∗
0
dFt(x) +
∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
xˆ∗
dFt(x)− Pht
]
[xn(1 + r) + wn(2 + r)]
+Pht [(xs − h)(1 + r) + ws],
where Pht is the fraction of agents among gamblers who escape the
poverty trap under γˆ defined by
Pht =
∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
xˆ∗
x− xˆ∗
yˆ∗
dFt(x).
Integration by parts yields
Pht = Ft(xˆ
∗ + yˆ∗)− 1
yˆ∗
∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
xˆ∗
Ft(x)dx.
The sign of the change in steady state aggregate income after an
increase of γ is given by the sign of the net fraction of agents that is
placed on the high income growth path, so that IˆSS(x)− ISS(x) can
be written as:
Pht − Ft(xˆ∗ + yˆ∗) + Ft(g) > 0
⇔ yˆ∗Ft(g) >
∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
xˆ∗
Ft(x)dx. (A.2)
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Using the fact that Ft(g) is a constant, the LHS can be rearranged:
yˆ∗Ft(g) = (xˆ∗ + yˆ∗)Ft(g)− yˆ∗Ft(g)
=
∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
xˆ∗
Ft(g)dx.
Inserting this into (A.2) yields:∫ xˆ∗+yˆ∗
xˆ∗
[Ft(g)− Ft(x)]dx > 0.
By definition the last inequality means that if Ft(x) second order
stochastically dominates any lottery [(xˆ∗−c), (xˆ∗+ yˆ∗+c), Ft(g), (1−
Ft(g))] with c > 0 on the interval [xˆ∗, xˆ∗+ yˆ∗], then aggregate utility
from the steady state endowments is higher under γˆ. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Consider an agent with endowment 0 < xi < h. Suppose the agent
chooses a symmetric lottery (x, y) such that x + ∆1 = xi and βy =
∆1+∆2 and x < f < x+βy. This lottery is preferred to the certain
endowment xi, if
xi − x
y
Us(x+ βy) +
x+ y − xi
y
Un(x) ≥ U(xi).
That is
β∆1
∆1 +∆2
[Us(xi +∆)− Un(xi −∆)] ≥ U(xi)− Un(xi −∆).
Let xi = f − ,  > 0 sufficiently small, such that Us(f −  +∆2) −
Un(f − ) ≥ U ′s(f − +∆2)∆2. Using the fact that U(.) is piecewise
concave, a sufficient condition can then be obtained by an adequate
first order approximation:
β
(
∆1
K1
+
γ∆2
K2 + (1 + i)∆2
)
≥ ∆1 +∆2
K1 − (1 + r)∆1 . (A.3)
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with K1 = (2+r)wn+(1+r)(f − ) and K2 = ws+(1+ i)(f − −h).
Closer inspection shows that for ratios
∆2
∆1
>
1− β
γβ − 1 ,
γβ > 1, there exist ∆1,∆2 > 0 sufficiently small such that (A.3)
holds. By piecewise concavity and continuity of U(.), for any ∆2 > 0
there exists 0 <  < ∆2 such that Us(f −  + ∆2) − Un(f − ) ≥
U ′s(f −  + ∆2)∆2 and the approximation is valid. Hence, for any
β > 1γ there exists a neighborhood to the left of f preferring some
lottery to a certain endowment xi.
Let now xi = f + , ∆1 >  > 0 sufficiently small such that
Us(f + )−Un(f + −∆1) ≤ U ′n(f −∆1)∆1. Such an  exists due to
continuity of U(.). Using the fact that U(.) is piecewise concave, an
adequate first order approximation to obtain a sufficient condition is
now
β
(
∆1
K1
+
γ∆2
K2 + (1 + i)∆2
)
≥ γ(∆1 +∆2)
K1 − (1 + r)∆1 . (A.4)
with K1 = (2 + r)wn + (1 + r)f and K2 = ws + (1 + i)(f +  − h).
Fortunately, condition (A.4) coincides with condition (A.3) so that
the first part of the proposition is verified.
To prove the second part, recall the definitions of x∗ and y∗ from
Lemmata 2.1 and 2.2. Denote the convex hull of U(.) by UC(.). By
definition all points U(x) with x ≤ x∗ or x∗ + y∗ ≤ x lie on the
convex hull of U(.). For these x it must hold that UC ′′(x) ≤ 0 by
piecewise concavity of U(.). This means that for these x there exists
no convex combination λUC(x+∆2)+(1−λ)UC(x−∆1) > U(x) with
λ = ∆1∆1+∆2 . For λ =
β∆1
∆1+∆2
, β < 1, the strict inequality becomes
weak. That is, for endowment levels xi < x∗ and xi > x∗ + y∗ the
certain income from xi is preferred to any costly endowment lottery.
Conversely, for every costly lottery that is utility-maximizing for
some agent it must hold that x ≥ x∗ and x + βy ≤ y∗. For any
optimal costly lottery it must hold for y that
∂Us(x+ βy)
∂x+ βy
=
Us(x+ βy)− Un(x)
βy
. (A.5)
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That is, given x, βy has to be chosen such as to maximize the slope
of the lottery. U ′s(.) decreases in its argument, so that an x that
maximizes the corresponding βy is associated to the flattest lottery
given (A.5). That is the lottery that is tangent to Un(.). This lottery
is given by x∗ and x∗ + y∗. Hence, x + βy ≤ x∗ + y∗. To conclude
the proof, suppose that x+ βy ≤ f . Then due to concavity of Un(x)
in x ∈ [0, f ] and Jensen’s inequality there exists no xi ∈ [x, x + βy]
such that a costly lottery with βy > 0 is preferred to Un(xi). 
Appendix B
Mathematical Appendix to
Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
(i) Let θ1 denote asset holdings in coalition N1 and θ2 those in coali-
tion N2. Assume without loss of generality that |θ1(i)| > |θ2(i)| for
some agent i who is assumed to be able to finance assets using his
wealth for now. Then agent i prefers θ1 in N1 to θ2 in N2 if and only
if:
vi(n1, θ1, ω(i), r) > vi(n2, θ2, ω(i), r)
⇔ pii(n1, θ1)+(1+r)(ω(i)−|θ1(i)|c) > pii(n2, θ2)
+(1+r)(ω(i)−|θ2(i)|c)
⇔ pii(n1, θ1(i))− pii(n2, θ2) > (1+r)(|θ1(i)| − |θ2(i)|)c.(B.1)
This means that preference for more asset ownership is non-increasing
in the interest rate. Firstly, note that inequality (B.1) strictly tight-
ens in r. Secondly, there exist a unique r0 such that (B.1) holds with
equality implying preferences for ownership are well-defined with re-
spect to r. An analogous argument applies to the case of an agent
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having to borrow to finance |θ2(i)| assets. However, for endowments
|θ1(i)|c > ω(i) > |θ2(i)|c inequality (B.1) changes into
pii(n1, θ1)−pii(n2, θ2) > (1+r)(ω(i)−|θ2(i)|c)−(1+i)(ω(i)−|θ1(i)|c),
where (1 + i) = (1 + r)γ. This has the same properties with respect
to r as (B.1), so that the above result applies.
(ii) Let θ1, θ2, n1, n2 be defined as above. Now we show that a
preference relation of agent i over (θ1, n1) and (θ2, n2) has a unique
endowment level for which it reverses. Agent i prefers the first to the
second if, depending on the degree to which θ1(i) and θ2(i) have to
be financed by debt, one of the following inequalities holds
pii(n1, θ1)−pii(n2, θ2)> (1+i)(|θ1(i)|−|θ2(i)|)c for ω(i) ≤ |θ2(i)|c, or
ω(i)−|θ2(i)|c> 1
i−r [pii(n2, θ2) + (1+i)(|θ1(i)|−|θ2(i)|)c]
−pii(n1, θ1) for ω(i) ∈ (|θ2(i)|c, |θ1(i)|c), or
pii(n1, θ1)−pii(n2, θ2)> (1+r)(|θ1(i)|−|θ2(i)|)c for ω(i) ≥ |θ1(i)|c.
(B.2)
Define now a wealth level ω2 by
ω2 ≡ 1
i− r [pii(n2, θ2)− pii(n1, θ1) + (1+i)(|θ1(i)| − |θ2(i)|)c] + |θ2(i)|c.
Clearly, ω2 is unique given r. Note that whenever ω2 < |θ2(i)|c this
implies that the first inequality of (B.2) holds. On the other hand,
whenever ω2 > |θ1(i)|c this implies that the third inequality of (B.2)
holds. To see this, let ω2 > |θ1(i)|c. Plugging this into the last
equation yields
(i−r)(|θ1(i)|−|θ2(i)|)c < pii(n2, θ2)− pii(n1, θ1)
+(1+i)(|θ1(i)|−|θ2(i)|)c.
This inequality can easily be transformed to yield the reverse of the
third inequality of (B.2). Thus ω2 > |θ1(i)|c implies that for all
endowment levels (θ2, n2) is preferred to (θ1, n2) by agent i. Hence,
a unique endowment cutoff value ω0 can be defined, such that for all
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endowments ω(i) > ω0, (θ1, n1) is preferred to (θ2, n2), and for all
ω(i) < ω0 the reverse is true:
ω0 =

ω if ω2 < |θ2(i)|c
ω if ω2 > |θ1(i)|c
ω2 otherwise.
This means ω0 is unique as well and agents’ preferences are well-
defined with respect to endowments. Moreover, it is easy to see that
ω0 is non-decreasing in r. The unique cutoff level implies that at most
agents with a unique endowment level may be indifferent between
any two alternatives of asset ownership and coalition size. Therefore
preferences are strict almost everywhere on I.
Proof of Lemma 3.3
The first statement in the lemma can be established by noting that
in any equilibrium satisfying the stability condition an owner of an
n > 1 firm must be indifferent between any worker when hiring. If
that is not the case there always exist blocking coalitions of owners
not hiring their favorite workers and these workers. This follows from
the fact that all owners prefer to hire the same rich workers and the
utility benefit an owner has from a worker’s wealth is equal for all
owners that have to borrow. This immediately implies that monetary
side payments only depend on the firm size.
Continuing we note that workers’ transfers to owners must be de-
creasing in firm size for all firm sizes present in equilibrium. Suppose
the contrary and let n, n′ < n be firm sizes that emerge in an equi-
librium and t(n)n >
t(n′)
n′ . An n worker with endowment ω(i) prefers
working in an n firm to an n′ firm if
piW (n) + (1+r)(ω(i)− t(n)
n
) > piW (n′) + (1+r)(ω(i)− t(n
′)
n′
) or
piW (n) + (1+r)γ(ω(i)− t(n)
n
) > piW (n′) + (1+r)(ω(i)− t(n
′)
n′
) or
piW (n) + (1+r)γ(ω(i)− t(n)
n
) > piW (n′) + (1+r)γ(ω(i)− t(n
′)
n′
),
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corresponding to the cases ω(i) > t(n)n >
t(n′)
n′ ,
t(n)
n > ω(i) >
t(n′)
n′ ,
and t(n)n >
t(n′)
n′ > ω(i). That is
piW (n)− piW (n′) > (1 + r)( t(n)
n
− t(n
′)
n′
) or
piW (n)− piW (n′) > (1 + r)[(γ t(n)
n
− t(n
′)
n′
)− (γ − 1)ω(i)] or
piW (n)− piW (n′) > (1 + r)γ( t(n)
n
− t(n
′)
n′
)
which leads to a contradiction in all three cases noting that the LHS
of all inequality is negative. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We proceed by first establishing existence and uniqueness of a match-
ing equilibrium given some interest rate r∗. That is we use Definition
3.2 without capital market clearing. Then we show that r∗ such that
(3.5) holds exists and is unique.
Existence of the matching equilibrium
The proof of existence closely follows Legros and Newman (1996).
Let the interest rate be given by r∗. A modified version of θ, θM ,
is needed to construct a super-additive characteristic function of the
matching economy (I, θ, vi) along the lines of Shubik and Wooders
(1983). Define a modified θM (N), N ∈ F(I) as follows:
θM : F(I)→ {AI , AII , ∅}R × [0, 1],
θM (N) = (θ(N), q(N)),
where q(N) 6= q(O), with N,O ∈ F(I), whenever N 6= O. q(N)
specifies the index of the set of assets the members of coalition N
own. Feasible ownership rights are defined by
ΘM (N) = (Θ(N), q(N)).
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Essentially, this postulates that in a coalition any member’s owner-
ship right must be assigned the same index and otherwise be feasible
in the sense used above. Now let V (O) with O =
⋃
k Ok, where
Ok ∈ F(I) are disjoint finite sets of agents, denote the characteristic
function of the economy (I, θM , vi):
V (O) = {(vi(|O|, θM , ω(i), r∗))i∈O :
for i ∈ Ok θM (Ok) ∈ ΘM (Ok)∀Oi ⊆ O}.
V (O) describes the set of agents’ attainable payoff vectors in coali-
tions Ok ⊂ O achievable by choosing ownership rights allocations.
Note that the notation using O is equivalent to a notation using
the corresponding vector of attributes (ω1, ω2, ..., ωn) as in Kaneko
and Wooders (1996). Let o = |O|. This notation ensures that any
union of disjoint coalitions can use the same allocation as the disjoint
coalitions. Then construct the comprehensive extension of V (O) by
defining
Vˆ (O) = {x ∈ Ro : x ≤ V (O)}.
Vˆ (O) has the following properties:
Vˆ is a non-empty, closed subset of Ro ∀O ∈ F(I), (B.3)
Vˆ (O)× Vˆ (O′) ⊆ Vˆ (O ∪O′) ∀O,O′ ∈ F(I), (B.4)
inf sup Vˆ ({i}) > −∞, (B.5)
∀ O ∈ F(I), x ∈ Vˆ (O) ∧ y ∈ Ro with y≤x⇒ y ∈ Vˆ (O), (B.6)
∀O ∈ F(I), Vˆ (O)−
⋃
i∈O
[(int Vˆ ({i}))× Ro−1] is non-empty
and bounded. (B.7)
Properties B.3, B.4 and B.6 follow directly by definition. Property
B.5 follows from the existence of an outside option, V ({i}) ≥ 0. This
and the definition of Vˆ also imply property B.7. Therefore Vˆ is a
characteristic function in the sense of Kaneko and Wooders (1986).
Let us represent all agents i1, i2, ..., ip ∈ O by their respective
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wealth ω(ik). Then it is straightforward that also
Vˆ (ω(iρ(1)), ω(iρ(2)), ..., ω(iρ(p))) = {(xρ(1), xρ(2), ..., xρ(p)) : (x1, x2, ..., xp)
∈ Vˆ (ω(i1), ω(i2), ..., ω(ip))}
for all permutations ρ of O. Thus the conditions Comprehensive-
ness (property B.5), Nontriviality (implied by property B.7), and
Anonymity in Kaneko and Wooders (1996) are met. We know from
Lemma 3.2 that coalition sizes are bounded above by n. The last
condition to show is continuity of {x ∈ Rp : V ({i}) ≤ x ≤ V (O)} on
[0, 1]n for n = 1, ..., n which trivially holds.
Admitting transfers of a limited kind as defined by equation (3.2)
we are in a position to apply the Theorem of Kaneko and Wood-
ers (1996) and thus have proven existence of the f-core of the char-
acteristic function game associated with Vˆ . What remains to be
shown is that an allocation in the f-core of Vˆ is also an equilib-
rium as in Definition 3.2 without capital market clearing. An al-
location in the f-core of Vˆ for some O ∈ F gives rise to payoffs
xˆ ∈ Vˆ (O) that cannot be improved upon in the sense of stability.
For x ∈ V (O) it must hold that x ≥ xˆ by construction of Vˆ . Then
for the equilibrium allocation neither can x be improved upon. Fi-
nally, by definition of V (.) for all x ∈ V (O) and xˆ ∈ Vˆ (O) such
that xˆ ≤ x there exist disjoint subsets of O, Ok, a mapping θM , and
side payments t such that xi = vi(|Ok|, θM , ω(i), r, t(i)). Define for
all j ∈ [0, 1] Oj = {i ∈ I : θM (i) = (θ(i), j)}. Then the collection
(Oj , j ∈ [0, 1] : Oj 6= ∅) defines the equilibrium coalitions in the sense
of our equilibrium definition.
Uniqueness of the matching equilibrium
The proof will establish that for any matching equilibrium given r∗
the equilibrium allocation of firms, that is (µn)n:µn>0, is determined
by side payments t which depend on firm size only. We will first proof
uniqueness of side payments consistent with stability and measure
consistency. Then we will show that µn is indeed uniquely determined
by side payments almost everywhere.
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Step 1: Uniqueness of side payments. As a preliminary define
measures µstrictnM and µ
strict
nW as the measures of agents strictly prefer-
ring to be owner of n firms, or worker in n firms, respectively, to all
other roles in firms that have positive measure in equilibrium. An
equilibrium vector of side payments t induces stability and measure
consistency which imply jointly
µstrictnM ≤ µn ≤ µnM and µstrictnW ≤ nµn ≤ µnW . (B.8)
By definitions (3.6) and (3.7) and for the strict versions accordingly,
the measures µnM , µnW and µ
strict
nM , µ
strict
nW are fully characterized
by side payments t(n). In particular, by inspection of the endow-
ment cutoff values ωM (n, .) and ωW (n, .) as can be derived using
the proof of Lemma 3.3, the measures µnW and µ
strict
nW strictly de-
crease in t(n) for µnW , µ
strict
nW ∈ (0, 1) and the measures µnM , µstrictnM
strictly increase in t(n) for µnM , µ
strict
nM ∈ (0, 1). Note further that if
µnM |t(n) > µstrictnM |t(n) for t′(n) 6= t(n), all other side payments equal,
µnM |t′(n) = µstrictnM |t′(n) and likewise for µnW and µstrictnW . Hence, some
µn consistent with t is not consistent with t′ such that t(j) = t′(j)
for all j 6= n with positive measure except for t(n) 6= t′(n).
Let n′ denote the next smaller firm size and n′′ the next bigger
firm size with respect to n with positive measure under t. By Lemma
3.3 we know that matching is negative assortative. This implies that
µnW and µ
strict
nW strictly increase in t(n
′) and t(n′′. µnM and µ
strict
nM
strictly decrease in t(n′) and t(n′′).
Suppose now there exist systems of side payments t 6= t′, both
associated with a corresponding matching equilibrium such that con-
ditions (B.8) hold.
Case {n : µn > 0|t} = {n : µn > 0|t′}: Let n, n′, and n′′ have
positive measure under both t and t′. It follows that if t(n) < t′(n)
then t′(n′) > t(n′) and t′(n′′) > t(n′′) is necessary for µn, such that
conditions (B.8) hold, to exist. An analogous argument applies to
t(n) > t′(n).
This implies that for t′ 6= t conditions (B.8) cannot hold if {n :
µn > 0|t} = {n : µn > 0|t′}. To see this, let µn, µn′ and µn′′
have positive measure each and suppose without loss of generality
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t(n) < t′(n). Then µnM and its strict version increases, µn′M and µn′′M
and their strict counterparts decrease. µnW and its strict counterpart
decreases, and µn′W and µn′′W and their strict versions all increase.
Increasing t(n′) or t(n′′) to induce measure consistency again the
same effect appears on the next smaller and bigger firms from a point
of view of n′ and n′′ firms. By induction all side payments in t′ must
increase. Hence, for the biggest firm size in equilibrium, the measure
of agents willing to own necessarily exceeds the measure of agents
willing to work, thus violating (B.8). If |{n : µn > 0|t}| < 3 the
argument can be applied accordingly.
Case {n : µn > 0|t} ∩ {n : µn > 0|t′} = ∅: Then there exists
n′ with zero measure under t but positive measure under t′ and n
with positive measure under t but zero measure under t′ such that
n′ is the next bigger or larger firm size with respect to n. This is a
contradiction to stability. To see this, suppose that at side payments
t there does not exist t′(n′) such that n′ is preferred to n by both
workers and owners, an implication of stability of the equilibrium
associated to t. At side payments t′(n′), however, by stability of
the equilibrium associated to t′ n′ is weakly preferred by a positive
measure of both owners and workers to n for all side payments t(n).
This means that a positive measure of both owners and workers
must be indifferent between n under t(n) and n′ under t′(n′). Positive
measures of both owners and workers for n firms under t must induce
measure consistency. However, indifference of both workers and own-
ers for more than two consecutive firm sizes is not possible generically,
as four equalities determining cutoff endowments have to hold with
three degrees of freedom, an issue we will return to in step (2) of this
part of the proof. Hence, measure consistency cannot be induced by
an allocation with measure zero of n firms and positive measure of n′
firms, a contradiction. This means {n : µn > 0|t} ⊆ {n : µn > 0|t′}
or {n : µn > 0|t} ⊇ {n : µn > 0|t′}.
Case {n : µn > 0|t} ⊇ {n : µn > 0|t′}: Suppose without loss of
generality t(n) < t′(n) for some n with positive measure under both t
and t′. As shown previously this implies necessarily that t(n′) < t′(n′)
and t(n′′) < t′(n′′). Suppose the next smaller or bigger firm size
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under t, say without loss of generality n′, has zero measure under t′.
To induce measure zero of n′ firms t′ has to be sufficiently greater
than t for the labor supply in n′ firms to collapse. But then agents
preferring to own n′ firms have to be matched in n firms and the next
smaller n′′′ firms violating measure consistency for n firms. Restoring
measure consistency for n′′′ and n firms requires necessarily that side
payments rise in the next bigger and smaller firms. This implies by
induction that for the biggest firm size under t′ condition (B.8) cannot
hold. This argument extends by induction to cases where more than
one firm size has positive measure under t but zero measure under t′.
Reversing the argument by exchanging t with t′ gives the same result
for {n : µn > 0|t} ⊆ {n : µn > 0|t′}.
Finally, the cases t(n) = t′(n) for all n ∈ {n : µn > 0|t} ∩ {n :
µn > 0|t′} either imply coincidence of side payments or can quickly
be led to a contradiction to stability.
Step 2: The allocation (P, θ) is unique in t almost everywhere.
Only for |µstrictnM −µnM | > 0 and |µstrictnW −µn ≤ µnW | > 0 for n = n′, n,
with n the next higher firm size than n′ and both firm sizes with
positive measure, is the statement not trivial. But then measure
consistency uniquely determines µn and µn′ , since to have |µstrictnM −
µnM | > 0 and |µstrictnW −µn ≤ µnW | > 0 for more than two consecutive
firm sizes is not possible generically, as four equalities determining
cutoff endowments have to hold with three degrees of freedom given
by the side payments in the three firms.
Existence and uniqueness of r∗
Here only the case w < c is of interest. Therefore r∗ is given by
conditions (3.4). For both properties it suffices to show that all three
conditions are getting slacker in r. Then (3.4) postulates that r∗ be
the lowest non-negative interest rate such that all weak inequalities
hold. The first condition is equivalent to
ωˆ ≥ ωU . (B.9)
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It follows immediately from the definition of ωˆ, (3.3), that it is in-
creasing in r. The second condition is equivalent to
ω(i) ≤ γ
γ − 1
t(n)
n
− piW (n)
(1 + r)(γ − 1) ∀ω(i) < ωU (B.10)
for all n with µn > 0 in the matching equilibrium as defined in the
last subsection. The set of conditions (B.10) is relaxing in r and in
t(n). Finally, no agent has a profitable deviation by forming non-
equilibrium larger n′ firms if
ω ≤ piM (n)− piM (n
′)
(1 + r)(γ − 1) + (n+ 1)c+
γ
γ − 1 [(n
′ − n)c− tˆ(n′)]
+
1
γ − 1 t(n) (B.11)
for at least one n given any n′ with µn′ = 0 in equilibrium. tˆ(n′) is
given by
tˆ(n′) = n′[
piW (n′)
(1 + r)γ
+
γ − 1
γ
ωU ].
Hence, the set of conditions (B.11) is relaxing in r and in t(n) as well.
However, the effect via side payments is second order. In particular,
labor demand decreases in r. This in turn means that the binding one
of conditions (B.9), (B.10), and (B.11) has relaxed. Because of conti-
nuity of the cutoff endowment levels in r and t(.), the fact that ω(.) is
continuously differentiable, and the possibility of agents’ indifference
between different roles equilibrium side payments are continuous in r
as well. Given continuity in r of conditions (B.9), (B.10), and (B.11)
and that ω(.) is continuously differentiable, µU is continuous in r as
well, which is all we need to show. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Starting with part (i) of the proposition, it is possible from this fact
and the above expressions to derive a cutoff endowment level for
agents to prefer working in an efficient K firm as opposed to working
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(i) in an n > K firm, in (ii) an n′ < K firm, or (iii) owning one asset
in a symmetric firm.
ω(i) ≥ piW (n)− piW (K) + (1 + r)γ[
t(K)
K − t(n)n ]
(1 + r)(γ − 1) +
t(n)
n
,
ω(i) ≤ piW (K)− piW (n
′) + (1 + r)γ[ t(n
′)
n′ − t(K)K ]
(1 + r)(γ − 1) +
t(K)
K
,
ω(i) ≤ piW (K)− pi1 + (1 + r)γ[c−
t(K)
K ]
(1 + r)(γ − 1) +
t(K)
K
. (B.12)
Conducting the same exercise for owners yields a cutoff endowment
level for preferring K ownership:
ω(i) ≤ piM (K)−piM (n)+(1+r)γ[t(K)−t(n)+(n−K)c]
(1+r)(γ − 1)
−t(K) + (K+1)c,
ω(i) ≥ piM (n
′)−piM (K)+(1+r)γ[t(n′)−t(K)+(K−n′)c]
(1+r)(γ−1)
−t(n′)+(n′+1)c,
ω(i) ≥ pi1 − piM (K) + (1+r)γ(Kc−t(K))
(1+r)(γ−1) + c. (B.13)
Assume now that endowments are scarce. We say an n firm crowds
out an n′ firm if, given equilibrium side payments t(n), there exist
no side payments t(n′) such that there is both positive measure of
agents preferring to be owner in n′ firms and positive measure of
agents preferring to be worker in n′ firms to the same role in n firms.
Lemma B.1 A necessary condition for n firms to crowd out n′ firms
is
t(n)
n
− c < n
′
n′ − n
piW (n)− piW (n′)
(1 + r)γ
− 1
n′ − n
piM (n′)− piM (n)
1 + r
.
and for n′ > n > 1 and
t(n)
n
− c > n
′
n− n′
piW (n′)− piW (n)
1 + r
− 1
n− n′
piM (n)− piM (n′)
(1 + r)γ
.
and for 1 < n′ < n.
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Proof of Lemma: Assume first that n < n′. Then, by Lemma 3.1 for
n firms to crowd out n′ firms, given t(n) there must not exist t(n′)
such that
ωM (n, n′) ≤ (n′ + 1)c− t(n′) and ωW (n, n′) ≥ t(n
′)
n′
,
where ωM (n, n′) and ωW (n, n′) is the appropriate cutoff endowment
level as derived in (B.13) and (B.12). That is, @ t(n′) such that
piW (n′)− piW (n)
(1 + r)γ
+
t(n)
n
− t(n
′)
n′
≥ 0 and
piM (n)− piM (n′)
1 + r
+ t(n)− t(n′) + (n′ − n)c ≤ 0.
Solving for t(n
′)
n′ we find that this condition only holds if
piW (n′)− piW (n)
(1 + r)γ
+
t(n)
n
<
piM (n)− piM (n′)
1 + r
+ t(n) + (n′ − n)c,
⇔ t(n)
n
− c < n
′
n′ − n
piW (n)− piW (n′)
(1 + r)γ
− 1
n′ − n
piM (n′)− piM (n)
1 + r
.
For n′ < n the same argument yields the necessary condition
t(n)
n
− c > n
′
n− n′
piW (n′)− piW (n)
1 + r
− 1
n− n′
piM (n)− piM (n′)
(1 + r)γ
.

By the previous lemma, for efficient firms to crowd out n > K
firms it must hold that
t(K)
K
− c < n
n−K
piW (K)− piW (n)
(1 + r)γ
− piM (n)− piM (K)
(n−K)(1 + r) ,
For efficient firms to crowd out n′ < K firms it must hold that
t(K)
K
− c > n
′
K − n′
piW (n′)− piW (K)
1 + r
− piM (K)− piM (n
′)
(K − n′)(1 + r)γ ,
Obtaining bounds on t(K) by comparing the efficient firm size with
symmetric n = 1 firms yields
pi1 − piM (K)
K(1 + r)
≤ t(K)
K
− c ≤ piW (K)− pi1
(1 + r)γ
.
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Now it is possible to derive the desired necessary conditions. For all
n > K and n′ < K it must hold that
n
n−K
piW (K)−piW (n)
γ
− piM (n)−piM (K)
n−K +
piM (K)−pi1
K
> 0 and
γ
n′
K−n′ [piW (n
′)−piW (K)]+ piM (n
′)−piM (K)
K − n′ +pi1−piW (K) < 0.
(B.14)
Rewriting (B.14) yields
(γ−1)
[
piM (K)
K
− piM (n)
n
]
>
Π(n)
n
−Π(K)
K
+γ
[
n−K
nK
]
Π(1)
2
and
(B.15)
(γ−1)n′[piW (n′)−piW (K)] < (K+1)Π(K)
K+1
−(n′+1)Π(n
′)
n′+1
−(K−n′)Π(1)
2
. (B.16)
Note that condition (B.16) holds for γ sufficiently close to 1 but the
LHS of (B.16) strictly increases in γ. Moreover, the LHS of (B.16)
decreases in the average output of K firms, Π(K)K+1 , all else equal. It
remains inconclusive whether the LHS of condition (B.15) increases
or decreases in γ for γ  1 and increases in Π(K)K+1 . This means for
sufficiently high γ the necessary conditions fail to hold given the pro-
duction function. Moreover, for given γ and production technology,
increasing γ or decreasing average output of K firms cannot make
conditions (B.14) hold if they did not hold before, but it can make
conditions (B.14) fail if they held before.
For part (ii) of the Proposition, conditions (B.14) can be manipu-
lated to provide us with sufficient conditions for some n and n′ firms
to be preferred by both some owners and some workers to K firms.
To have positive measure of both n and n′ in equilibrium,
(i) both conditions (B.14) must not hold. We analyzed this case
in the previous part and found that sufficiently high γ and sufficiently
low average output in K firms such that Π(K)K+1 >
Π(n)
n+1 and
Π(K)
K+1 >
Π(n′)
n′+1 always induce conditions (B.14) to fail.
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(ii) n and n′ firms must not crowd out each other and therefore
conditions (B.14) where K is substituted by n′ and n, respectively,
must fail to hold, that is
0 ≥ n
n−n′
piW (n′)−piW (n)
γ
− piM (n)−piM (n
′)
n−n′ +
piM (n′)−pi1
n′
and
0 ≤ γn
′
n−n′ [piW (n
′)−piW (n)]+ piM (n
′)−piM (n)
n−n′ +pi1−piW (n).
Rewriting these conditions as in inequalities (B.15) and (B.16) yields
0 ≥ (γ−1)
[
piM (n′)
n′
− piM (n)
n
]
+
Π(n′)
n′
−Π(n)
n
−γ
[
n− n′
nn′
]
Π(1)
2
and
0 ≤ (γ−1)n′[piW (n′)−piW (n)]+(n′+1)Π(n
′)
n′+1
−(n+1)Π(n)
n+1
+(n−n′)Π(1)
2
.
That is
0 ≥ γ
[
Π(n′)
n′
− Π(n)
n
]
− (γ − 1) [piW (n′)− piW (n)]
−γ
[
n− n′
nn′
]
Π(1)
2
and
0 ≤ (γ−1)n′[piW (n′)−piW (n)]+(n′+1)Π(n
′)
n′+1
−(n+1)Π(n)
n+1
+(n−n′)Π(1)
2
.
Both conditions always hold for sufficiently high γ and sufficiently
high average output of n firms compared to n′ firms. Additionally,
positive measure of n and n′ firms implies that ω is sufficiently small
and ω sufficiently large, as ω < ωW (n, n′) < ωM (n, n′) < ω.
(iii) there must not exist any other firm size n′′ crowding out n or
n′ firms in the sense of Lemma B.1 implying the appropriate version
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of conditions (B.14) for n′:
0 ≥ n
′
n′ − n′′
piW (n′′)− piW (n′)
γ
− piM (n
′)− piM (n′′)
n′ − n′′
+
piM (n′′)− pi1
n′′
and
0 ≤ γ n
′
n′′′ − n′ [piW (n
′)− piW (n′′′)] + piM (n
′)− piM (n′′′)
n′′′ − n′
+pi1 − piW (n′),
where n′ > n′′ and n 6= n′′′ > n′. Likewise for n it must hold that
0 ≥ n
n− n′′
piW (n′′)− piW (n)
γ
− piM (n)− piM (n
′′)
n− n′′
+
piM (n′′)− pi1
n′′
and
0 ≤ γ n
n′′′ − n [piW (n)− piW (n
′′′)] +
piM (n)− piM (n′′′)
n′′′ − n
+pi1 − piW (n′′′),
where n > n′′ 6= n′ and n′ 6= n′′′ < n. The previous analysis,
in particular of inequalities (B.15) and (B.16), shows that if γ is
sufficiently high and average output in n′ and n firms is sufficiently
high compared to average output in n′′ and n′′′ firms, the set of
conditions above holds. Then positive measures of both n and n′
firms emerge in equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Let (P, θ, r, t) be an equilibrium associated to the endowment distri-
bution F induced by ω and G be a redistribution from owners to
workers from F induced by ω′ in the sense of Definition 3.3. Then
(P ′, θ′, r′, t′) denotes the equilibrium associated to ω′(i).
Assume first that the interest rate remains constant, i.e. µ′U =
µU or
∫
I
ω(i)di ≥ c, as aggregate endowments do not change. By
assumption θ(i) 6= ∅ for ωi = ωˆ. Let nˆ = |θ(i)|. As
µ(ω(i) ≤ ω) ≤ µ(ω′(i) ≤ ω) ∀ω > ωˆ,
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it must hold that
∑n
n=nˆ+1 µnM |ω,t ≥
∑n
n=nˆ+1 µnM |ω′,t.1 In particu-
lar, for nmax > nˆ defined as the biggest firm size with µnmax |ω > 0,
it must hold that µnmaxM |ω′ < µnmaxM |ω. Likewise, as additionally
µ(ω(i) ≤ ω) ≥ µ(ω′(i) ≤ ω) ∀ω < ωˆ,
it must hold that for all m > nˆ
∑n
n=m µWn |ω,t ≥
∑n
n=m µWn |ω′,t
because of negative assortative matching and the fact that agents
that are workers in nˆ firms under ω, have less measure under ω′ by
assumption, that is µnˆW |ω,t,r < µnˆW |ω′,t,r.
Then
∑
n>nˆ µn|ω,t ≥
∑
n>nˆ µn|ω′,t if side payments and the in-
terest rate remained constant. Note that equality only holds if ω and
ω′ coincide for all i with the property |θ(i)| 6= 1, i.e. for all agents
in n > 1 firms. This means both supply and demand for n > nˆ
workers weakly decrease. Equating supply and demand using side
payments then gives measures µn|ω′,t′,r for which it must hold that∑n
n=nˆ+1 µn|ω′,t′,r ≤
∑n
n=nˆ+1 µn|ω,t,r and for nmax in particular that
µnmax |ω′,t′,r < µnmax |ω,t,r. However, it holds that ωU |ω,t ≤ ωU |ω′,t.
Moreover, t 6= t′ so that capital market clearing as defined in (3.5)
may be violated. That is the interest rate may have to adjust.
Given that this is only a second order effect decreasing one mar-
ket side, it must hold that indeed
∑
n>nˆ µn|ω,t,r ≥
∑
n>nˆ µn|ω′,t′,r′
and µnmax |ω,t,r ≥ µnmax |ω′,t′,r′ which asserts the statement in the
proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Let us first look at a stochastic decrease inducing a uniform scarcity
of workers given old side payments t and the old interest rate r. We
denote measures after the decrease given t and r by primes. That is,
µMn − nµWn = µM ′n − n′µW ′n for t, ω′, r.
1We follow the convention of writing µMn |t,ω to indicate the measure of indi-
viduals weakly preferring to be owners of n firms given side payments t and the
endowment distribution ω(i).
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Then t′(n) < t(n) for all n because workers are scarce. Moreover,
ωU ≤ ω′U and capital market clearing requires r′ > r. The cutoff
endowment level to prefer owning an n > 1 firm to owning an n′ > n
firm is given by
wM (n, n′) =
piM (n)−piM (n′)
(1+r′)(γ−1) −
1
γ−1 [γ(t(n
′)−(n′−n)c)−t(n)]
+(n+1)c,
if t(n) > t(n′)− (n′ − n)c. For the opposite case the following holds.
wM (n, n′) =
piM (n′)−piM (n)
(1+r′)(γ−1) −
1
γ−1 [γt(n)−t(n
′)+(n′−n)c]
+(n′+1)c.
For workers the cutoff endowment level to prefer an n > 1 firm to an
n′ > n firm is given by
wW (n, n′) =
piW (n′)− piW (n)
(1 + r′)(γ − 1) +
γ
γ − 1
t(n)
n
− 1
γ − 1
t(n′)
n′
for t(n
′)
n′ < ω <
t(n)
n . Therefore side payments cannot decrease
uniformly, i.e. t(n) − t′(n) 6= t(n′) − t′(n′) for some n 6= n′ >
1. Suppose the contrary. Then clearly for both owners and work-
ers, k = W,M , wk(n, n′) < w′k(n, n
′) and w′k(n, n
′) − wk(n, n′) =
w′k(n, n
′′) − wk(n, n′′) for all 1 < n < n′ < n′′. This means cutoff
values increase linearly in transfers. This in turn implies that mea-
sures of owners do not decrease uniformly but those of firm sizes with
higher wM (., n), i.e. the larger firms, decrease slower. Measures of
workers increase faster for firms with high per worker side payments,
i.e. small firms. This means t(n) − t′(n) < t(n′) − t′(n′) for n < n′
and relative side payments in small firms increase relative to those of
large firms.
A similar argument applies to the case where a change in the
endowment distribution leads to uniform scarcity of owners. It is
straightforward that all side payments have to increase in this case.
Proceeding analogously to the above reasoning it can be shown that
then relative side payments of small firms decrease relative to those
of large firms. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
The support of the firm size distribution is given by {n : µn > 0}.
Let the greatest firm size in the economy be denoted by n. If there
exist large firms in equilibrium it must hold that
nmax = max
n≤n∗(r∗)
{n : µnW > 0 ∧ µnM > 0}.
To develop a necessary condition for a firm of size n > 1 to emerge in
an equilibrium, note first that workers in and owners of equilibrium
n > 1 firms must prefer this to being members of symmetric n′ = 1
firms, i.e.
ωM (n, 1) =
pi1 − piM (n)
(1 + r)(γ − 1) + c+
γ
γ − 1 [nc− t(n)] and
ωW (n, 1) =
piW (n)− pi1
(1 + r)(γ − 1) +
γ
γ − 1c−
1
γ − 1
t(n)
n
.
To have an n firm in equilibrium it must necessarily hold that
ω > ωnM > ωnW > ωU .
Collecting terms yields
ω >
γn(pi1 − piW (n))− (piM (n)− pi1)
(1 + r)(γ − 1) + γnωU − (γn− 1)c. (B.17)
This inequality weakens in the spread between ω and ωU and in the
interest rate. ωU is strictly increasing in ω and the endowment gap
c − w. The interest rate in turn increases in ωU . If endowments
are abundant, then ωU = ω and r = 0, and the necessary condition
reduces to a sufficiently large spread between ω and ω. Of course,
conditions analogous to condition B.17 have to hold for each n′ 6= n
and n > 1. Note that the necessary conditions give implicitly an
upper bound on the largest firm size in equilibrium, nmax. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Monotonicity of incomes in endowments follows from a revealed pref-
erences argument. Suppose agent j chooses in equilibrium to be
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worker, i.e. θ(j) = ∅ in an n firm this giving rise to an upfront
payment of t(n). Suppose further that agent i chooses optimally
some other combination of firm size and ownership rights, (n′, θ′(i))
leading to upfront payments greater than t(n). Formally,
vi(n, θ, .) < vi(n′, θ′, .) and
vj(n, θ, .) > vj(n′, θ′, .). (B.18)
Because of the credit market imperfection it must hold that
vi(n, θ, .) > vj(n, θ, .),
i.e. agent i would derive greater income from agent j’s choice than
agent j. On the other hand, because of the asymmetry in investment
cost, by Lemma 3.1 inequalities (B.18) can only hold if
ω(j) < ω(i).
This argument holds for any j and any combination of firm size and
ownership rights, although weak inequalities apply for comparisons
between agents with equal asset ownership admitting for the case
r = 0.
Now we turn our attention to income and endowment gaps for
agents matched into n firms. Let j denote the poorest agent in the
economy with endowments ω(j) > 0 who is worker in an n firm.
Agent j’s income is then given by
vj(n, θ, .) = piW (n) + (1 + r)γ(ω(j)− t(n)),
assuming t(n) > ω(j). Let i be the richest agent with endowments
ω(i) who is owner of firm n. Agent i’s income is given by
vi(n, θ, .) = piM (n) + (1 + r)γ(ω(i) + nt(n)− (n+ 1)c),
assuming ω(i) < (n+ 1)c− nt(n). The ratio of incomes is then
vi(n, θ, .)
vj(n, θ, .)
=
(1+r)γω(i)+piM (n)−(1+r)γ((n+1)c−nt(n))
(1+r)γω(j)+piW (n)−(1+r)γt(n) . (B.19)
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Note at this point that whenever the poorest agent with endowment
ω > 0 were to remain unmatched in equilibrium, the income spread
between this agent and any firm member l must exceed the endow-
ment spread regardless of whether the firm member borrows or lends
because the payoff of the firm member’s equilibrium choice exceeds
(1 + r)ω(l) for almost all l. A necessary and sufficient condition for
vi(n, θ, .)
vj(n, θ, .)
<
ω(i)
ω(j)
is therefore
piM (n)− (1 + r)γ[(n+ 1)c− nt(n)]
piW (n)− (1 + r)γt(n) <
ω(i)
ω(j)
(B.20)
This immediately implies that for sufficiently low side payments such
that piM (n) < (1 + r)γ[(n + 1)c − nt(n)], the above inequality holds
trivially. We know that j prefers to be worker, so that
piM (n)+(1+r)γ[ω(j)−(n+1)c+nt(n)]<piW (n)+(1+r)γ(ω(j)−t(n)),
which immediately implies (B.20). This argument extends to the case
where i lends and j borrows. If j lends and i borrows we can use the
last inequality on an appropriately modified (B.19) yielding
vi(.)
vj(.)
<
(1 + r)γω(i) + piM − (1 + r)γ((n+ 1)c− nt(n))
(1 + r)γω(j) + piM − (1 + r)γ((n+ 1)c− nt(n)) <
ω(i)
ω(j)
for piM (n) > (1 + r)γ[(n+ 1)c− nt(n)]. 
Proof of Proposition 3.7
For the model economy to have a bimodal equilibrium firm size dis-
tribution the formal requirement is that
µi > µj > 0 and µl > µj with l > j > i > 1. (B.21)
This implies
µiW > µj and µiM > µj
µlW > µj and µlM > µj
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Measures µnM and µnW are determined by cutoff endowments ωnW ,
ωnW and ωnM , ωnM as defined in Lemma 3.1. This means there must
be sufficient mass of the endowment distribution within [ωiW , ωiW ]
and [ωiM , ωiM ] compared to [ωjW , ωjW ] and [ωjM , ωjM ]. This means
the intervals for i firms must be large or the endowment distribution
must have sufficient mass around the mean due to negative assortative
matching.
For l firms the intervals [ωlW , ωlW ] and [ωlM , ωlM ] have to be
sufficiently large compared to those for j firms as the density function
is assumed to strictly decrease to the right of its mode. This means l
firms have to be more attractive for both owners and workers. This
means either |K − l| < |K − j|, in which case |K − i| > |K − j|
and i firms are strictly less efficient than j firms, or side payments
in l firms must be sufficiently high compared to smaller firms. This
means that owners of l firms have to be sufficiently scarce compared
to smaller firm sizes. Sufficient relative scarcity of owners in l can
only be induced by an endowment distribution that is sufficiently
skewed in the sense that the left tail of the endowment distribution
contains sufficient mass.
In the following we provide explicit conditions on cutoff values
necessary for µj < µl to hold from which our argumentation can be
deduced. Assume first side payments t(l) and t(j) such that either
all workers have to borrow or both side payments are negative. Then
the necessary condition is
µ(ωlM ≤ ω(i) ≤ ωlM ) > µ(ωjM ≤ ω(i) ≤ ωjM ).
This inequality only holds if
(ωlM − ωlM )− (ωjM − ωjM ) (B.22)
is sufficiently great. This condition weakens considerably if ωjM >
ωlM , as the density decreases to the right of the peak. This only
happens if workers have to borrow to pay side payments in both firms,
as can be seen by noticing that workers must be indifferent between
firm sizes, and owning n firms must involve less investment than
owning n′ firms. Hence, high side payments and sufficient scarcity
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of owners for zero side payments facilitates the emergence of large
firms. Sufficient scarcity of owners implies sufficient skewness of the
endowment distribution.
Assume now side payments are negative. Then the difference
(B.22) increases in t(l) by the proof of Proposition 3.4. Therefore
(B.21) implies that side payments in l firms have to be relatively
high in comparison to those in j firms net of the different levels of
profit piM (.).
Finally, assume that at least some agents have to borrow to afford
t(j)
j , whereas
t(l)
l ≤ ω. Hence, the cutoff endowment for preferring to
work in an l firm is
ωW =
piW (l)− piW (j)
(1 + r)(γ − 1) +
1
γ − 1
[
γ
t(j)
j
− t(l)
l
]
.
Then (B.21) implies that µ(i : ω ≤ ωW ) has to be sufficiently large.
Noting that ωW > ω ≥ 0 and solving for t(l) we obtain
t(l) < γ
l
j
t(j)− l piW (l)− piW (j)
1 + r
. (B.23)
We show now that this is consistent with µlM > 0 as the cutoff
endowment for owners between l and j firms is for (j + 1)c− t(j) <
(l + 1)c− t(l) given by
ωM =
piM (j)− piM (l)
(1 + r)(γ−1) +(j+1)c+
γ
γ − 1 [(l−j)c− t(l)]+
t(j)
γ−1 .(B.24)
To have l owners it must hold that ωM < (l + 1)c− t(l). Combining
this with (B.23) yields a condition for the existence of both agents
preferring to own l firms and agents preferring to work in l firms,
that depends on t(j) and the efficiency of l versus j firms
t(j) >
j
γl − j
Π(j)−Π(l) + 2lpiW (l)− (l + j)piW (j)
1 + r
+
j(l − j)
γl − j c.
Note that this condition is required to be sufficiently slack in order
to permit a sufficiently large measure of l firms compared to j firms.
This means both the general level of side payments and relative ef-
ficiency of l firms compared to j firms is required to be sufficiently
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great. High side payments imply sufficient skewness of the endow-
ment distribution. This concludes the example. 
B.2 Numerical Examples
Numerical Example for Section 3.5.3
In this subsection we provide the numerical example that generates
figure 3.4. Renegotiation is assumed to be intra-firm bargaining
(Stole and Zwiebel, 1996) and the payoffs are taken from Gall (2004).
In equilibrium, measure consistency requires that measures of owners
equate proportional measures of workers and, given transfers, there
exists no blocking coalition. We restrict our attention to transfers
where ti = t(n) for an owner of an N firm, tj = − t(n)n for a worker in
an N firm, and t(K) = 0 for all i ∈ I for K firm members. A worker
i has no blocking coalition if for all n′ 6= n
piW (n)+(1+r)(ω(i)− t(n)
n
) ≥ piW (n′)+(1+r)(ω(i)− t(n
′)
n′
) and
piW (n)+(1+r)(ω(i)− t(n)
n
≥ pi1+(1+r)ω(i) and
piW (n)+(1+r)(ω(i)− t(n)
n
≥ (1+r)ω(i). (B.25)
For negative values of wealth net of side payments, the interest rate
is given by i = (1 + r)γ. For owners j it must hold that
piM (n)+(1+r)(ω(j)+t(n)−(n+1)c) ≥ piM (n′)+(1+r)(ω(j)+
t(n′)−(n′+1)c) ∀ n′ 6= n
and
piM (n)+(1+r)(ω(j)+t(n)−(n+ 1)c) ≥ pi1+(1+r)ω(j).(B.26)
Again this expression is for positive net wealth and has to be modified
accordingly if j has to borrow. The set of conditions (B.25) and
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(B.26) combined with labor and credit market clearing, (3.9) and
(3.5), provide necessary conditions that we exploit to find equilibrium
side payment schemes and interest rate by means of simulation.
The algorithm takes as inputs side payments in n = 2 firms and an
interest rate guess. Then all other side payments are calculated as to
make the poorest agent indifferent between working in any n > 1 firm.
We proceed by clearing the labor markets associated to each firm size
sequentially, starting with the one with lowest side payments, i.e. the
largest firm size. A market n is cleared by varying side payments in all
n′ < n markets such that workers in those markets remain indifferent
until market n clears. Thereby NAM in equilibrium (as under part
(i) of Proposition 3.2) can be exploited as clearing market n does not
affect markets n′ > n2. Special attention is required by the algorithm
to the fact that excess demand for labor for a given firm size may be
set valued as agents may be indifferent between two firm sizes. In
this case the measure of indifferent agents has to be assigned to both
markets associated to the firm sizes such that the market where side
payments are lower possibly clears.
This procedure yields market clearing side payments for all but
the smallest firm size and thus an aggregate excess demand for labor
for any value of n = 2 side payments. Repeating this step and vary-
ing n = 2 side payments appropriately approximates the matching
equilibrium given an interest rate. For the credit market to clear this
procedure has to be repeated varying the interest rate appropriately
until all conditions in (3.9) and (3.5) are satisfied.
The parameters of the simulation of a drop of capital on the econ-
omy are as follows. The endowment density function φ(x) is param-
eterized as
φ(x) =
1
G
[
1
2
x(gxg−l exp(−gx) + (1− 1
2
x))(βλβxβ−1 exp(−(λx)β))
]
2This is the reason why admitting partial ownership generates certain difficul-
ties for numerical simulation. Typically, clearing markets sequentially causes cir-
cles as owners of asset II tend to sit in the middle of the endowment distribution.
This leaves a nonlinear system of equations in excess demand correspondences
which can be quite tedious to solve.
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where G is defined such that
∫ ω
ω
f(x) = 1 given all other parameters.
The increase in endowments corresponds to a change in parameters
as reported in Table B.1.
The production function depending on the number of workers in
a firm, n, is assumed to be
f(n) = (hnh)0.68−0.06
√
|n−K|
.
with h = 0.90 and K = 3. Cost of an asset is c = 0.1500 and the
degree of credit market imperfection is γ = 3.00. Then we obtain the
results in Table B.1.
before after Results before after
c 0.1500 0.1500 mean endowment 0.1479 0.1498
γ 3.0000 3.0000 r 0.1900 0.1715
ω 0.0000 0.0125 n = 1 firms 0.0826 0.0701
ω 1.0000 1.0125 n = 2 firms 0.0673 0.0618
β 1.9000 1.3000 K = 3 firms 0.0546 0.0439
λ 10.4500 13.0000 n = 4 firms 0.0284 0.0271
g 2.9000 2.2000 n = 5 firms 0.0432 0.0603
l 3.6000 2.5000 mean output 0.4216 0.4204
Table B.1: Simulation Details for Figure 3.4
Numerical Example for Section 3.6
In order to provide some evidence of robustness of our findings to
Assumption 3.2, we conduct a numerical example that generates fig-
ure 3.5. Renegotiation is again assumed to be intra-firm bargaining
(Stole and Zwiebel, 1996) and the payoffs are taken from Gall (2004).
However, we replace Assumption 3.2 by the following assumption on
technology
Assumption A B.1 Let f(An, hn) = 0 for n > 3 and K = 2.
Moreover, f(A3,h3)4 <
f(A1,h1)
2 . Joint ownership is not feasible.
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Thus we can limit our attention to n < 4 productive coalition yet
admitting for all ownership constellations except for joint ownership.
Table B.2 lists the possible combinations of ownership rights:
Coalition Size n Ownership Rights Identifier
1 ({AI}, {AII}) A
2 ({AI , AII , AII}) B
2 ({AI}, {AII , AII}) C
3 ({AI , AII , AII , AII}) D
3 ({AI}, {AII , AII , AII}) E
3 ({AI , AII}, {AII , AII}) F
Table B.2: Ownership Structures
Coalitions of type F will not emerge in equilibrium as they are
dominated by type A coalitions under our assumptions. To see this
let side payments in an F coalition be denoted by tW (F ) for the
workers’ payments and tO(F ) for the payments of the owner of two
assets AII , henceforth denoted by O. Note first that in order to have
both workers and managers in F coalitions, the following condition
on side payments, derived analogously to Proposition 3.2, has to hold:
2c− piM (F )− piW (F )
1 + r
− 3
2
tW (F ) ≤ tO(F )
⇔ tO(F ) ≤ 2c− piM (F )− piW (F )(1 + r)γ −
3
2
tW (F ). (B.27)
To have both workers and owners of two assets AII the following is
required to hold
tW (F )
2
− 2c+ piO(F )
(1 + r)γ
≤ tO(F ) ≤ tW (F )2 − 2c+
piO(F )
1 + r
. (B.28)
Combining (B.27) and (B.28), a necessary condition for workers,
managers, and owners to emerge in equilibrium is given by:
c−
Π(F )
4 − piW (F )
1 + r
≤ tW (F )
2
≤ c−
Π(F )
4 − piW (F )
(1 + r)γ
. (B.29)
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Finally, we must have that in equilibrium some agents prefer to be
workers in F coalitions to being members of n = 1 coalitions. This
implies
tW (F )
2
≤ c− pi2 − piW (F )
1 + r
.
Plugging this into (B.29) and some algebra yield a simple necessary
condition for emergence of type F coalitions:
Π(A)
2
= pi2 ≤ Π(F )4 .
This condition is violated by Assumption B.1. Hence we do not need
to consider F coalitions in equilibrium.
Moreover, it can be shown that investments for managers and
owners in coalition types C and E must be identical, as their payoffs
in the renegotiation game are identical as well. This leaves us with a
vector of just four side payments (tW (B), tW (C), tW (D), tW (E)) that
need to support the labor market equilibrium. This allows us to use
the above simulation approach.
We use the same endowment distribution as in the case above.
The production function depending on the number of workers in a
firm, n, is assumed to be
f(n) = (hnh)0.6 .
with h = 1.25 implying K = 2. Cost of an asset is c = 0.3000 and
the degree of credit market imperfection is γ = 3.00. The results are
reported in Table B.3.
Identifier A B C D E unempl.
Measure 0.0135 0.0328 0.0139 0.0580 0.0000 0.6009
Table B.3: Simulation Results for Figure 3.5
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Appendix C
Mathematical Appendix to
Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 4.2
As a first step, the following lemma translates the GID condition into
our notation.
Lemma C.1 φ(.) has GID if g(.) has (weakly) increasing differences
and for all a, b ∈ A and c, b ∈ B with xa > xb and xc > xd if and
only if all of the following conditions hold:
(i) for v > g(xa, xd):
g(xa, xc)− g(xb, xc) ≥ δb(g(xb, xc)− g(xb, xd)
+δ−1b (v − g(xb, xd), d), c)
−δa(g(xa, xc)− g(xa, xd)
+δ−1a (v − g(xa, xd), d), c).
(ii) for g(xb, xd) < v < g(xa, xd):
g(xa, xc)− g(xb, xc) ≥ max{−δa(g(xa, xc)− φ¯, c),
δ−1c (φ¯− g(xa, xc), a)}
+δb(g(xb, xc)− g(xb, xd) +
δ−1b (v − g(xb, xd), d), c).
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where φ¯ = g(xa, xd) + δd(g(xa, xd)− v, a).
(iii) for v < g(xb, xd):
g(xa, xc)− g(xb, xc) ≥ max{−δa(g(xa, xc)− φ¯, c),
δ−1c (φ¯− g(xa, xc), a)}
−max{−δb(g(xb, xc)− φ¯, c),
δ−1c (φ¯− g(xb, xc), b)}
where φ¯ = g(xb, xd) + δd(g(xb, xd)− v, b).
Proof of Lemma: Let v > g(xa, xd) and apply (4.11) to the definition
of GID. Then GID is equivalent to
g(xa, xc) + δa(g(xa, xc)− g(xa, xd) + δ−1a (v − g(xa, xd), d), c)
≥ g(xb, xc) + δb(g(xb, xc)− g(xb, xd) + δ−1b (v − g(xb, xd), d), c).
Rearranging yields statement (i) in the lemma. Now choose v ∈
[g(xb, xd), g(xa, xd)]. GID holds if and only if
g(xa, xc) + δa(g(xa, xc)− g(xa, xd)− δd(g(xa, xd), a)− v, c)
≥ g(xb, xc) + δb(g(xb, xc)− g(xb, xd) + δ−1b (v − g(xb, xd), d), c),
provided g(xa, xc)− g(xa, xd) < δd(g(xa, xd)− v, d). Note that from
g(xb, xd) < v < g(xa, xd) it cannot be concluded whether this is true.
Otherwise the equivalent condition is given by
g(xa, xc)− δ−1c (g(xa, xd)− g(xa, xc) + δd(g(xa, xd)− v, a), a)
≥ g(xb, xc) + δb(g(xb, xc)− g(xb, xd) + δ−1b (v − g(xb, xd), d), c).
Rearranging all these conditions gives statement (ii) in the lemma.
Finally, if v < g(xb, xd), there are four cases depending on whether
g(xa, xd) + δd(g(xa, xd)− v, a) > g(xa, xc) and/or
g(xb, xd) + δd(g(xb, xd)− v, b) > g(xb, xc).
Let
g(xa, xd) + δd(g(xa, xd)− v, a) < g(xa, xc) and
g(xb, xd) + δd(g(xb, xd)− v, b) > g(xb, xc).
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Then
−δa(g(xa, xc)− g(xa, xd)− δd(g(xa, xd)− v, a), c)
−δ−1c (g(xb, xd) + δd(g(xb, xd)− v, b)− g(xb, xc), b) < 0.
But g(xa, xc) > g(xb, xc) and therefore in this case GID always holds.
The other three cases are ambiguous and must be included in the
lemma. 
PAM is clearly efficient if g(xa, xb) has (weakly) increasing dif-
ferences as the TU matching equilibrium coincides with solution to
social planner’s problem and exhibits PAM. A sufficient condition for
PAM in equilibrium is GID of φ(.) as in Legros and Newman (2004a).
By inspection of the conditions in Lemma C.1 it can be checked by
simple calculation, using the respective condition on v in some cases,
that all hold given the assumption on δi. As an example we look at
the case (ii) of Lemma C.1. Let v be such that the decisive condition
is given by
g(xa, xc)− g(xb, xc) ≥ δ−1c (g(xa, xd) + δd(g(xa, xd)− v, a)
−g(xa, xc), a) + δb(g(xb, xc)− g(xb, xd)
+δ−1b (v − g(xb, xd), d), c).
By monotonicity of δi we know that the right hand side is smaller
than
δ−1c (δd(g(xa, xd)− v, a), a) + δb(δ−1b (v − g(xb, xd), d), c).
Using the assumption δc(u, i) > δd(u, i) for all u ∈ R and i ∈ A this
in turn must be less than or equal to
g(xa, xd)− g(xb, xd) < g(xa, xc)− g(xb, xc).
This last inequality follows from the ID property of g(.). Lemma C.1
gives a sufficient condition for GID of φ(.) when g(.) has WID and
this verifies the proposition. 
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Proof of Lemma 4.1
First note that ua can be expressed in terms of ub as follows.
ua = ub + k(xb)− k(xa).
However, xa depends on ub by the relation
ub + k(xb) = g(xa, xb). (C.1)
Let xb > 0, then g(xa, .) is continuous and monotone. Hence, g(xa, .)
is a one-to-one mapping of the form g : X 7→ Y where
Y = [g(inf
X
xa, xb), g(sup
X
xa, xb)].
It is a well-known fact that then its inverse g−1 : Y 7→ X exists
and is a continuous function. Furthermore we know that under this
condition g−1 is differentiable at all x ∈ X, g′(x) 6= 0 which must
hold due to the Inada conditions. Its derivative is then given by
∂g−1(x)
∂x
=
1
∂g(xa,xb)
∂xa
.
This implies the first part of the lemma as
∂ua(ub)
∂ub
= 1− ∂k(g
−1(ub + k(xb)))
∂g−1(ub + k(xb)))
∂g−1(ub + k(xb))
∂ub
= 1− ∂k(xa)
∂xa
(
∂g(xa, xb)
∂xa
)−1
, (C.2)
where we used the identity g−1(ub+k(xb)) = xa. Moreover, ua(ub) is
clearly continuously differentiable. Differentiating (C.2) with respect
to ub and exploiting convexity of k(.) as well as differentiating (C.1)
yields
∂2ua
∂u2b
−
g′(xa, xb)
∂2k(xa)
∂x2a
∂xa
∂ub
− k′(xa)∂
2g(xa,xb)
∂x2a
∂xa
∂ub
(g′(xa, xb))2
< 0.
This establishes the second part of the lemma. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.4
Assume some agent a ∈ A rationally expects to be matched with
agent b ∈ B with attribute x¯b in equilibrium. Assume further agent b
needs to be given at least utility u¯b to accept agent a. By Definition
3, δi, i = a, b, is piecewise differentiable with δ′i(u, j) ≤ 1 whenever it
is differentiable. Define u∗b implicitly by
∂ua(u∗b)
∂ub
= −1. (C.3)
By concavity of ua(ub) from Lemma 4.1, u∗b is a singleton, suppose
umax ≥ u¯b > u∗b where umax is defined by 0 = ua(umax). If xa is cho-
sen efficiently, generating utility ua(u∗b) for a at zero side payments,
and b is given utility u¯b, agent a’s utility is given by
ua(u∗b)− δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b , b).
If xa is not chosen efficiently, generating utility ua(u′b) at zero side
payments with u′b > u
∗
b and giving b utility u¯b, then agent a’s utility
is given by
ua(u′b)− δ−1a (u¯b − u′b, b) for u¯b ≥ u′b,
ua(u′b) + δb(u
′
b − u¯b, a) for u¯b < u′b.
Agent a optimally chooses xa efficiently if and only if
ua(u∗b)− ua(u′b) ≥ δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b , b)− δ−1a (u¯b − u′b, b),
ua(u∗b)− ua(u′b) ≥ δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b , b) + δb(u′b − u¯b, a) resp.,(C.4)
for all u∗b < u
′ ≤ umax. Define ∆ub = u′b − u∗b and rewrite (C.4) to
get this necessary condition
ua(u∗b)− ua(u∗b +∆ub)
∆ub
≥ δ
−1
a (u¯b − u∗b , b)− δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b −∆ub, b)
∆ub
for all 0 < ∆ub < umax−u∗b . As the proof focuses on ∆ub sufficiently
small to derive a contradiction the case u′ > u¯b is omitted. Note that
by Lemma 4.1
lim
∆ub→0
ua(u∗b)− ua(u∗b +∆ub)
∆ub
= 1.
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This and concavity of ua(ub) imply that there exists ∆ub sufficiently
small such that for  > 0
ua(u∗b)− ua(u∗b +∆ub)
∆ub
= 1 + .
By Definition of Dk, k = A,B, δ has weakly decreasing differences so
that
δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b , b)− δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b −∆ub, b)
∆ub
≥ 1.
If δ−1a (u¯b− u∗b , b)− δ−1a (u¯b− u∗b −∆ub, b) > ∆ub we can approximate
the expression using the first derivative of δa at a point uˆ ≤ u¯b − u∗b
where δa is differentiable:
δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b , b)− δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b −∆ub, b)
∆ub
≥ ∂δ
−1
a (uˆ)
∂u
Choose now
0 <  <
∂δ−1a (uˆ)
∂u
− 1.
This yields a contradiction to (C.4). Conversely, for δ−1a (u¯b−u∗b , b)−
δ−1a (u¯b − u∗b − ∆ub, b) = ∆ub with ∆ub sufficiently large, inequality
(C.4) always holds for both u′b > u¯b and u
′
b ≤ u¯b. The case 0 ≤ ub <
u∗b can be treated simultaneously although δb does not need not to
be inverted and the inequality signs need to be reversed. 
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